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TORTS P. 46. 
Held: P cannot recover. The violation of an ordinance constitutes actionable 
negligence only· when it injures someone of the class to be protected by the 
ordinance's enactment. This city ordinance was not enacted for the benefit of P, 
nor for school children in general. It was rather enacted so that the public might 
know where one alights from or boards buses. The fact that there was no sign did 
not have any direct relationship to the driver's care and so is not actionable 
negligence. Nor was the driver bound to keep P on the bus since t~o passenger on a 
common carrier may alight at any stop which he desires, be he inf&.i"!'~ or adult. 
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' lOOo' Revised August, 1953 
.r~/ .~ f erns False Imprisonment 
r f¥''> . c,;l'·* . The elements of the tort of false imprisonment are: (1 ) an unprivileged :i,mpr:i. §O:-l--
,c f r•'> .1 ;_nt actual 0 2: ca.ns.t.z:uc_tiJr.e; (2) defendant must have ~u_tended t h e imprisonment, a.e1d 
f"i) (3) _£laintiff must have knowu. he was .imprisQned. 
It is false imprisonment to . force someone to leave by the back way when he is ~d L· . 
ling to leave voluntarily by the customary :front way. 153 Va. 348, 149 S.E. h53. 
TOm'S False Imprisonment 182 Va. 605 
P went to Norfolk to visit her brother who was in the service. She and her brothe t 
inadvertently entered a place cf not very good r eputation. D, a police officer, aske 
he r if t he man she was with was her husband. She said, 11 No." Then D told her she 
wo uld have to leave to1.rn. She replied that she was not going to l eave town, that s110 
came a long way to see her brother, and gave the officer r eferences in her own town. 
D then said she was under arrest, and she asked him why, and D sarcastically replied , 
"Oh, you wouJ.dn't understand." 
Held: Arrest not privileged. P was corru1 itting no crime in the presence of the of-
fic er. • He deliberately refused to investigate when P offer ed evidence to clear her-· 
s elf of suspicion. The trial court committed error VJhen tt r educed the damages from 
$1,000 to $400. The court took judicial notice that ther e wer E:) thousands of wives , 
sisters, and sweethearts visiting the boys in camp, and that the very gr eat ma jority 
of them wer e moral and l aw-abiding. 
TORTS False Impris onr.1ent 199 F. (2d) 720, 723-724 
,Circuit Judge Soper stat es t hat ther e i s ·?- ruh~ of l CJ.w in eff ect if.! Virginia and 
els ewher e that if an owner, acting in t he ex ercis e of his right to protect his prop-
erty, ha s r easonable grounds to believe that another is stealing it, he is justif i ed 
i n det a ining the suspect .in a r Gasonablo manner and for a r easonable time for inves-
t i gation . It wa s r eversible er r or f or t he Ijistrict Court to r efuse to give s uch an 
instruction. 
TORTS False . Imprisonment Evidenc q 188 Va . 485 
A, wl10 wa s D' s manag <::;r, saw P stoal an it rcm i n D' s s tore worth 75¢. P stated that 
he did not s teal it but purchased it earlier in t he day. A called the police who a t 
A's direction searched P. and found trw ar t icle . Latt:r a war rant wa s sworn out. P 
was tried for petty l a rc eny and acr:tuitt ed • . P i s now suing D fo r f alse imprisonment. 
Q.l. Was the arr es t privileg ed? Held: No, as th~:) offic ;~ r had no warrant and the 
misdemeanor was not committ8d in his pr osenc .) . 
Q.2. P expr e s sly sued for compensa.t or y damages only. Ma:r D introduc e evidenc e tha t 
A saw P s t eal t he artic l r:! :' Eeld: li~~wver.s no 1 Tlv:1t is immat erial since the arrest 
,.;as not privileged. Note 1: If P w0ru a sking f or punitive damages, such evidence 
would be admissible in mitigation of punitive damages. Note 2 : If this wer e a ma l i -
cious prosecution suit, such evidence would be admissibl8 to show probable cause . 
Q.). I f P had been convict .:;d of t he cri me, woul d evidenc e of such conviction be ad-
mis s ible? No . It \-TOuld b~ i rrel evant as t he conviction did not make t he arrest -
privileged . 
Q.h. I n t he ins t ant c as6 P was acquitted . Hay P introduc e that f act into evidenc E 
No , f or t h.:1t fact i s a l so i mm.:J. t eria l r:1s to tho e.mount o:' compensa tory damages and i s 
again confus ing malicious prosecuti on (wher e t he IJl ::lintiff mus t show a f avorabl e t e r -
mination) with f al se ':lrrcs t ::md f alse impr isonrovmt . 
. TORTS Co nver s i on 
~<-r'>•t- Where: a bank wr ongfully s ;:;lls s tock t hat has b0en pl edged with 
ure of damages ? And who i s .entitl od to divi dends dt::c l ar e;d aft er 
before pl edgo r ha s noti c e of tho co rN,3r sion? 
1 S .E. (2d) 292 
it , what i s the meaE 
t he conversion but 
11 Thc current r ul e i s t o ascertain t lt<; hi ghost m~lrlwt va lLte of s t ock unlawfully con-· 
vert ed by a pledgec- bctw_el: :.tb-G ·· t..e of.. conver s i on and a r easonabl e time aft er the 
owner has r eceived noti c ,; of _i t." Dividends G'lrncd ·tft er th\:l conver s ion bel ong to t h 
cor1V"8r t c r , -'lS when th .::: j udem·~nt i s sat isfied t ith: p?.s s ·.~s to t he co nvert er by :re la~iG . 
back a s of th '=! d ;;1t e of the convursion . 
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':\HI'S Conversion Property . 10 S.E. (2d) 551 
f bought some standing timber from D who later wold some of the same timber t o X, 
h~'l0 !'8upon P sued D for conversion. (1) Does such an action lie?- -H-eld: -:f.es., .sine -;, 
t l18 timber was constructively sevGred at time it was sold if to be removed at onc e c. 
,,::L thin a reasonable time . Note that realty cannot be converted. (2) What i~:; the 
m8'·t surb of damages'? (a ) The measure of damages is the value of the property at tho 
time J.nd place of conversion. (b) If there is no market at that place, then the val-
ue is to be determined by the marke:t price at the ne.irest market less the cost of 
getting it ther e . 
TORI'S Punitive Damages 184 S.E. 186 
Following a disput e , X, a man, chas ed Y, a boy, X being in his car and Y on his bi· 
cycle . X wilfully but not malj,ciollsly ran Y down and injured him. Is an instructior. 
en punitive damages proper? Held: Yes. "T c;~.lan dama es alic e 
n?ed not be "'hcym. Whenever the assault is of a wanton netture, manifesting a wilful. 
disregard of the rights of others, the party a ggrieved is entitled to exemplary dam " 
ages. ·The; absence of actua l malice does not defeat th.a right t o recover such darnag~::. 
Exemplary damages are also cc:tlled punitive damages or, vulgarly, 11 smart money •11 
TORTS . Consent 190 Va. 162 
X, a mature married woman, became pregnant and begged D, an abortionist, to perfo::."r, 
an illegal operati.:.:n. D complied, and X died as a result. X' s personal representa-
tive sued D f or $15,000 (the then maximum) under the dea th by wrongful act statute. 
Held: Judgment f o r D. To him who consents no lega l 1o1rong is done. The law will 
not a id a party who has flouted it. It is im.rn.::1t erial that under the Va. abortion 
statutes the woman is not an accomplic e . She ha s neverth8less actively urged the pel 
petration of a crime, and the l aw vJill not r eward her. If X could not recover had st 
lived·, her personal r epresentative c annot r ecover. Not e : This case was distinguishE 
from the type of case where a statute is pa ssed primarily f or the protection of a cer 
tain class of society (ns the statutory r a pe statutes) a.nd the injured person is a 
member of that class. 
TORTS Defense of Prc perty--RiE;ht t o Kill Dogs Attacking Chickens 181 Va. ?79 
Held that one is within his rights in kil ling dog s that are in the act of attackinr 
cfiickens, when ther o i s no •Jther rcason:=tf.>l e 11my t o prvtect the f owls. One doe s not 
have t o merely drivE: them away a nd give them another chance. F'G\-Jl-killing dogs are 
no bette r than sheep-killing do~s just because they pnfer chicken t o mutton or l amb. 
TORTS Legal Authority 180 .va. 222 
p owned a f arm 1-vith a fine spring on it. The Comrnor::vwalth of Virginia owned land 
nearby upon which it oper ::r.t ed a fish hatclll .. ry. It needed mor l"; ·1-1a t er f or the hatche r : 
s u it dug a ditch f or a pipe t u be l ai d t o a spring Gn Stat e l and. The ditch ran t c-
within 30 f eet of P 1 s s pring . It was limes tcmo c -:)untry J.nd noc" ssary t o blast. P 
begged the man in cha.rgo not t o blast, t elling him it might ruin his spring , and it 
did . P .sued D, .the ma n in charr;e , personally . 
Held: Since D wa s per fo rming a Stat l~ functi on in a prcper manner, he has the im-
munity (; f the St :1t e . IJ wa s t aking or d8rs from his supcrj_r:r, and not from outsiders. 
Not e : If D had net been authorized t o bletst, or had pers -:; nally us ed t oo gr eat a 
charg~ , the n he would haVG been per sonally lia blb, but i n th 13 above case the act uf 
the St at e anJ t hE: act of D wor e one and t h•::: s arnu a nd insepelr able . 
TORTS Legal Authurity 187 S.E. 481 
X, a police vffic er u..'1der the l m·!S of Vircini'l , cau[.ht Y in the act of stGaling $1 
worth of c ual from an int t;rstat o shi pment . By f eder a l l aw :my theft of gouds in in-
t erstat e com.rnerce is a f el ony . X att urnpt eJ. t o arr est Y. Y r an. X shct Y and seri-
ously injured him. Is X liable '? 
Held: No , neither civilly nor criminally if ther (:) was m: c)ther way t o prevcmt his 
esca pe (a jury question). X has a s much ri ~Sht as any individual t o eff ect Y' s arresi 
Quot i ng Hinor: 11Supposinc a f el ony t o have beG n com.rnitt od and the party who is t o b< 
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F.n 'ested t o be guilty of it, . private persons are indemnified f or killing, like off i ·· 
c e rs . But if there had been no f elony, or the person slain is innoc ent, how pr obab> 
so ever t he caus e of suspi cion, the slaye r is guilty of mans laughter at l east." Com-
pare 178 S .E. 8. Note : One is not privileged to kill on mer e suspicion of fc,lony 
where no fe l ony ha s actually occurred. (Petrie v. Cart>vright, 114 Ky. 103). Btr t. ii' 
an off~~ r easonably _believe s that a f elony has been committed a nd reasona bly be-
J.i ev es that X committed it, he ca n legally make an arrest a nd use any amount of forc e: 
nec essary short of killing or inflicting s erious bodily harm. 
Ry the better view a n officer is not privileged to kill to prevent the escape of a 
f elon unless the f elony is one of the more aggravat ed ones for which the penalty may 
be death. Thes e f elonies are rape, murder, robbery with a dangerous .weapon, kidnap-
ping , a rson, attempt ed rape , burgl a ry, and treason. 
TORTS Lega l Authority -- C.r imina l Law -- Arrest -- Self-Defens e 192 Va . 598 
D was a police officer of th8 town of Emporia . He saw X in a ca r a t 2 a.m. and by 
polic e. siren called upon him to stop . Ins t ead, X speeded up to 70 miles an hour, a nc· 
D followed. X' s ca r came t o a s t op 2 miles outs i de Emporia , a nd D pulled up a l ongsic 
it a nd t old X he was under arrr~st. X r esisted a rres t and finally broke away f rom t h, 
offic er. D called t o him t o ha l t . 'Nhen X reached f or hi s pocket, D shot and killed 
him. P1 1r1ho i s X' s per sona l r epr csent<'ltive , sued D. 1tJhat j ud§;111ent? 
Held: For P. This ar rest f or a misdemeanor was at t empt ed me r e tha n .a mile outsi dt 
the city limits a nd, as t he l aw was the n, w:ts illegal. X ~ns privileged t o r esis t ar 
illegal arrest. D had not des i s t ed from hi s illegal purpos e, and he had no right t o 
shoot X. 
Not e : By V#l9-73 p.::tssed i n 1950 a n of f ic t: r in actua l pursuit may arrest a fl eei ng 
misdemeanant in the adjoining cit;l or c ~J unty i n which it may be nec essar y t o go , or r 
fe l on a nywher e i n the; s t a t e , even though t;e has no v.rar rant.. Sinc e an offic er i s not 
justified t o shoot t o ki ll a fleeing rnis de:;meanant, even if he has authority t o arres·i 
him, the decision abov e would still be t he s ame . 
TORTS Legal Author ity -- Hust Polic e St op f e r Red Lights ? 194 Va . 418 
P su ed the D Bus Co . and c, a police officer. Tho l a tter went through a r ed light 
in a ca r eful manner blowing his s iren a nd f lashing his light s while answering an emer 
g~ncy call. The driver of t he bus negli~ently f a iled t o s ee or hear t he appr oaching 
police ca r and ente r ed the inters ection on the gr een light. The jur y f ound f or P 
against t he D Bus Co . a nd exoner a t ed C of a ll liability. On~y t h e Bus Co . appeal ed . 
Va. Code pr ovisions applicable a r e V#46-180 , 11It shall be unl aHful f or any person 
•••••• t o (vi ol a t e ) a ny of the pr vvisions of t his chapt er ." (Regulation of Tr a ffic); 
Vl/46-181 provi des that thi s chapt er shall apply t o t he dr i ver s of all v ehicles owned 
or oper a t ed by the State cr any city, t own or ot he r politica l subdivis i on of t hi s 
State , subj ect t v trw specif ic exc eptions set f or t h i n t hi s chapt er . The r e is no ex· 
pr ess r i ght gi ven t o such v ehicle s t v go t hrc·ugh r ed l i 1;hts . 
Hel d : C i s liabl'e also a s a mat t er of l aw. 'rhc verdi ct i n his f avor was s et a s i d. 
and final judgment wa s entered against bot h D a nd C, as wo.s done i n 3 S .E. (2d ) 419 
in the Plt:Jading portion of t he s e notus . In ba l anc ing conveniences i t may be better 
t o l et a crimina l escape or a fi r e t c gai n headvmy t han t o ,j eopa r dize t he l i ves of 
peopl e r el ying on gr een light s , as Has ·rlone in this very ca s e . " If th e polic e a r e t ' 
be permitted t o di s r q;ard r ed t r af fic light s , t hi s danger ous right must be gi v ei; by 
the l egi s l a t ure-:: and n,)t by this court ." · 
TORI'S Legnl Author ity-- Nunic i pa l Corpvr "1t i c-ns- - Constitut i onal Law 194 Va . 836 
The Elizabeth Rivt;r Turmel Dis tric t and Commi ssi vn was creat ed by t he St a t e Legi sl< 
turu and authoriz ed t o c unstruct a tunnel unde r t he River. D di d part of the wor k 
a nd , without negligenc e on his p~rt , JN~l.ged P ' s prcperty by r emoving part vf its sul 
j ac ent support. I s D liable? 
He l d : No. ''A contr::tct rJr or agent l avJfully ~cting un behal f of a pr i ncipa l t o whor 
the r ight "o f eminent doma in has bec.:n accor deJ , in making a pr opvs ed public impr ove-
ment, ca nnot be hf}l d personally liable f or d8lll;If8S if such impr ovement i s made wi t hoL 
I I 
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negligence on his part. 11 Otherwise, contractors 1-vould not wish to bid on such work. 
P' s r emedy, if he has one, is agains t the party for whom D did the work and who mi gl-:t 
;·~· e 1.-:.atl e under the law of eminent domain. 
TORTS Legal Authority -- Criminal Law -- Arrest V#l9-78.1 
By statute any police officer may, at the scene of any motor vehicle accident, or 
i n the apprehension of any person charged with the theft of any motor vehicle upon 
t he highways of the Commonwealth, upon reasonable grounds to believe , based upon per-
sonal investigation including information obtained from eye-witnesses, that a crime 
has been committed by any person then and there present, apprehend such person with-
out a warrant of arrest. 
TORTS Standard of care -- Sudden Emergency Rule 
When one is confronted by a sudden emergency not due t o his own fault and he acts 
r easonably under the circumstances, though, looking back; it can-bo-sGen that if he 
had done something els e it would havG bc;;eh better, he is not liable . 
TORI'S Standard of .Car e -- Sudden Emer gency 190 Va. 421 
Mrs. X was pushing ~ baby carriage while walking east on the paved portion of a 
hi ghway on her right. D was driving a truck on the right side of the highway going 
east, and he swerved t o his left in order t o pass Nr s . X. He did not s~asonably turn 
t o the right after passing her. P was drivi ng a truck in a westerly direction on the 
same highway, and, as the two vehicles apprcachGd at such a r at e of speed that the ga 
between them would be closed within three s econds, P had t he fo llowing options : (l) 
Turn t o his right onto a narrow shoulder, wher e he would pr obably run into a culvert 
and demolish his car, . (2) Put on his emer gency brakes and pr obably be run into head-
on, or (3) Turn t o hi s l eft sharply and go into an open fiel d . He turned t o lus l eft 
but, just as he did so, D r ealiz ed he w.".!s on the t..;rong side of the r oad and suddenly · 
turned t o his right, so th~t the cars collided head-on 1v.ith disastrous r esults. P 
sued D, and the jury f ound i~ P 1 s f avor. \'lfas this proper? 
Hel d : Yes. P is not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of l aw. He was 
confront ed with a sudden emergency f or whi ch he was not t o blame and is not negligent 
merely because , as events turned out, he di d the wrong thing. 
TORTS Standard of Care--Sudden Emer gency--Imputed Negligence 192 S.E. 800 
P, a young and attr~ctive widow (before t he accident) was r eturning to State Teach-
ers Colleg e aft er Christmas vacation in a Ford truck operated by X. The D Bus Com-
pany 's bus passed the truck, and X followed t h8 bus too closely. Wher e the road in 
question went over the N & ~v tracks t here was a narrow arched bridge . The bus was 
going at 45 miles an hour. Because of the arch t he driver of the bus did not see .m 
approachi~ car until it was almost upon him, and t he bus driver slammed on the air 
brakes, cauSing the bus to stop suddenly and Cous i ng X to collide therewith. P was 
injured. De s es: ' (l) Sudden emer gency and (2) i mputed negligence from joint e~ter 
prise, as X' s ughter and ot her student s were all goil1g t o State Teacher s College . 
Held: Where s dden emer gency i s due t o def Gndant' s own f~ultJ h.e cannot evoke the 
rule . Driver' s n ligence i s not i mput ed to passenger i n 2.bsence of right of pass en-
ger to control vehi l e . henc e judgment for P agai nst the D Bus Company. 
TORTS 
In the fol l owi ng case no r ecover y was allovmd, because defendant had usect. due car e 
for t he pl aintiff' s safet • 
TORTS St andar d of Car e 189 Va . 219 
p was struck by a whi sky bott.l c whil .::-: 1.Jatchi ng a ''Jr estlinfi cont es t in Norfolk. 
There were about 3, 000 spectators . It is not known who t hr ew the bottle or why it 
was thrown. Thirteen policemen and f ive ushers vJere on dl.lty t o keep otder. Drinking 
was not allowed on t he pr emises , and soft ~rinks wer 8 sold only i n paper cups . P 
sued t he promotor, D, and a jury f ound for P. 
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f-Ield: Reversed. The evidence fails to show that D has violated any duty owed to i· 
.Svct1 if he should have had more guards and had had them, the accident would not nec eE 
:·;a ~cily have been prevented. Hence D1 s violation (here not proved) of duty was not tL . 
.f-'roximat e cause of the injury. D is not an insurer of P' s sa f ety and cannot possibly 
· :~.~-,t .icipate ,jus t when and where some irresponsible party may do something he shouldn ' t. 
~ 'CHTS St andard of Care 182 Va . 77 
P was a little tot aged three years and very fond of soda pop. D >-.ras a tinner and 
was r epairing a roof. He had some commercia l hydrochloric acid in a Pepsi-Cola bottle 
on his truck. While D was on the roof' :working, P sa1.J the open bottle of "Pepsi-Ccla" 
and without further formality attempted to get outside of it. This suit is f or r t -
sulting injuries. 
Hdd: (two judges: dissenting) This was just an unfortunat e accident. D was not 
guilty o f any negligenc e . In spite of the fact that small children '\-Jere known t o be 
about, .he could not r easonably have anticipated that anything of this nature would oc-
cur. Note: Had he l eft the bottle on the gr ound, the r esult might well have been 
differt:nt. 
TORTS St anda rd of Care 187 Va . 677 
P h.J.d purchased a bus ticket. 'fher e was quite a crowd ar ound the bus platforms, and 
she did not notic e that these platforms wer e E:l evat ed five i nohos above street l evel. 
She f ell and was injured v.rhen she unexpectr;;dly stepped over the 5-inch curb. She c o r:~ 
t ended tha t the D Bus Co . was negligent in having th8 5-inch el ev-'9.tion and in not h.;n· .. 
ing chains t o pr event people from falling. 
Held: No neglig <:;nc '~ pr ov ed. Thes e " s-'lw t coth" typ<;S of platforms hav e been gener-
ally adopted, and ther e is no evidenc o what ever t o show tlv1t any other type of plat-
f orm would be safer. Chains a r (.; used i n Washingt·.m, D. C., but the object is t o fore ~ 
people into a single line , u.nd not f or Gaf cty. P must havo been entirely obliviou s 
of he r surroundings not t o notic e her general surroundings despit e the crowd, and is 
hence barred from a r ecovery on tha t gr ound 2-.l one . 
Note : 'lrJhile a corrunon carrier of pas::;enger s owes the highes t degr ee of practical 
care f or the protection of its pa ss e:ngor<; in the oper .'1tiun of its buses a nd cars, it 
was conceded in this case tha t cnly or dinar y car e i s 01:JCld in the c onstruction and 
maintenanc e of its s t ation f acilit i es. 
TORTS Standard of Care 191 Va. 685, 690 
What is the tes t of liability under the doctrine of entru.,tment? 
It i s whether the owner of a motor vehicle. knew or had reasonable cause t o know 
that he was entrusting it t o an unfit drive r likel y to cause injury t o others. In 
the case of intoxication there must be knowl edge t hat the driver's habits are such 
that he is likely to dri ve while he is intoxicated. Testimony merely tha t a certain 
person will take a drink any tirnt: hL; could get it is not su ff icient to show such 
knowledge . 11That dx:pr ession, frt;quontly heard, indicates n wi l l ingness r a ther th_?-n 
a practice , and is too vagu e t o convict him of being addicted t o the habit." "If onlJ 
t eets.>taler G could be employed, many v.:~hic los wou.ld probably stand idle . 11 
TORTS St andard of Care 191 Va. 758 
In an accident case: the court instruct ed the jury that th~ l aw pr ohibited driving 
an automobile in sucb a manner as not t o have the sam0 under complete control. 
Held: Error . 11 No human being ca n keep his automobil e in compl et e control while it 
is in moti on." The correct st-:md.ard is pr oper cvntrol -- not complet e control. 
TORTS St andard of Car e 192 Va. 776 
T owned a well that got out of or der . P cam8 ..,.Jith a 35- foot crane t o pull out the 
pipe in the well. D owned high t cnsi•,n uninsulo.ted wires 35 f e0t high and 6 f eet t o 
the side of the vmll. P wa s injured by electric current j umping from the wires t o 
the crane . He sued 'I' and D. 
Held f or defendant s . T·1e wir.::~s were as appar ,·,nt t o P as t u T. Ther e is no duty t o 
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,.;a:rn of obvious dangers. D owed no duty to insulate wires at such a height 1-vhere h ~· 
Lad no reason to s~ppose anyone would come into contact with them. Compare next c a1: ; 
T'O ftTS Standard of Care 194 Va. ~64 
P was electrocuted w.hen he was >-JOrking in an orchard, while carrying a 2h-foot al:.t-
lTJinum ladder in a ve:tt.ical position in moving it from one place to another, when th0 
ladder came ·in contact With high voltage uninsulated wires of the n· Power Co., which 
had a right of way over the ·orchard. · Some time prior thereto another employee had 
been injured in much the same 1'!ay, but D had made no change in the conditions. 
Points to note: (l) D r elied upon th~ "unbending testn rule and argued that evi-
dence of experts to the effeet that the power line was erected in accordance vJi th ap~ 
proved practices and at a height greater than that required by the National Electri-
cal Safety Code is,· in the absence of evidence to the contrary,_ conclusive as to the 
lack of negligence on its part. {2) But here there is evidence to the contrary a s 
follows: (a ) D knew of the prior accident; (b) D knew that ladders had to be used t c 
take ~roper care of orcnards and that trees were as high as, or higher than, the . 
vJires. (3) D 1 s negligence and P 1 s freedom from contributory negligence were jury 
questions. The jury could have found th.'.lt P slipped or stumbled on the wet ground, 
thereby causing the l adder to t ouch the vlirc accidentally. 
TORI'S Standard of Care Simple Tool Doctrine 193 Va. 506 
P, an experienced farm arnjJloyee, 1-vho had every opportunity his employer had to in-
spect the floor of. an ordinary wagon, was inj11red when his foot 1~ent through the flee 
boards t.rhile he was unloading fertilizer. 
Held for employer. "Where the tool is simple in construction, so that defects 
therein can be discovered without special skill or knov.rledge and without intricate il. 
spection, the employee is as v:ell qualified as a nyone els e to detect the defects and 
to ju'dge of ~he probable danger of using tl-}e devic t:: VJhile defective; and where the 
tool is in the possession of tho employee, his opportunity is better than that of thF 
employer. 11 Hence ther e is no evidence of the employer's having failed to use ordinar 
care. But the simple tool doctrine does not apply where there ar e technical latent 
danger- as where a hammer· has b8en tempered in such a •my as to make it brittle and 
employer, without lvarning empl::Jye ;~ , ;_1. 3ks him to strike that hammer with another one 
. and employee is injured by fiying steel. 7 S.E. (2d) 883. 
TORTS Standard of Care 191 S.E. 615 
Is the driver of ~n automobile neglig~ut a s a matter of law if he operates his car 
at night at such a r at e of speed thilt he cannct stop uithin the range of its lights? 
No. He is justifi8d in assuming that ther e· will he no unlight 8d obstruction in th( 
r oad. 
TORTS Standard of Car e 192 S.E. 782 
If a n engineer of a railroad train sees children i n the vicinity, must he slow doW1 
in the same way that a motorist is required t c do '? 
Not unless he has reasonable gr ound to suppos e thc1.t th e: children will get in the 
way of the train, as tho r ailroad by s t atute b-1.s the exclusive use of . its tracks. 
TORTS Standard of Car0 200 S.E. 591 
Facts: A customer of Def~ndant Bank .f 2ll on steps cover ed 1rJith worn rubber mats 
securely c emented to st c; ps . These mats wor 0 originally 3/1611 thick and were worn 
through in places. Plaintiff docs not knew how he happened to f all. 
Question: Should a verdict in Plaintiff' s f :w or be set aside as contrary to the 
l aw and the evidc nc ,.:: ? 
Answer: Yes. Thor 8 is no evidenc e t o indica te that Defendant Bank has violated 
any duty owed t o Plaintiff. Defendnnt Bank i s no t <m ins urer. Nor is there any evi· 
dence t o show that t he slight dopressi'.Jns in the rubber m,'l t s was a proximate cause of 
the inj_ury. Hence, it is i.Jnm:it erial 1·1betber c r net Pl aintiff wa s contributorily neg-
lig8nt. So , consi.dcring the evidenc e in its most f avor abl e aspects, it still does 
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not support a verdict for Plaintiff, and such a verdict must be set aside and judgmE-. · 
entered for Defendant Bank. 
'l'OH.TS Standard of Care 187 Va. 5 
\rJ' tvent to visit her husband, H, who was a patient at the D charitable hospital. 
The:re was a freezing rain falling off and on through the day. She left the hospital 
at. 9 p.m., and, as she went down the outside steps, she slipped and seriously hurt he:. 
self. She was not warned of their slippery condition. No ashes, sand, or sawdust 
had been placed thereon. The jury awarded her $9,000, and the trial judge set the ve: 
diet aside as contrary to the law and the evidence. What result on writ of error? 
Held: Trial judge was correct. A charity owes a duty to invitee to use due care 
to keep the premises safe. In this respect a charity is like anyone else. But D did 
not violate this duty. It .was under no duty to remove the ice until the storm sub-
sided. To place sand, ashes, or sawdust on it beforehand would be us8less, and it 
would be utterly impractical to remove the sriow and ice as it . fell~ Hence D has vio-
lated ~o duty owed W • . Nor was D under a duty to warn i;! that it was slippery outside. 
D's agents had no notice ·vl·was ignorant of th:-tt situation. D provided lights and a 
handrail, and the stairway vms not itsslf defective . D was not an insurer of W's 
safety any more than the City would be if W had accidentally fallen on a slippery 
sidewalk during a sleet storm. 
TORTS 
· In the following cases there was citht::r a viob.tion of a duty to use due care as a 
matter of law .(negligence per se ) or a jury could properly find a violation. 
TORTS Standard of Care 200 S.E. 589 
A wrecking true~ at night was on Plaintiff's side of tho road at a 50-degree angle 
in order to aid a disabled car. A boy with a flashlight was stationed to warn ap-
proaching cars. Plaintiff was blinded by lights from an approaching car and.ran into 
the wreck~r and was injured. 
Questions: (a) What measure of care did owner of wrecker owe? (b) Has he exercise, 
that measure of care? (c) Has Plaintiff contributorily negligent in not stopping whc: 
his vision was obscured? (d) Was Pl~intiff contributorily negligent per se in operat· 
ing his automobile so as not t u be able to stop within tho range of his lights? 
Answers: . (a) Not the highest degree of'care, but only reasonable care to avoid in-
jury t o travelers:- (b) Since reasonable people might differ as to whether this was 
reasonable car e, it is a jury question. (c) Quoting from 174 S.E. 7~, "Undoubtedly 
there are courts of great ability which hold that, when vision is temporarily destroy 
by glaring lights, it is his duty t o stop. But this rule ••••• must be applied in the 
light of present day traffic conditions. Many highways carry unbroken str(?aJns of car 
Sometimes they flash by almost every seccnd, and cf nec t:ssity their lights obscure 
vision. To hold as a matter of law that one must come to a stop when lights interfer 
is to say that .he must not travel at night. 11 Hence this was not contributory neg~­
gence per se. (d) While th ~re is some authority outside Virginia to this effect, 
this has never been the rule: her G. In the absence CJi' a statute, such a rule is too 
broad. V#46-209 only requires <l reasonable speed having regard to traffic and other 
existing conditions. It is not specific enough to require r:tS a matter of law a speed 
so low that one can always stop at night withtn range of h:i.s lights. 
TORTS Standard of Care 197 S.E. 527 
Action against driver of school bus to r ecover for in.juries sustained by 13-year-
old boy who was shoved by other pupils under slowly moving bus. Driver knew that 
· children were in habit of crowding around bus. 
Held: (1) He could not escape liability on ground that his services in operating 
. school bus constituted an act on behnlf of a govGrmnental agency. (2) Public offi-
cers are liable for injuries r 0sultine: from their n0r,ligcnce in performance of duties 
which do not involve judgment or discretion in their performance, but which ar e purel 
ministerial. It was negligence in this caso t o keep the bus moving under the circum-
stances. 
I 
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TC:2TS Standard of Care 2 S.E. (2d) 3JO 
The evidence showed that a nine-year-old boy was riding his bicycle on the right 
s:i.Je of a highway and that A ran into him, inflicting serious injury. A moved that 
the court strike out all.of T's evidenc~ on the ground that it did not show even a 
jury case for negligence. The court granted A's request. Was this correct? 
Held : No. When a motorist sees a child of tender years upon or near the high1fay, 
h0 is under a duty to keep his car under control so that he can stop if need be." 
Her1ce the jury might have found A liable, and it was error to take the case from them 
TORTS Standard of Care 3 S.E. (2d) 153 
Dr. A was an interne in a private hospital operat8d for profit. He negligently 
injected a solution of iodihe into the tissue of T instead of into her veins. As a 
result T suffered terribly, and her arm became paralyzed and her health gravely im-
paired. She sued tho hospital and received a $13,000 verdict. Result on appeal? 
Held: Judgment affirmed. The hospital held itself out as able to provide compe-
t ent medical servicGs. It paid the interne, and he was its servant or employee. T 
had no'control over him. All the el ements of thtJ tort of negligence are present. 
Not e : Had it been a charitable hospital (even though injured person paid), it 
would not be liable for negligence of its empl cyees causing injury to a recipient of 
the charity unless the hospital authorities were negligent in tho selection or reten-
tion· of the employees. But a charit,c;.blo institution is li::,-.ble as anyone else for 
injuries done t o thos G who are not r <::cipients of the charity. 
TORTS Standard of Care 185 Va. 965 
p ordered four tons of coal from D, who sent the coal to P in a large dump truck, 
the body of which could be raised 14 feet. There was a septic tank near the coal 
shed, of -v1hich D had warning. P had an 11-year-old boy. Vl'nen D went to unload the 
coal, he first raised the body of th~ truck the full 14 feet making it top-heavy. 
He then maneuvered the truclr. t o get it in just the right position. In doing so, he 
ran a wheel over the septic tank and the 1rlh8el broke through, causing the truck to 
·overturn. It was later aiscover Gd f or tb.e first tim;; that P1 s boy was under the 
truck crushed to death. Is ,'J. juJgment f or P as personal r epresentative of the child 
f or $10,000 proper? 
Held: Yes. It was negligenc e (2.. ) t o movE: th0 t op-heavy trLLck at all, (b) to run 
over the septic tank, (c) t o fail to keep· a l ockout for children. An 11-year-olcl 
boy is presumed incapabl e of negligence, and this presumption was not rebutted. The 
mother was not contributorily negligent in not keeping tho boy inside while the coal 
v1as being unloaded . Note: If the mother had been cuntr·ibutorily negligent, she 
would have been barred a s a beneficiary, as no one should profit from his own wrong. 
TORTS Standard of Care 187 Va. 444 
The owners of the Cape Charles Flying Service invited the members of the senior 
class of the l ocal high school t o visit t heir field and ride in their planes. This 
was done f or advertising purposes. D was a pilot in one of the planes and did some 
stunt flying, ther eby getting P, a 16-year-ol d girl, dizzy, excited, and upset. When 
she got out of the plane, she walked intc the propeller, which was "idling" at 500 
revolutions per minute . It was hidden from view by the struts, npd its noise only 
added t o P's cvnfusion. The jury f ound for P, and its ver dict stat ed that defendant 
(singular) should pay P $20,000, in spite of the fact that both the pilot and the 
Service, Inc. wer e defendants. The attorney f or F' stated thJ.t P might have been the 
daughter of any of the jurors cr of their friends. The Court stopped him and in-
structed the jury t o disregard such an ar gument. 
Held: (l) P was not guilty of contributory negli gence . (2 ) D was guilty of neg-
ligence in not stopping t te pr opeller ~d in not warning P of the danger~ (3) On 
the whol e r ecord the jury clearly m,:;ant defendants (plural), and the singular was a 
mere obvious clerical error. Hence the verdict is not t ou vague. (4) The instruc-
tion of the court t o the jurors t o disregard the infa.rTll'ml.tor ;y i:lrgument cured the im-
proper conduct of the attorney and hence is not gr ound f or a new trial. 
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'rOlt.I'S Standard of Care 187 Va.. 619 
Due to the negligence of Dl and D2, there was an automobile collision of cars dri1 -
by each. One car pushed the other against P1s house knocking it from its foundatio n 
Lefendanta contended the traffic laws were for the protection of people using the 
higbwny and hence no duty owed P was violated. 
Held.: Both Dl nnd D2 owed P 4L duty not to knock his house down. He was in the 
~rbit of the duty, for one who drives negligently can reasonably foresee that people 
or propert,y on or near the highway may be injured as a proximate result of such neg-
ligence. 
TORTS Standard of Care 187 Va. 555 
P broke his llllg in a football game. Dr. Vann set it and put on a cast. A fet.v day~ 
later D complained of unbearable pains. Dr. Vann refused to eY..amine the cast and 
left town, leaving no one in charge of P. During this time P 1 s condition became 
worse. Sometime later serious infection set in, and P1 s leg had to be amputated. 
The jury found on competent evidence that the infection entered through bruises cause 
by the' cast 1 s being too tight :md left on in spite of warnings. P r ecovered a verdic 
of $20,000, and P' s f ather for ::~5,000. 
Held: The verdict is not contrary to the l ::rw and the evidence. Dr. Vann held him-
self out as a bone specialist and O'I-TC:d a duty to use duG care. When he ignored dan-
ger signs of pain and fever and l eft paticnt 1-ri t hout providing for other doctor's 
care , he violated a duty owed to P, and as a proximate r esult of such violation P 
l ost his leg. hence all the elvnents of th e t ort of negli gence are present. 
TORTS Standard of Care 187 Va. 755 
This case reaffirmed the principle laid do.-m in 145 Va. 48 9 which held that if a 
parent allowed his son to drive his car for the son's use when the parent knew the 
son was unfit (often drunk) and the son negligently injured P, the parent was liable, 
not on the theory of r espondeat superior but on the theory that the parent was neg-
ligent himself when he d:i.d such a thing. The same principle tvould apply if one al-
lowed a person to drive, knowing that that person's driver 's license had been r evoke( 
because of r eckless driving. But if the parent gives no permission and the child 
drives the car in spite of that f act, th·.~ parent is not liabl e . 
TORTS Standard of Care 187 Va. 857 
If a statute r equires certain precautions for t he benefit of t he general public, h 
a. compliancc with the statute nt;cessarily in and of itself the exorcise of due care? 
Held: No. It is well settled that this alone is not conclusive proof of the duty. 
The common law uuty continues t o .,axist in all cases where the circumstances r ender 
the statutory warning inadequate in f act. The latter is only the minimum precaution. 
(p. 869) Hence where a railroad maintained semaphor signals which were placed too 
high where the railroau crossed a main highway just west of Richmond, it was held im-
material that such 'signals satisfied the statute if in fact they were inadequate. 
TORTS Standard of Care 188 Va . 458 
Deceased, who weighed 200 pounds, became intoxicated and l ay down on D's R.R. 
tracks. Two boys silw his peril but wer e unable to dr ag him off the tracks. They 
heard a freight train coming and r an up the tracks to meet it in order to flag it 
down, but the engineer paid little, if any, attention to thom although, if he had, 
he could have stopped in time. 
Hel d: A jury verdict for ~~15 , 000 should not be .s cJ t "lSide . vlher e railway knows 
ther e ar e apt to be trespasser s or bare l ic ens .Je s , the:r c is a duty to exercise r easor. 
able car e to see them in time to avoid killing trwm, ar1u this is especially so when 
we have the superadded fact of an indt:pendent vlarr..ing . The court distinguished this 
case from 186 Va . 195 in that in that case it was impossible to discover t he deceaseG 
in timo t o prevent the accident, :md there was no super add ell warning in that case 
either . On p. 470 the court says, "If the trairunen se8 cr should see, in the exer-
cise of ordinary car e, a trespasser in peril, it is their duty to avoid injuring him 
if it can be dono consistC:;ntly with saf ety to thems elves and t o passengers." 
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':.'Ci1.TS Standard of Care Sales 194 Va. 842 
- .P purcb.as.ed .. a spraying .material manufactored by D known a s 11Tag11 for use in their 
urchards. State and federal statutes require that the labels and other printed m3.t ...,. 
ter ;:;.ccompanying what are known as ~~ ec.anomi.c. poisons'• shall contain directions for 
us3 ecnd a warning or caution when necessary to prevent injury to man, vegetation, anc 
usef ul insects. In the directions there was a positive prohibition worded as followt 
"Do not use this product on apple-bearing trees later than petal fall." And there 
Has a caution t hat the liquid would burn if any carne in contact with flesh or ey•JS . 
1N.hile D's vice-president was present, P sprayed his trees some two weeks after pet al 
fall. The spray killed the leaves and ruined both the crop for that year and the on( 
for the next year. A jury awarded P $30,000 damag0s, but the trial court set aside 
the verdict and entered judgment for D. What result on appeal? 
Held (2 justices dissenting and 2 concurring specially): that the verdict in favor 
of P should be reinstated.. The caution was inadequate. No warning of what would ha]. 
pen if directions were not followed was given. 11 This is not a case of a plaintiff's 
having acted in defiance of a warning. Here there -vms no warning (as to effect on 
foliage). Where ther e is a duty to warn and the defendant fails to give the requir8r 
warning, there is no a ssumption of risk. 11 Thore is a difference between directions 
and warning. 11 The dir.ections arc requirod to assure effective use, the warning to 
assure safe use." 11An insufficie:mt ~ing is in l egal effect ~ warni?g. 11 It is 
the purpose of the statutes to protect the general-plibiic who are pract~cally at the 
mercy of chemical manufacturers, as t h8 ordinary man cannot be expected to be an ex-
pert in such matters. 
TORTS Degree of Care Owed Gratuitous Guest 
By V#B-646.1 a gr atuitous guest cannot recover fron1 a host unless the host has bee; 
guilty of gross negligenc e, which has been defined as negligenc e that "shows an uttej 
disregard of prudence amounting to compl et e negl ect" of the safety of the guest. Ap· 
pli.cations of this rule follow. 
TORTS Gross Negligence 189 S.E. 310 
p was D's guest in D's car. D's car was the middle of three cars, all going the 
same way across a wide bridge at a r easonable speed. F's car was behind D's car. 
F decided to pass D, so F blew his horn and turned to his l eft. When F was almost u 
with D, D decided to pass the car in front of him. As a result, F's car struck D's 
car and pushed it off the bridge, killing P. In D's car all tho windows were down. 
D did not blow his horn; nor did he give a hand signal; nor did he notice the lights 
of F's car. Is D liable for P1s death? 
Held: There is liability -only if ther e is gross or wanton negligence. While the 
violation of one statute or the failure to use ordinary caro as to one factor would 
not be gross negligence, three or four such viol ations together may amount to gross 
negligence. In this case the matter was properly l eft t o t he jury, and a verdict fc 
p will not be disturbed. 
TORTS Gross Negligence 191 S.E. 589 
Held that a basketball coach who goes to sleep while driving a car home from a 
game may be f ound by t he j ur y to have been gr ossly m:::gligent and henc e liable t o a 
member of the t eam who was his guest. 
TORI'S Gr oss Negligence . 2 S.E. (2d) 318 
p was riding a s the guest of D who (l ) i 0 nored r epeated cautions of P t o go mor e 
sl owly, (2) passed a hi ghway crossing si[{n without checking his speed, (3) drove 55 
miles per hour and r an t oo cl,)S0 t o the beginning of an S curvt: t c make the turn, 
around which he could not see , (4) on a slipper y r oad with wh).ch he was unfamiliar, 
(5) and applied brakes suddenly, causing car t v skid nnd t o be wrecked. (a) If a 
jury wer e t o find there was gr vss negligenc e , shc:ul d its verdict be set aside? 
(b) If a jury wer e t o find f or D, shoul d its ver dict be sBt asi de? (c) In tho in-
stant case the court struck out P1 s evidence . Was this error ? 
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I t was error f or the court to strike out P's evidence, as there was evidenc e from 
\·rhich the jury might find gross negligence. If the jury did so find, the verdict. i~ · 
''.11 right. If the jury f~.:;und for D, the verdict is all riGht. But it is error t c-
ta.l-:e the case from the jury when reasonable people mieht differ as t o whether or n ::;-';, 
I; r..ras f.:Uilty of gr oss negligenc8. 
TORTS Gross Negligsnce 9 S.E. (2u) 452 
H0st attempted t o pass three cars ahead of him on an S curve while traveling at a 
speed of !.;.5 miles per hour. An approaching car stopped, but Host ran into this car 
Hithout even diminishing his speed. 
Held: Error to strike Plaintiff's evidence. There was at l east a jury question af 
t o whether or not Host was r::-:rossly negligent. 
TORTS Gross Negligence 179 Va. 7 
D went t o sleep while driving a car, and her guest was injured. Jury f ound for tht:. 
r,uest. Should trial judge set verdict aside? 
Held: No. Any speed is t oo fast to drive a car while asleep. Going t o sleep whil< 
driving a car may be found by a judge cr jury to be gr oss negligence. 
TORTS Gross Negligence 183 Va. 670 
D 1 s intestate was driving a truck dor,m a 6-d<Jf~rc.:: e grade and around a 32 -degree 
curve. P1 s intestate was a guest in the truck. The rip,ht wheels of the truck went 
off the r oad and onto a soft shoulder. The driver was unable t o regain control of 
the truck, and its occupants were killed. 1'vidence as t o speed indicated a speed of 
from 20 to 35 miles per hour. 'l'here was a drizzling rain, and some f og. The jury 
found for P. Was this error? 
Held: Yes. For a guest t o recover it must be shown that the host was guilty of 
gr oss negligence--that he Wr:!.S driving the car in such a manner as t o show 11 an utter 
disregard of prudence amounUng t o complet e neGl ect of the saf ety" of his guest. 
The evidence in this casE: fails t o show such a complet e neglect. 
··'"'TORTS Gross Negligenc e 185 Va . 744 
P was D1 s gratuitous guest in his car. X was drivinv a car in the opposite direc-
tion. X' s steering gear suddenly broke, and he put on his br::J.kes. This caused X' s 
car to swerve directly in front of D's c!lr, and P was injured in the collision. P 
sued D and recovered a verdict upon which jud.p:~ent was enter ed. D appeal ed. Result· 
Case reversed. The evidence shows nc gr oss negligence, or, f Gr that matter, any 
negligence on D's part. It was just an unavoi d::tblc accident. Even if D had been 
going t oo fast, his excess speed was net the cause of the accident. 
TORTS Gross Negligenc e 186 Va. 261 
D drove a car mor e than 13 hours within 24 hours i n viol ation of statute, drove 
55 miles per hour when war speed limit was 35 miles per hour, and when it was rain-
ing so hard that visibility was poor, and dr ove car 8nto soft shoulder. 
Held: While no one of the above is ~:ross ne~ligence, the jury could find gr oss 
negligence from the combination. (189 S.E. 310 f ollowed). 
TORTS Gross Neglieence 186 Va . 394 
n--was driving carefully at a f air r ate of speed ar ound a curve when the rear wheel. 
of the car were caught in ruts made by the 'sinking of the streetcar tracks. In try-
ing to get out of the rut he l ost control of the c.J.r, lvhich skidded 30 f eet into a 
pole injuring P, a r,r atuitous guest. The trial court f ound f or P. What r esult on 
appeal? Held: Reversed and final judGment enter ed f or D. Ther e was no gross neg-
ligence as a matter of l aw. 
TORTS Gross Negligence 
Guest sued Host f or dalll.:tges 
The truck was parked entirely 
lane of a f our-lane highway. 
187 Va. 4h 
ar1.s1.ng f r um injuries in an m1tomobile-truck collision. 
acrcss one l ane and ha lfway ac r oss the next or passing 
It was dark. Ther e wer e no lights on the truck, and 
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~10 flares had been placed on the highway. Host demurred to the evidence, and GL1est 
;:oined in the demurrer. Discuss and decide. 
ln the case of a demurrer to the ·evidence, the court must overrule the d emurrer t c 
th2 evidence and find for the demurree guest if a jury might so find. This r educ es 
t.:-lu issue to the question whether a driver \'rho on a dark ntght fails to see an un-
lighted obstruction of the kind described in time to avoid a collision might be founc 
cuilty of gross negligence. Ordinarily a person has a right to assume that there 
·Hill be no u.nlighted obstructions in a highway. The most a jury could possibly find 
in· this case would be ordinary negligenc e. Host's conduct as a matter of law falls 
sho)'t of shmving an utter disregard of prudence amounting to complete neglect of the 
saf ety of his guest. Hence Host's demurrer to the evidence should be sustained. 
TCRTS Gross Negligence 191 Va. 886 
D was driving P, his married daughter, back from a shopping trip. There was a 
light snow falling. D had. no chains on his tires. D was driving south on a three-
lane high\·;ay. There 1-fere snow plows in front of him, and he turned into his extreme 
l eft 1ane, while driving 30 miles an hour, to pass the snoH plows. He was then ap-
proaching the crest of a hill on a curve. X' s car ca.me over the crest, whereupon D 
attempted to turn to his right, but h:i,s car skidded and crashed into X's car, which 
had come to a stop on X 1 s right shoulder of the ro.e.d. P, who was sitting in the 
front seat beside her father and had not objected to the way in which her father 
drove, was seri ously injured. The jury awarded P a $10,000 verdict. Should it be 
set aside? 
Hel d: No. D was guilty of gr oss negligence as a matter of law. P was not guilty 
of contributory n.:;gligence . It is one thing t o warn a driver of a danger unknown to 
him and quite another t o give directions when the danger is already imminent. The 
first may prevent an accident; the second may t end t o creat e an additional hazard. 
p di d not know her father was planning t o enter his l eft l ane , and after h6 had done 
so, it was t oo l at e t o r emonstrat e. nThe guest should not undertake t o drive and may 
trust the driver until it becomes plain that such trust is misplaced.n The sudden 
emergency doctrine is not applicable, as D's acti-:ms caused the emer gency. 
TORTS Gross Negligence 193 Va . 604 
It i s not gr oss negligenc 0 t 0 i n2.dver tently put one 1 s f oot on the accelerator in-
stead of the brake when a tire blov;s cut.' 
TORTS Gr atuitous Guest? 194 Va . 541 
p and D were school t eachers. D owned a car and offered P a ride to school. When 
p f ound that D was ~lling t o t ake her r egularly, she started t o pay her $1.20 per 
week every Friday, l-fhich was t £w samo as bus f ar e would have been. D did not ask 
f or the money but accepted it over a two-year per i od. "[r.Jhat degree of care does D 
owe p when P is riding under tho abov.; m·r:mgement? 
Held: D owes P a duty of cr dinary car e and tvill be liable f or ordinary negligenc e. 
The r egul ar payment of $1.20 p::!r week , acquiesc ed ·i.n by D over a l ong period cf fime, 
indicates an understanding that compensation is t o bo pai d . It is more than a mer e 
social amenity. P is as a matter of l .:J.w not nD. guest with,)ut payment" as contem-
plated by V#B-646.1. 
TORTS Viol ation of St atute 
Viol ation of a stat ut e passed f or thE: gener al pr ot ection c.f the public is f ailure 
t o use due care as a matter of l aw, .and, if such viol ation was a proximate ·cause of 
plaintiff's injury and if pl aintiff was a member of the class f or whose prot ection 
the.·statute was passed, he has ~ prima f acio cas e. Illustrative cases f ollow: 
TORTS Violation of St atute 186 Va . 444 
D remodeled a house , which consisted of twc stories and an attic, into a t enement 
house with two families on each of the two st ories and one family in the attic. 
Ther e was only one stairway t o the attic, although a city ordinance r equired two. 
The r oom in the attic which l ed t o the stairway caught 0n fire, a nd P's family was 
\ 
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t r apped and two of his 1.ittle children burned to death. P sought damag es under the 
death by wrongful act statute. Defenses were (l)House was in existence before ·the 
ordinance was passed and ordinanc e was not r etroactive, (2 )Contributory negligence a:~.r_ 
as sumpt i on of risk of Pin living in the attic,(J)Life of child is of no pecuniary 
value, since- it .. is- a sourc e of ex:p~se rather than income. 
Hel d : (l)Whi l e house was built bJfore the ordinance, its conversion into a t enf'lm ~:::rrt 
t ook place after the ordinance was passed and in violation ther eof linless t her e wer o 
two sta irways. (2)Wher e statute is passed fo.r protection of a certain class, even con-
sent of a member of that class will not bar an action. The ordinanc e placed the duty 
on t he landlord for the protection of the tenant. (3 )The jury has almost an absolute 
discretion up to $25,000 in determining the damages in death by Hrongful act, and 
pecuniary considerations are not the only matters on which their verdict may be bas e: 
(4)Impossibility of getting mat erials for second stairway did not excuse D fr.om com-
plying with . ordinance. 
TORTS Violation of Statute Suggested by 187 Va .309. 
D was driving a milk tru'ck at ten miles an hour in the middle of the street instead 
of wholly on his right.A three-year-old child suddenly ran from D's right directly i n 
the path of the truck. Instead of putting ()n his brakes, he turned sharply to the 
left. The child was struck and killed. W11at three objections ar e there to the foll~w­
ing instruction? "The co.urt instructs ·the jury that under the law the driver of a 
motor vehicle shall drive his car upon the right half of the highway, and, if D did 
not so drive his truck, then he was negligent in not so doing, and they should find 
a verdict for the plaintif f." 
Held: (l)The deceased was not a member of the class f or whose b enefit the statute was 
passed --i. e .,people on t he l eft s ide of t he highway;£2)the court did not instruct 
the jury that it was al s o necessar y that D1 s viol ation of the statut e be a proximat e 
cause of the injury;( J )the court f ailed t o instruct t he jury on the sudden emergency 
doctr~ne . Since this was ~~ finding instruction, it must be complet e and accurat e . 
Revers ed and r emanded. 
TORTS Violation of St atut e 187 Va .23L 
D entered an arterial highway when his visibi lit y was qui te limited because of a 
pecket of fog. As he enter ed, he s aw P's car appr oaching . D stopped his car when he 
was s orne three f eet into t he hi ghway, but i t was t oo l at e to avoid collision . P con-
tends(l)that D was under a duty to stop, look and listen, and(2)that D was guilty of 
negligence per se in that he violat ed V#46-256, whi ch prohibits any vehicle from 
stopping in such manner as . to impede traf f ic except as t he r esult of an accident or 
mechanical breakdoHn. · 
Held: (l)Tber e is no hard and f ast rule that one must conti nually stop,look and 
listen. Under the facts above stat ed it was a jury question whet her or not an ordi-
nary prudent man would have ent or ec,i t he arterial hi ghvmy without first listening. 
(2)Nor is tho second cont ention well made . Every statute mus t be given a r easonable 
construction. Stopping when traffic conditi ons demand i t is a part of traveling just 
as much as i s motion. Surel y D owed no dut y to keep going when a collision was im-
minent if he did so . By stopping, he did not impede t r affic withi n the meaning of 
the statute-. 
TORTS Vi olat ion of St atuto 189 s .E.339 
P was driving eas t · on a paved highway. He had a c l ear view of an intersecti -):lg r oad 
for 75 .feet up the road, and aJ.so had the rig11t of way over D who was approaching on 
the i nter secting road at P' s l eft. The cars collided. P test i fied t hat he did not 
s.ee D'-s car until th e moment of the col hsion. Is a j udgment fo r p proper ? 
Held: No. He i s barred by his contribut or y negl i genc e . Statute giving man on the 
right the r ight of way It does not l egalize blind drivi ng . 11 
TORTS Functi on of Judge and Jur y 179 Va .JO 
P was ridi ng in D' s bus , D being a common carrier of passenger s . P ei t her had one 
arm out of the wi ndow or r Gst i ng i n the open window when due to the concurrent neg-
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.igence of D and E the bus was sideswiped and P's arm was crushed. P recovered an 
~; 8 , 000 verdict and judgment was entered thereon. What result on 1,1ri t of error to t b 
S:1pr eme Court of Appeals? 
Ther e is a conflict of authority-as to whether or not holding one's hand out of a 
bus >vindow is contributory negligence as a matter of law, or whether it is a jury 
question. But resting one's arm in a wil1dow so that a collision might cause it to bl 
jarred out of a window would at best raise only a jury question, and, as verdict was 
for P, the jury has decided the question in P's f avor. $8,000 damages is not exces-
sive . Note: D has burden of proving contribUtory negligence so that if evidence is 
equally balanced as to whether or not P was contributorily negligent, judgment shoulc 
be for P. 
TORTS Function of Judge and Jury 179 Va. 693 
p bought a bottle of Coca-Cola at a stand. · He drank some of it and became very 
sick. He lost 30 pounds before recovering his health. There was affirmative evi-
dence that the bottle contained a vile-smelling forei gn substance which burned his 
mouth.and stomach. Jury f ound for Pin n suit against bottling company. 
Held: If P can show that bottle had not been tampered with since it l eft the bot-
tling company, the finding of the fort;!ign substance creates· a prima facie case of 
negligenc e. Evidenc e that bottling company was careful merely makes a case f or the 
jury. Judgment affirmed. 
TORTS Function e;f Judge and Jury Procedure 194 Va. 332 
· p was seriously injured t o at l east the extent of $10,000. The evidence as to D's 
negligence was in conflict. The jury was not certain whether or not D was t o blame 
f or the accident. So the jury evidently decided t l, pu.t part of the burden on each 
and rendered a verdict f or $5,000 upon which verdict judgment was entered. Both P 
and n· appealed. Wh~t r esult? 
ijeld: Two wrongs do not make a right. If the jury believed the preponderance of 
·evider1c e was in favor of P, they shculd have given him adequat e drunages. If not, 
they should have given him nothing. The judgment should be reversed and the case r e· 
manded f or new trial on all issues (and not sol 0ly on the issue of amount of damages, 
·~S Proof of Neglig~nce -~bl~c ~tilit~es . . 184 S.E. ~77 
~~et car passenger su~ng f or lnJurlos sustalned ln derallmerffi made out pr~a 
facie Qase on proof that he was a passenger and that a der ailment occurred, since th: 
type of accident is r ar e unless defendant was negligent, and if in fact there was no 
negligence, defendant can ordilli~rily prove that such was the case . · But when defend-
ant shows that accident was due t o latent defect in axl e not ascertainable by any 
practical method of inspection, plaintiff's prima facie case disappears, and a ver-
di~t in his favor cannot be sustained . 
TORTS Proof of Negligence 186 s. E. 289 
1. Fact that automobile l eayes public driveway and injures pedestrian on sidewalk 
cr~ates a presumption of negligence and casts on Def endant burden of showing that 
there was no negligenc e. Same rule applies where Plaintiff is injured standing on 
hi~ own land at some 13 f eet from paved portion of highway. 
2. Under such circumstanc es ther e is no r eason t o instruct jury on the l aw of con· 
tributary negligenc e . 
TORTS Proof of Negligence 189 S.E. 1(:4 
X dr ove a truck f or D. On0 of the tires was puncturecl.. He t ook off the tire and 
rim, fixed the puncture, roassembled the t ire and rim, r olled same t o Y1 s gar age and 
asked p t o inflat e the tire . While P was doing this, the rim came apart and viol ent .. 
ly struck P, inflicting serious injury. Expert evidence showed that the accident 
might have been caused by any one of six causes, some of which wer e, and s ome of 
which were not, within the control of defendant, D; but ther e was no evidence indi-
cating just which one of these causes was the r eal one. 
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Held: Wher e evidence shows that any one of several t hings may havE:) caused the in · 
.~iury, for some of which defendant is responsible , and for some of which he is not 
n:;sponsible, and leaves it uncertain as to what was the real cause, then pl ai ntiff 
has failed to establish his case, and he had the burden of proof. Doctrine of r es 
ipsa loquitur does not apply, since P had control in part over the instrumentalities 
causing the accident. 
TOHTS Proof of Negligence 6 S.E. (2d) 661 
P had rheumatism. Dr. X told her she would have to have all t eeth r emoved, so Dr. 
D, a dentist, r emoved the offending t eeth. However, he l eft some 8 or 9 roots in 
P's mouth. Dr. S made a plate for P, but, because of the roots (which could only be 
seen in an X-ray picture), the plate only caused pain. · 1-fu en Dr. S took an X-ray pi c-
ture, he discovered the roots, and this nec essitat ed a second operation. P sued Dr. 
D and r ecover ed a verdict for $300 on proving the above f acts. Is the verdict valid? 
Held: No. The doctrine of r es ipsa l oquitur is inapplicabl e. More than roots of 
t eeth still in the gums must be shown. It was not shown that it was customary for 
dentists to t ake X-rays aft er extractions; nor was it shown that dentists could t Bll 
whether roots were still in the gums by an examination of the extracted teeth. 
TORT'S Proof of Negli gence 182 Va. 138 
P ordered a case of 7-Up from D, and it was delivered. Later P put some bottles oi 
7-Up in an electric cooler along with some beer. Three hours later a customer asked 
for a bottle of beer, and P opened the cooler t o get it. There was a violent ex-
plosion of a bottle of 7-Up causing the loss of one of P's eyes. P sued D. Result? 
Held: No liability. Ther e was gr eat er pressure on the bottle when outside the 
cool er. Hence the explosion was probably not due t o any def ect in the bottle . In 
fact, there is no sat isf actory expl anat i on. It might have been due t o P1 s hitting 
the beor bottle against the 7-Up bottle . At any r at e, the doctrine of r es ipsa l oqui 
tur is inapplicabl e unless def endant ha s exclusive control over the instrumentalitie~ 
causing the accident. It is not applicable wher e the caus e of the accident might 
equally be D's negligenc e or some f actc.r f or which D is not r esponsible . (Two judgeE· 
dissented.) 
TORTS Proof of Negligence 184 Va. 94 
' Defendant maintained a switch box on a pole about ten feet f rom t he ground for the 
purpose of throwing switches for its streetcars . As plaintiff went by the box, it 
burned out, and a bolt of el ectricity went through her body injuring her. Evidence 
indicated that the defendant had exercised every pr ecaution and t hat no such accident 
had ever occurred before. Plaintiff r elied on the doctrine of r es ipsa loquitur. IE 
defendant liable? 
Held: Since Plaintiff ' s only evidenc e of negligenc e is based on the doctrine of 
r es ipsa loquitur and since defendant's evidence complet ely r ebuts any possible pre-
sumption of negligenc e arising out of that doctrine, judgment must be for the defend· 
ant in spite of a jury' s verdict for the plaintiff . 
TORTS Proof of Negligenc e . 186 Va. 746 
The Danville Corrrrnunity Hospital was organized as a corporation for profit. Its 
stockholder s ar e entitl ed to free hospit alization within st ated limits . It always 
enters a charge for services r endered and collects if it can. It has not paid any 
cash dividends for year s , although many of its stockholders have r eceived free hos-
pit al car e . Linda was born ther e . On the day aft er her birth it was notic ed that 
she had a deep burn on her l eg . No one would admit that he or she had the slight est 
idea of the caus e of the bur n . Complications s et in, and Linda Hill be a little lame 
for the r est of her life . She su r:ld the hospital four years l at er. It defended on 
tW:o grounds: (1) it was a charit:3.bl e or ganization and liabl e only for negligenc e in 
the selection of its l.,Jmployees , and (2) ther e 1.vJ.S not pr oof of aegligenc e. What 
judgment? 
Held: Judgment for Linda f or ~~5,000 affirmed. A corporation organiz ed for profit 
does not become a charitable or ganization mGrely because it fails to make money. Thi 
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i s a res i psa loquitur case . Def endant had full control over Linda and her surr ou:-1< . · 
icgs. Babies ar e not ordinarily burned unless one or mor e of the attendants ar e nog·-
1igent . Linda could not be expected t o t estify what happened. Hence the burden of 
going f orward with the evidence (not t he burden of proof)" was cast on def endant, '.-The 
t:r offer i ng no p~oof as t o the cause of the injury failed to meet Linda 's case. 
Que:r y : Hovl l ong did Linda have in which t o bring suit? The statute wou.ld not st ar 
t u run until she vJas 21, but in no case shall the period be over 20 years. 
TORTS Proof of Negligence 189 Va. 89 
P dr ank part of a bottle of Pepsi-Col a when she noticed the r emains of a partially-
decomposed mous e in the bottle . She rushed t o her doctor and then t o her l awyer. 
She suffer ed a sever e and l ong-continued digestive upset. A local druggist preserved 
t he carcass of the mouse in a solution of fo rmaldehyde f or the eventual benefit of 
t he j ury. P sued the D Bottling Co . in a t ort action. Tho Court instructed the jury 
"that they may infer negligence from the f act that for ei gn substance was found in the 
bot t le and t he law does not require the plaintiff to show the particular dereliction. 
Hel d: Revers ed and r emanded for t wo reasons: (1) The i nstruction should have 
stat ed that if the jury believe from the evidenc e t hat the for ei gn substance was in 
the bottle at t he time D parted with posses sion of it, etc. As given, D was deprived 
of t he def ense that t he-mouse may have gotten into the bottle either while it was in 
t he possession of t he local groc er or while it w~s in the poss es sion of the plaintiff 
(2) The instruction should have told the j ury th~t the infer enc e was a r ebuttable 
one , and that if they believed from t he e ridenc e that D had used due car e , or, if 
t hey believed t he evidence to be in equilibrium on t his matter, they should find for 
t he def endant, since (even if this i s :,~ res ipsa l oquitur case ) the burden of proVing 
negligenc e is on t he per son who alleges i t . 
TORTS Proof of Negligence 189 Va. 140 
D wils 20 year s old and had jus t purchased a two-seat ed cubtraining plane with dual 
control s . tle was duly lic ·3nsed and asked a two- year-ol d boy, P, t o go up with him. 
The pl ane eventually crashed, and D and P wer e bot h ki l l ed. Ther e was s ome evidenc e 
of mot or troubl e but only conj ecture as t o wh~t ca used that trouble . It could just 
as easily have been due to r.tn acc i dent as to negligenc e. P's r epresentative sued D' s 
r epr esent at i ve . 
Held : For D1 s p~rs om.l repr t:sent ative . ' Doct rine of r es i psa l oquitur is not ap-
plicabl e, f or it i s cormnon knowledge that airpl anes Gft cn crash without f ault of t he 
pilot . Negligenc e cann::Jt be pr oved by speculation and surmi se a l one . 
Not e : (1) Ther e i s nothing in the case to show wh0t her cr not P' s par ents gave 
their consent f or their son t o eo riding i n an airpl am . (2) Ther e is nothing t o 
i ndicat e whet her or ne;t gr oss negligence i s r oquired i n hust-r uest airplane cases as 
it is in host-guest automobile c ::tses . 
TORTS Proof of Neglie:ence 189 Va . 948 
p lived i n D' s t ourist hor1.e . While .P was absent , f i re broke out in P 1 s r oom. The 
fi r e may have been due· t o D1 s negligonce wi th r efer ence t o the gas and light fixtures 
or it may hi'J.VO been due t o s~me other cause over whi ch D had no control. Is D liable 
t o p f or the l oss of per sonal pr operty? 
Hel d : No. One does not make out a case by showing t hat a f ire might have been due 
to the defendant' s negligence . "Wher e the evidenc e shows that any one of the sever a l 
things may have caused t he i nj ur y, fo r some of which the defendant is responsibl e, 
and for some of which he i s not r esponsible:!, and l eaves i t uncertain as to what was 
the r eal cause , t hen the plainti.i'f has failed to establ i sh his cas e ." 
TO RTS Proof of Negligenc e 190 Va . 521 
A heavi ly-loaded trail er was l eft ,,rith D for t he pur pose of unloading. The forward 
support of the trailer slipped f orward and upward, ca.using i t to crash on the concr et f· 
driveway and damagi ng the t r ai l er to th~ extent of $1SOOo No one knew exactly why 
t his happened . I t might have been due to careless moving on t he part of D, or to a 
structural defoct in the t r ail er, or t o pur (:; accid0nt. The trial court held for t he 
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plaintiff, relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Has this error? 
Held: Error. 1Nhat caused the accident is pure speculation. The res i psa loquitu:; 
doctrine is not applicable where the accident might be due to a number of caus es, fo:c 
some of which defendant is responsible and for some of which he is not, but is limit ,_ 
t o t he ca se in which,.....in___the ordinary course of events, the accident_:_could- not have -
happtmed ..except on the theoryo"f-n:eg-l~-1=>-laiz:.:tiU--has--f<r!reci -to prove any neg-
ligenc e a nd hence has failed to make out a prima facie case. 
TOHTS Proof of Negligence 190 Va. 613 
D o-.vned a drug store which was entered by a swinging double door. When P was l eav-
ing the store, she pushed the door on tbe right open and went out . In some unex-
plained way a . finger on her right hand wa s caught between the two doors a s tl1ey shut 
quickly, and her fing er wa s 'S'GV'ered. There was only 1/ 1611 opening between the two 
doors vJhen they were closed, and there was evidence that there should have been %". 
Ther e wa s no evidence that the springs or that the r estraining fluids were not in 
proper condition. Such doors a re in common use throughout the country and accidents 
very rare . The trial court struck P' s evidence. Was this error? 
Held: No error. P has failed t o show a violation of duty. This was clearly an 
unexplained freak accident. The fact that ther e was only a l/16a opening was not a 
proximate cause of the injury. Testimony that the doors clos ed quickly is t oo vague 
t o be of probative value , as it moans cne thing to c. ne perscn and a nother t o s ome om~ 
else. 
TORTS Proof of Negligence Sudden Emer gency 190 Va. 979 
While walking on the sidewalk at the corner of 3rd. and Gr ace Streets in Richmond, 
plaintiff was' injured by a city transit bus which ran up onto the s_idewalk and hit 
her. Afte r shovJing the above f acts, plaintiff rested her cause . Defendant bus com-
pany then showed that aft er the accident it wa s discovered that the solder had broken 
and loosened a cap over the end of the air hose connected with the brake. Experts 
t estified tha t this coulrl not have been J:iscovered by a r easonable examination and 
that such a breakage was, if not tlnhear d of, a t l .;;ast very r nr e . The driver t esti-
fi ed tha t when he went to apply his brake to l et a customer off at the safety zone · 
near the corner, t he brake di d not \-rork, and. thc;.t to a void piling into the back of 
cars waiting for the street light to change , he had t o Sl•Ting the bus out into the 
intersection, where it hit a nother car ahd. r an up onto the sidewalk. There was evi-
dence to the effect that the bus was go ir1g only 10 m.p.h. at the time , that when t he 
dr i ver discover ed the failure of his brakes, he wa s 87 feet from plaintiff, and that 
had he applied his hand brake , he couli..l h,::tve stopped in hO f eet or l ess. Instruc-
tions wer e given the jury t o t he effect tha t plaintiff had r ais ed the inferenc e of 
negligence which \voul J entitle the jury t o find f or her in the absenc e of evidenc e 
satisfactorily showing froedom from negligence, but on the vJhole case the jury must 
believe the accident wa s due t o negligenc e in cr der so t o find . The c ourt also in-
structed the jury tha t they could find defendant liable if they f ound that the drivel 
wa s negligent in f a iling t o apply his hmd brnke aft er finding out hi~ air brakes-
woul d not work . Are the inst ructions proper? 
Hel d: Yo·s . I~Jhere pla intiff show8d that a bus s ol ely under defendant's control r an 
up on t h e sidewalk wher e busses ordin..:trily do not go , she 1o1as entitled t o r ely on 
the doctrine vf r es i psa -loquitur. 'l'he jury couLl find th -::tt t he cap became l oose a s 
a r esult of the accident r ather than befor e t he accident. Expert t estimony indicate~ 
how urilikely such n prior f ailure of the brake would be . Whilo the court does not 
appr ov e of the und~rlint::u wur ds used in the ins tructiun, it cannot agr ee tha t, when 
consider ed in the light of the c.:ntire instruction, the l.Ju r ds placed upon def enda nt 
the burden of shuwing l ack of neglige nc e r ather t han just going f orward with the evi-
dence. Furthermor e , the jury c c1uld f:ind, as t hoy did, that defenda nt was not protect 
ed by the sudden emer gency doctrine when he failed t o appl y his hand brake . The bus 
was going only about 10 m.p.h., and t ht::re wg_s o.mpl C; opportunity f or any r easonabl e 
man t o use the br :.:tko . 
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'l'O?.'I'S Proof of Negligence 191 Va. 635 
The tracks of the D Ry. Co. run through the town of M (population 500) and cross a 
r:ruch-traveled highway at right angles. The view up and down the tracks is obscured 
by a bank and underbrush until one reaches the railway's right of way. Then there ii 
e:.n unobstructed view for 1800 feet on each side of the crossing, at which points 
curves interfere with visibility. The highway runs downhill until it reaches the 
railway's right of way, and then there is a slight elevation as it crosses the trach 
There is an automatic warning signal which operates when a train is within 2500 feet 
of the crossing. There is no town ordinance regulating the speed of trains or other 
duties of the railvmy. P was 67 years of age and in average health. Just as he was 
about to cross the tracks in his car, the automatic signals started. A passenger 
train was approaching at the rate of 80 miles an hour but was not then visible . P 
kept on going, but his car stalled on the tracks and P was killed when the train 4e-
molished the car. What are the rights of P's personal repres entative, if any? 
Held: H~ has no rights. There is no proof as to why P's car stalled. It may not 
have been tne fault of .the railroad company. Negligence is not to be presumed when 
there'are hypotheses just as plausible as that of negligenc e . But even if the D Ry. 
Co. was negligent, it took the train 20 seconds to cover the 2500 feet, and if P did 
not "abandon ship" within that time, i;.he sole proximate cause pf his death was his 
foolhardiness in staying in the car in spite of appr oaching disaster which he could 
have easily avoided. (His ten-year-old grandson got out in plenty of ~ime when he 
saw the train coming ar ound the curve 1800 feet away.) · 
TORTS Proof of Negli genc e 194 Va . 597 
P was a paying passenger riding t o work .in D's car. She alleged and proved that 
while she was sitting in the back seat of the car r elaxed, D suddenly applied the 
brakes as hard as he could, that she vlas thrown .forward and injured. The trial cour1 
sustained a motion to strike out P' s evidence. Was this error? 
Held: Action of trial cotirt was right. Negligence is not c.1rdinarily presumed fron 
the happening of an accident. D was not bound t o introduc e any evidence unless P's 
evidence prov8d a prima faci ,, cas e . From anythint~ that appears in the evidence, D 
might have had good r eason t o slc:lrn c·n the brakes . (It was also said that weaving in 
and out of traffic was not neglig(mc e per s e -- t rw.t 1:Jould depend on the circum-
stances.) 
'l'ORTS Proof of Negligence .. 194 Va. 615 
P was a non-paying guest·in D's car when it struck a concrete post on the right 
side of a culvert. The survivors of the accident could not give many details of its 
cause, but ther e was evidenc e to indicat e that D was driving tvith due care prior to 
the time he hit the post, that the car did not skid, and that D turned to the right 
just before hitting the post~ D stat ed that he:! could not r emember what caused him tc 
turn to the right -- whether it was some obj ect or vJhether something else distracted 
him. The verdict and judgment were for P. 
Held: P has failed to make out a jury c ::tse of gross nE.gligence . Reversed and 
final judgment for D. What actually caused tho accid8nt is unknown and speculative . 
P had th e burden of proving gross negligenc e . His ovid ne e does not show that D 
acted with "a heedl ess and r eckless disregar d uf ·the rights of another which should 
shock fair-minJ.ed men." 
TORTS Proof of Negligence 10. S.E. (2d) 887 
D t estified that he did· not r emember how he happon8d to drive his car into P's car 
but supposed h~ must have f aint ed . Discuss. 
Point l. If D had no ~eason t o suppose he was about t o faint, and did faint sudden 
ly, then it was not his act, and it was an unavoi dable acc i dent. Point 2. But if he 
can't r ecall the circumstances because of th e shock of the accident (a common occur-
rence) and the accident may have been due t o drowsiness or inattention, he cannot es-
cape liability by merely saying he does not r emember what happened. Poiot 3. And th 
burden of proving tha.t he fainted is upon him who alleges it. 
I 
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TORT0 Proof of Negligence Pleading and Practice 181 Va. 471 
In Virginia, whether it is gross negligence for a defendant to fall asleep while 
driving an automobile, thereby rendering him liable to his gues t , is a jury question . 
P alleged in his notice of motion that D failed to keep a proper lookout while driv-
ing his car. He did not allege that P went to sleep at the wheel. Is evidence of 
this latter fact admissible? 
He l d : Yes . Contrary to the rule at common law the declaration in a negligence 
cQs e is no longer demurrable pecause it does not s et out the f acts that constitute 
l10'gligence . If D wishes these, he should ask for them in a bill of particulars. 
Proof that B was asleep is not a variance from the allegation that he failed to keep 
a proper l ookout. It is rather proof of that fact. 
TORTS Proof of Ne gligence 183 Va. 379 
D was driving at night with P, a guest. The car was f ound demolished against a 
tree near the highway, and D and P were both dead. Tho ro ad was a straight four-lane 
highway. P's personal repres entative sued D's personal r epr es ent ative . There were 
no witnesses. Result? 
R8 ld for D. There is no evidence of gross negligence . The mere fact of the acci-
dent is no evidence of_' negliganco where the accident ·could have happened as a r esult 
of blinding lights, som<:1thi ng in the machine breaking, or sudden illness of driver. 
Wher e the facts can bo explained as a r esult of. nogligoncc or on some other r eason-
able hypothesis, ther e is no presumption of negligence . 
TORTS Proof of Negligence 192 Va. 150 
P was killed while in tho act of removing n. live wire from E, who was attempting to 
r emove it from thu street. Does P's per sonal r opr os ontativo make out a prima facie 
case of negligence against tho D Electric Co. by showing the above f acts? 
Held: Yes. "It is well sottlod ••••• th3.t under the doctrine of r es .ipsa loquitur 
proof that an injury has r esulted from cont.:~ct wi th a highly charged wire which i s 
under tho exclus ive oper at ion and control of t h0 def endant and is out of its proper 
place , r ais es a prima f ac i o presumption that the dofendunt was ne gligent ••••• and 
throws upon it the burdE.:n of ov0rcomine; sueh pres umption. 11 
I s pl aintiff barred by his contributory nc::gli gonco? Held: Jury question. One 
may, in a comnendable effort to save human life , t ako chances that he could not 
otherwise take without being guilty of mtgligenc 0, but even then one cannot r ashly 
or r eckless ly disregard a ll consideration for his own p0r sonal safety. In the in-
stunt case it was claimed that the D Electric Co. was negligent i n that the wires 
which wor e stretched from pole to polo some 35 fee t fr om the gr ound wor e not insu-
l at ed. What effect, if any, should be ci ven to evidence that it was not th~ prac-
tic0 or custom of (J l octri-:: companies t o ins ulat e s uch wires ? Hold: While us age and 
custom do not justify negli gence , ovidonco of such us o.ge and custom i s conclusive 
evidence of due care unless it is shovm by competent evidence that the usage does not 
afford as high prot'ection o.s vwuld r esult fr om nny other known and practical methods 
of tho bus iness . · Since no such ovid en co was introduced , P di d not prove that failure 
t o insulate the wires was negligent conduct . 
TORTS ·Proof of Nor:;ligence Sal es 192 Va . 192 
P purcha::;ed s ix bot tles of Coc'1-Col a , which she pla ced in a pasteboard carton fur-
nished by the D Mnnufucturer of the product to tho s t or E: keoper from whom P purchas ed. 
While s he was walking in tho s treet, tlrr ee of the bottles fe ll out when part of the 
carton broke , and P was ser i ously injurod by the f lying gl ass . Thor o was no proof 
of l ack of proper i nspection by D, or even whothor the carton was damaged befor e or 
after it was de liver ed t o t he stor e . 
Held : For D, as thore i s no pr oo f of negligence on its part. 
Note: Tho Court said t h0r e was l iabi lity f or ne gligence oven without privity when 
the r mnote seller or manufacturer w::1.s dealing i n f oods nr in n.rticles inher ently dan-
cror us . "But beginning with MacPhorS('ll v . Buick Motor Co . the r ecent co.s os have en-
l ar ged t ho liability of a ma nufacturer to o. rer~1ot o vondoo t o inc lude articles~ not 
i nher ently danger ous wher1 pr oporly constructed rtnd put t o thuir i ntended use, which 
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~ I.' defectively constructed may reasonab ly be anticipated to cause injury to those 
pr·-:> perly using them. 
"In the cas e before us it is not necess ary that we decide whether the former or thu 
rr,ocle rn rule should provailr' as ther e was a failur e to prove negligence. 
'r:JRTS Concurrent Causes 188 Va. 803 
M Street runs north and south and is intersected by S Street, which runs oast o.nd 
wost. In violation of a city ordinance, H parked his Buick on tho southwest corner 
in· such a way th.~'l.t it f aced south on M Stroet but proj e cted some 4 fo ot into S Street 
Duo to the negligence of A, who was driving a truck south on M Street, and to the 
ner,ligonco of B, who was driving a Ford we st on S Street, the truck hit the r ear 0net 
of the Ford, knocking it southwest in clockwis e motion o.nd crushing P between the 
Ford ~nd tho Buick. P was a little girl about nine years of age , o.nd she was at that 
momont standing in back of tho Buick avmitin(~ a chance to cross M Street when traffic 
conditions should permit. The jury thought that A was 50% to blo.me, B 40/o, and H lo;'lo 
Tho judgEJ told tho jury tho damages could not be apportioned in that manner, whor e -
upon t~e jury f ound f or P against A, B, and H. Tho court s et the verdict aside as t o 
H, over the ob,jection of A and B. 
Held: H was negligent ns a matt er of l aw in parking his car in violation of ordi-
nance . A jury could have found that StlOh parkin,; forced P t o wait in a danger ous 
placo for an opportunity to cross M Stroot. The parking was not o. supers eding caus e 
but a concurrent one. Some sort of tr affic accident could have been foreseen by H as 
a r esult of his improper parking, n.nd i'G is inrmateria.l he could not expect the very 
one that t ook place . It wo.s error t o s et o.s ide· the jury's verdict against H, a:s th,~r 
was at l east a jury question. 11Thor e is no yardstick by which every case ( of l egal 
caus ation) may bo measured nnd fitt ed ir.t o its proper plo.ce . In oa.ch cas e the problc. 
is t o be solved upon mixed cons idorat i :Jns of l ogi c , cammon s ens e , justice , policy and 
preced.:::nt. 11 ( p. 816) 
TORTS J oint ancl. Sever a l Tort-fo<:Lsors Su t;gosted by 187 Va. 530 
Duo t o tho ordinary nvgligcnco of T, u third party, and of Host, Guest was injured 
in an aut omobile collision. ·what £',r e tho ri ghts of tho parti es? 
Since tho negligence of Host is not i mputed t o Guest, T is liable to Guest. But 
does ho have a right of contribution under the statuto which allows contribution be-
t~en j oint tort-fea.s ors where it is a t ort of mero negligenc e not involving moral 
turpitude ? l'Jo o T ha.s · no such right. In s eeking contribution ho is subrogated to 
Guest's ri ghts against Host, and as Host was not guilty of gr oss ne gligence , Guest 
has no right s t o be subrogat ed to. 
TORTS -- Joint and Sever al Tort-foas ors -- Ccveno.nt Not t o Suo 191 Va. 306 
P, a l ocomotive fir or:m.n f'or theN Ry. Co ., was injured when tho l ocomotive in which 
he was riding co_llided r,tt <J. crossing with a tr actor driven by D. In consider ation of 
$3500 p gave tho r ailwc.y C·::lmpany a s i gned c0venant that he would not commence any ac-
tion a~a.inst it f or drunages arising out cf the collision . The;:; covenant expressly r e-
s erved ·the right in P t o institute D. l at er action agains t D and in addition contni ned 
thes e words, "It is expressly uP-dvrstoocl thfl t this instrument is mer ely a covenant 
not t o s ue and not a r e l eas e ." P l at E:r instituted suit aga inst D, alleging that the 
collision was the proximate r esult of D's ne gliGenc e in driving onto the cross ing in 
fr ont of the t r a i n . D fil ed a special ploo in bar r eciting the above covenant and 
tho r ul G that r e l ease of one j oint t ort-feas or is a. r e l eas e 0f all in spite of any 
r es ervs.tion of ri ghts against the oth \J r s . In r ep lication P contended that this was 
not a r e l eas e but mer e l y 9. covenant net t o sue and that ther e was nothing t o show 
that D and the r a ilway w0r e j oint t ~rt-feasors anyway. 
Hl3 l d : Judgment f or D. By the gr eat wei~-;ht of aut hority e l sewher e a covenant not 
t o sue , as distinguished fr or:! a. :re l 0t'1so , docs not oper at e t o d i schar ge the covenan-
t or's claim against othor j ~) int t ort-feas or s . But Vir ginia ho.s ado pted tho strict 
common l aw viow that r..:ny settl <>ment n.nd r e linqui shment of ri [!;hts £tgainot ono t ort-
f eas -. r oper ates as n.n a.c cor J. and sa.tisf'o.ction ani extingu is hes t ;1c ri ght t o sue other 
t or t -foas ors r ot;o.rdlos s of tho f or m ,i f t ht:: r elinquishment. P' s cont ention that ther e 
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i s no showing tht: parti e s we r e j oint tort-fe'lsors is answer D.bl -1 in two ways. [<' irst) 
i··.n.ving s1.; ttled with the railwa y company, he i s es topped to deny thn.t h EJ held o. cla i m 
.-:.o.[~(", inst it. More over, since P ha d but a singl e indivisiblo cn.use of o.ction f or dt~n ­
.-.. f~(;s f or his pe r son n.l injuries, in de t ermining whether h e h as r ecived s a tisfa c tion 
t!wr (:~ for, it · is irrnnn.t 0ria.l whether thos e guilty of the wr ongdoing wer C'; t echnica lly 
joint tort-fen.sors. · 
"I'OHTS Proximate Cause ·.190 S.E. 82 
X n egligently r a n into Y's ca r, and Y's car came to n stop on tho sido of tho road 
;:;~..Yld Y got out. Z n egligent ly ran i nt o X ' s car, which had stopped, struck it a glllnc-
ing blow, ~nd before getting .his co..r undor control had run into Y injuring him. Y 
sued X for all t"ho damages. Result? 
"V'Ihe r o thor o intervene s the independ ent act of a third pn.rty b e twc <m th<.; n egligenc o 
of the de fendant and the resulting injury which is its immed i at e ca us e , rto r e cove ry 
can b e sustainod. 11 So X is liable in this case only for th0 injury t o Y's cn.r. 
TORTS • ProxiD1Jlt e. Cause 191 S .E. 651 
Landlord n 0gl octed t o furnish metnl fir o oscnpos r.1 s r oquirod by ordinance. Fir e 
os cape could. hov o boen o.t o i thor end of hall or in middle of building . Tpe r e wer e 
woodon stairways at each end of ha ll. ' Docoased wa s burn0d t o deo.th b e cau se of in-
ability to got into and through the hall. The wooclen ste ps a t e ither end of the ho.ll 
wer e not burned . Is l andlor d liable ? 
No , as proximate cn.use o f death was ina.bility to r eo.ch hall, and dec.th wou-ld ha·,re 
r esulted even if ther e had be e n a .met rJ. l fire esco.pe n.t e"ncl of hall. 
TORTS Proximate Cause 192 s .E. 772 
P w0.s. standing on ei. gr ade crossing l r;oking a t a n a pproQching train, the enginee r 
of whi.ch .f;d:ilod t o give statutor y s.i gnn. l s . Suddenly P dec i ded t o cross in front of 
it i nstead of t o wait, but poo r P did not quit e make it, D.lld he r pers onal r e pr esenta-
tive is now suing the Southern Ry . Co . ~·Vhat r esult? 
He ld: V-//:56-416 , which pro,rides tho.t if Railroad f £dls t o gi ve s t atut ory signals 
P ' s contributory n egligenc e. i s n ot c, b ~~r but merely g~)OS in mitigation of dama ges, is 
not n.pplicable whor e sole pr oximnt o c·.tus e o f inj ury i s negli r;encc of Plaintiff. Un-
der such circumsta nc es tho giving of tho s i gno.. l c ould Give such party no i _nf ormation 
h o . d i d not a lready possess, 'J.nd fa.ilure to give si r.;nals c ouLl not be said t o b0 a 
c •; ntributing caus e ;)f the -'l ccidont. · 
TORTS Pr oximate Ca use 194 S . E. 69 2 
D, in v i ol a tion of s t u.tute , p arked his c a r withuut a. t a il li i_';ht afte r dark. Thor e 
wor o struetli ghts. P wn.s blinded by tho li ghts of an a pproaching c o.r and r o.n into 
D's car. P wa s s eriously i n jured . Is D liablo ? 1-Jc. ,. D.s vi0 l a tion o f sta tute, while 
nogligenc e per s G, W (.tS not n proxim~to c auz o o f the a cci,lon t. 
TOR TS Proximate Cause 197 S .E. 468 
S owned n. new Pierco- Arr aw c nr, which h~:J ld 24 .gn: l a ns o f 1;o. s •· He stopp0d a t the 
StB.nclard Filling Sb.tion o.nd h u·-1 it fill r:~cl up. It went about a milo when it sput-
t e r ed nnd stopped in fr ont · of the Alnc-;rican Fillin g: StAtion . Tho a.tt endn.nt ther e said 
t he gas prob ab ly h f. ..< vmtc r :l.n it. He obtn.inod 11 tir e -tos tin [~ p'ln , tha t h ol d s ome s ix 
gallons, nnd a tub <3 c:.n l s t a rted t o •lr ain •! Ut t h rJ gas o l ine . S was v ery angry and r e-
queste d the o.tterid a.nt t o t .-:tlcc~ . him t o the St undar d St a tion s ,J h o c nulcl protest ::tbout 
getting watE;r . Thls was drmo as a f avor r e luct antly cons ontorl t o by owner of the Amor 
i cD.ll St ation, who SQi d thnt he c ould not hanrlle a ll t h E:- businoss by liims olf. Ev eryonv 
f or got ab out the dr o.ining oper ations , n.n~l the pun r nn ever a.n l the gas started to run 
clown the guttor. Someone was h uorJ t ·) so.y , "I wond er i f th 'l. t i~'> gas0lin c or wat er," 
o.nd he n.ppliod the light ell match t est . The Pi erc e - Arrow was burned . I s the St a ndard 
lin.blo? Is th American l iable ? 
Hold: Applying the f r1 r es i ght test , nn.turo.l s <;qu onco t ost, t?.nd substo.ntial f actor 
t es t o f tho R th'lt tho o.ct o f tho Stand.er d wo.s t e- o r ewJt e . Thor o were t oo many inter-
voninfs circumstances . Al s~) , he wa s barr od , by his c ontributor :r negligence , fr om 
1021 
l'e :::,overy from the American Oil Company. Note that if r easonable people might diffc :c· . 
qu.:.; s tion of proximate cause is for jury. 
1'0R'!'S Proximate Cause 1 S.E. ( 2d ) 261 
On8 who see s a train approaching when thBr e is y et time to stop, and is injured irl 
a t t <Jmnting; to cross the track .ahead of i.t, cannot r EJ cover from r n.ilroa.d on ground o f 
:'a:i.lur <::- ·so sound whistl~) , since there would be no causal conn e ctj_on b etween such 
failur e :\nd the accident. But if failure to give statutory signo.l contribute s in any 
wo.y to crossing collision, injured person may r er~over from rflilrond despite gross 
ne t~ligcnc e , which may a s a result of statute :l.n Vir ginia mitigat e the amount of r o-
covery but _canno;t .prevent it. (And 11may " moa.ns 11must 11 -- 185 Vo. . 908) 
TORTS Proximate Cause 3 S.E. (2d ) 169 
A bus driver, in violation of sto.tute , stoppr;;d his bus on paV'Jcl. surface of a throo-
lar10 highwn.y"' withou} giving any signal. X, with his guest, P, was apprdaching in a 
car. X was not watching and several seconds lntor ran· into tho bus . Ct'J1 P r e cover 
from the Bus Co.? 
Held: No, becaus e the sole proximate caus e of the accident was thG officicnt intor 
ve ning act of X in not keeping a lookout. Benc e the ne gligence of the Bus Co. was no 
a proximate caus e of _ _.tho accident; nor' is this evc.-r: '·'· c.a s e of concurrent negligence . 
TORTS Proximats Cnus c 3 S.E • . (2d) 397 
The violation of a statut" , while lfne b li ~;ence pe r se, 11 will not support a r e cove ry 
f or damages unless such viole.tion p:-oximnt" ly contributPd to th;:; injury. Vihere bus , 
in violation of stntute , had stopped partially on hi t:~hw:w to discharge passenger · and 
was proc eeding to move f orward when ov3rtuking truck side swiped lms and collided with 
a.n oncoming automobile , causing d eath of mot orist, the stopping of the bus partly on 
the highway in violati on J f st n.tuto was 11r emot e c ::1us c ," and negligence of ·truck driv-
er, who could have obs e r ved bus when it wn.s 400 f eet ahe ad of truck but faile d to do 
so, was sole proximate caus e of collision. ·whcro a ~ 0 ccnd tort-feasor becom0s n.ware, 
or by ex or-cis e of ordinary care should be · a~ar t: , :- f the - .~xj_stenc e of a potential dan-
ge r created by n egligfJnce of n.n ori ginal t ort-fe o.s or a nd ther eafte r by ·nn independent 
act of neglicence brings ab out .nn accident, tho e cndition crea.teq by tho original 
tort-feasor be c omes mer e ly a circumstance o f the accident ansi is n ot o. proximate caus : 
ther eo f, and .the intervr:ming indepond E:nt tl.EJgli geno e of the second t ort-feas or b e comes 
the s ol o proximate c n.us c ;.:: f the accident. Generally, tho ju1·y and not tho· cQurt has 
tho ri ght t o determine ·.vhat is the proximate c o.us o ')f an aut omobile ~ccidqnt, but, 
when the facts nre not d isputed and a re susc eptiblo r; f but em u infer ence ,· :the ques-
ti on be c omes on e o f l n.w f or the c ourt. 
TORTS Proximatu Co. us '- 4 S .E. ( 2d ) 786 
Pede strians we r e. stand ing on th~.;; riGht s i d o of the r oad a t night and were struck by 
a truck approaching , fr om the r e ar, t he drive r of which C')Uld have sven them 350 f eet 
o.h oad e .. nd c otlld ho.ve avoided strikin~: thom by a slight turn t o the l eft. 
He l d : Violation of statute r e quiring pedestriQns t o kee p t o l eft wa s n ot a proxi-
mate c nus e .,f accident. Als o that last clear chanco ch ctrine applios. 
TORTS Proximate Ca us e Civil Conspirncy 179 Va. 335 
p brought an action of tre spass on the cas e against D and E~ alleging tho.t 'th 0y 
conspired t o ex pel hir!' fr om the Union t o which they o. ll b e l onged and t o pr event him 
f"roni having a fair he-c.ring on the ch('.r ge that h e wa s assisting competing unions. P 
admitted the truth of this l ast statement c..t the hearing . 
He l d : No c aus e of action s t ate.cl.. In o civil C(mspirocy darnnr.es must be alleged 
and proved . It must a ls o b e allGir,cd s.nd proved that the c (·•nspir n.cy was the J?roximate 
c aus e of tho damage . In the instn"Gt C flS O the c.dmissions of P c ould very well h avo 
b een t he proximate causu of t ho d.omac;o , r ath er th:m the O(' nspiracy. Not e : Ip crim-
inal c onspira cy no drunage n e ed b e pr oved . 
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TORTS Proximate Cause 186 Va. 669 
X drove a truck for Y an~ was a competent driver. He inadvertently allowed his 
dr iver's license to expire. Y knew this fact but allowed him to drive anyway. X 
stopped by his sister's house, and her children came running out and started to clim~ 
on the truck. She ordered them to go around in the back yard and stay there. One oi 
t hem, aged 6, snelik:ed back, climbed i nto the truck, and hid hims elf. When X started 
s:way, tho boy became panic-stricken and jumped from the truck and was killed. Is Y 
lia.blo? 
Held: No. X's not having a driver's permit was not a proximate cause of the child's 
injury, so it is not necessary to consider any other points. 
TORTS ; Proximate Cause 187 Va. 222, 227 
Dr. D negligently ran into P. Th~ force of the car drove a portion of P's metal 
garter and portions of his clothes into his leg. Dr. D s ewed up P's wounds, l eaving 
parts of his garter and clothes ther e in. P gave Dr. D a release for all damages aris-
i ng out of the collision. Sometime l at er gangrene s et in, and P was permanently in-
jured.' He sued Dr. D for ne gligently treating the wounds. Dr. D r e lied on the r e -
l ease. What judgment? · 
Hold: ·The s econd tort was independent of tho first. A r e l eas e of Dr. D in his 
capacity as chauffeur does not r ol eas e. him from ~ tort committed in his capacity as 
a doctor. One cannot r easonably f or esee that if he injures a man his dqctor is going 
to be so gross ly negligent as to s ow for e i b~ substances i nto his wounds. Hence the 
first wrongful act is not the proxL~ate cauJe of the s econd one . Cf. A.L.I. Torts, 
Section 457, wher e the originD.l wrongdoer is made li r.tble f or t he risks of medica l at-
t ention whether render ed in a proper or n<1 gligent manner. 
TORTS Pro~imate Caus e 187 Va. 384 
The D Ry. Co . l eft one of its coal cars s o that it proj ected ha lfway across a high-
way. Although the night w~s dark and f oggy, thG coa l car was not lighted. P was 
trave ling about 20 miles ~n hour wit h hi s eye Qn the white line in the center of the 
road. The coal car obstructed the l eft ha lf of the r oad as P ~pproabhcd on his right. 
The white line stopped abruptly when it came t o the r ailway cros s ing, and P r an into 
the coal car and wns injured. The court instructed the jury that if they believed by 
a pre ponder ance of the evidence that tho coa l car was on P's l oft side of the highway 
tltey should find f or D. Was this instruction proper? 
Hel d : No . The statute r equiring people t o drive on tho right w::> s not passed f or 
the protection of r ailroads while s t oring their unlighted cars on public highways at 
night. The jury might have f ound that P's be ing on the· wrong side was inadvertent 
and a condition or circumstance of the collision r ather than a proxirr~te caus e ther e-
of. At any r at e it was err or not t o submit this i scue t o the jury. 
TORTS Proximat e Cause 194 Va .• 692 
According t o D's evidence , he was drivinb north in the l0ft northbound traffic lane 
when the car in front of him suddenly st opped , wher eupon D Lad t o s t op suddenly with-
out giving s ignals. and P, who was f ollowing on n mot or sco ot er, ran into D and was 
hurt. According to P's version, D. was i n the ri ght northbound t r affic l ano , turned 
suddenly and without s i gna l into tho l eft l ano , and as suddenly stopped wi thout giv-
ing any s~gnal, although P admitted that he saw D's car mu.ke this turn and slowed 
down f or that r eason. .The court i nstructed the j ury that i f D f a iled t o give ade-
quate signa ls, t hen he was liable t o P unles s F w11s cont ributorily negligent. D als o 
asked f or an instruction which was contrary t c his evidence althou~h supported by P' £ 
evidence . 
He ld: (1) The instruction given was orroneous, becaus e it r e quired D t o give a sig-
nal even if i t wer e not pos s ible f or him t o do s o 9ocnu s e of the sudden .s top of the 
car i n fr ont of him. (2) Unl ess D' s turni ng into the l s ft t raffic l ane was a proxi-
mate caus e of P' s injury, it i s i.nunat eris. l whether or n r-:. t p.t;t gave signa l s at that 
t i me. (3) D i s entitled t ~ any ·proper ins truction he wishe$ th11t i s based upon rele-
vant .. eviden-ce even though he himse lf contends t he f acts wer e differ-ent. 
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?ORfS Foreseeability of Result 104 Va. 39 
P leased a house to D for one year. D abandoned the premises leaving the door un-
locked. Thre e weeks later it was burned by some tramp. P sued D. What judgment? 
He ld: For D. Loaving the door unlocked was not a malicious act. "If the wrong 
·md the r osulting damage are not known by c·ommon experience to be natura lly and usu ·.'- : 
ly in sequence, and the damage does not, according to the ordinary course of events, 
f'ollow from the wrong, then the wrong and the damage are not sufficiently conjoined 
••••• as cause and effect t 'o support q.n action." The wrongful act of tho tramp wo.s n.r 
efficient intervening cause as a matt'tlr of law. Cf. Hines v. Garrett, 131 Va. 125, 
whore defendant railway was held liable for a criminal assault made on a female pas-
senger who was negligently carried past. her destination and let of~r near a city durnp 
about dusk when to the knowledge of the officers of the railway tramps made their 
headquarters there. Such an attack or efficient intervening cause could have been 
foreseen, and. in such a cO:se there is no break in tho causal connection~ 
TORTS Foreseeability of Result 186 Va. 74 
P, rtged 75, was in the D Hospital for nn eye operation. He had boon warned not to 
attempt to go to the bathroom bu,t to ring for n. nurs e , who would send for an orderly. 
He rang and rang and rang. After waiting for s ome thirty minutes he attempted to go 
hims e lf, as the pain ru1d embarrassment' v;ero unbearable . He f e ll and broke his hip. 
De f ense : Proximate caus e of accident was his own 11ct in going himself.. . 
Held for P. Such an 11tte:mpt on P 's part could have been forese en. The cause of P 1 
going himself was f a ilure of hospital nurs e to pay any attention to his bell. Under 
such circumstances there is no effici ont intervening cause r e lieving D. Compare: Ir 
184 Va. 994 an intoxicated pass en ger was nc;: g li gently put off a bu)f) in a dangerous 
place and run over by a "third -po.rty. Ee ld: No break in caus a l connection. In 
111 Va. 32 a pass enger was n<J gligently d irected to wrong train. .A.fter it started, 
he jumped off injuring himself. It was he ld that his ovm negligent act in jumping 
off was sole proxima t e caus e of injury. But in this case passenger voluntarily 
jumped , while in hospital case P was f orced by his pain to do an act D should have 
anticipated. R#(r43 of Torts, "An intervening act of a humrm being or animal which 
is a normal respons e t o the stimulus of a situation created ~y the actor's negligent 
c onduct is not a superseding caus e o f harm to another ••••• " 
' TORTS For(;3see ability o f Re sult 187' Va. 222 
Dr. Ono pulled P's t ooth but negligently l oft a r oot in her gums. He r e fused t o d e 
anything f urther by way of treatment <:..nd paid P $225 f or u r e l ease. P then went to 
Dr. Two who pulled an ad j ac ent t ooth and s owed s ome a bs orbent cotton into the cavity 
made by the r0movo.l of thu t ~Joth. She su ed Dr. · Two, wh0 relied on the releas e she 
had gi ven Dr. One . 
Hold: For P. The s e cond wrong by Dr. '1\vo was not Cl:'. us od by the first wrong of Dr. 
One. Ho could not r eas onably foresoo o.ny such g r ()SS negligence by another doctor. 
Even thou gh the injury t o P' s gums mor ~;ed int•J on o injury, she is still entit'led t o 
a chance t o prove the runount of each t\nd t o r ocov <? :r from Dr. 'rvro f or h,is second i ·n-
jury t o her. The or d inary rule that if X injures Y and Y goes t o a doctor who treats 
him unskillfully X is liable f or the ln.tter injuries a ls o , ho.s no application her e , 
b e caus e (1) Dr. Two was not continuing tho r ~movo. l of tho r oot but performing a dis-
tinct oper ati on a..11d (2 ) tho sewing of tho cr) tt ,Jn into the cavity was s o extraordina r :y 
as not t o be r oasono.bly anticipat ed . 
TORTS For es eeability of Resu lt 193 Va.. 543 
p was a p ass onger on D's bus. Tho bu s stopped t o l ot her off w~th tho rear of tho 
bu s on ther tro.c.ks of a r a ilroad line opor e.t ed so l e ly by th e M Co . for s.erving the 
needs of its coal mine . P alighted and waited a moment t o s ee who.~ the operator of 
tho bus was go ing t o do . Some ca r s on the railroad we r e boing backed out and struck 
the bus , causing it t o b e shoved upon P. Both tho bus drive r and th,bs o in char ge of 
tho train should ho.vo s een each ot i1cr. D contends that its n er;ligenc e in s t opping 
the bus on tho tracks was a r omot o cause of tho accident and tho.t M'a neglig~nce was 
t he s ol o proximat e caus e cf P's injury. 
I 
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Held: A jury could find that D could reasonably have foreseen the intervening 
caus e , and in such a case the .causal connection is not broken. 
TC)li. TS Assumption of Risk Agency 193 S.E. 524 
A truck driver was in charge of a truck and under duty to keep it in r epair. r was 
tile t ruck driver's helper. He told truck driver the brakes were bad, and truck drive · 
pronii sed to i'ix them that night. .Eext day P. was inJured as a result of defective 
br akes, o. s . the truck driver had not fixed brakes. The ovme r of truck employed only 
3 mon. Is he liable to P? 
Hold: Ye $ , for ( a) common le·,v applio~; (b) knowledge of truck driver was employer' ; 
knowledge; (c) truck driver .was a vice-principal and not a f 0 llow servant; (d) P did 
not assume risk when he continued work as a result of promise that brakes would be 
fixed. $20i000 r e covery sustained. · 
TOR.TS As sumption of Risk 12 S.E. (2d) 821 
P, a station agont for the Southern Ry. Co., met his doath whe n h e f e ll off a 
bridge• while cho eking · numbers on ·freight cars that wen.: in interstate commercE.:. The 
Ry. Co. had violated no sta tl.J.t c , and the dange rs of the work we r e obvious and fully 
known toP. What are P's rights? 
They are governe d by tho F ede ral Employers Liability Act, 45 u.s.c.A. #&1 and 54. 
P sued for $25,000. He ld: No r e covery. Und E:J r this act assumption of risk is a de-
fens e unle ss tho Ry . Co. h as viol::l t od a statuto enacted for tho safety of employee s 
and such violation is _a proximat e caus e of the injury, or the r ailway compa ny has 
in some other wa.y boen neglig:.ent. I n a lJ. other ca.s os ( a nd this is one of them), the 
assumption of risk is still a d e f ense in nn action brought und e r this act. Not e : If 
Workmen's Compens ation La.w had a pplied, t hen assumption of risk would have b een no de· 
f enso. · 
TORTS Contributory Negligence 198 S.E. 441 
Q. Is the following instruction proper in n n egli genc e ca s e wher e defendant r e.lies 
upon plaintiff's c ontributory negligenc e '~ "The court instructs the jury that if the 
defendants rely upon the c ontributory negligenc e of tho pla intiff as a def ens e in 
this ca s e , then tho burden is upon s a id de f end ants t o pr ovo such contributory negli-
gence by a pre ponderanc e of tho evidence ." · 
-A. . Tho above should be suppleme nted by adding ther e t o "unless such contributory 
negli genc e is disclos ed by plaintiff's evidenc e or cnn be fairly inferred from the 
circumstances." In this particular c as e , since neithe r pla i ntiff's e videnc e nor the 
circumstance s showed that plaintiff was guilty of c ontributory negligence , the in-
struction a s originally given wa s h armle ss . 
Note: For c ontributory ne gli gence t o b e n bnr it must ho.vo b een a substantial fac-
t or in causing the accident . HencG em instruction tha t no rocov ery should be allowod 
if plaintiff's negligenc e " in any dogr ee " c ontributed t r) the accident is err oneo us 
as overemphasizing ~rivialitios. 
TORTS Contributory Ne gli g0nc e 1 S.E . (2d ) 255 
Is contributory ne gligence o f doco o.sod a bar -i f ho is kill ed while cross ing a rail-
r oad track in a. city that ho.s no ordinance r equiring any sort of s i gnal t o b e g iven ? 
Yes. V#56-414 appli es only t o casas in which n signal i s r equired by statute or 
ordinance . In a ll other c o.s os C'"lnnne>n l aw principle s a pply. 
TORTS ·Contri-butory Ncgli[~unc o 12 S.E. (2d) 826 
D ente red a highway fr om ·'.l pri v at 0 r oad . He stopp0d. and l r)Q kod o.nd then ent er ed 
the hi ghway, whore h o was s truck by I' wh0 vvos tra ve ling at nn excessive r a t e of 
speed • . P contends h e had tho ri ~~ht o f wny . Dis cuss . 
By V#46-2~8 the driv8r of any vehiclo trave l ing at an unlawfu l speed f orfe its any 
right o f wrxy which h u mi ght otherwise ha ve . 
TORTS 
Q. 12. 
Contribut ory N8 gligo nc e Bo.r Exam Doc., 1943 
A is a d.romo.n on a Norfo l k a.n,d Weste rn tr a in running fr om Roanoke., Va. t o 
• ' 
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Hagerstown, Md. The en gineer :('an by a red light which could have been observed by 
t .w:J fi reman and the engineer for., a distance of a mile. By virtue of this ne gligence 
a bend - on collision resulted with another train, and the fireman lost his life. His 
widow duly qualified as administratrix and instituted a suit under the Federal Employ 
crs Liability Act for $50,000. Under the rules of the Company the fireman was charge< 
with joint responsibility with the engineer in the proper observance of signa ls. At 
tho tria l the defendant company offered to prove the rules, to which couns el for the 
pl a intiff objected. (1) How should the court rul E;) , and, (2) assuming that the s.uit 
wo.s brought in the Oircuit Court o.f Warren County, Virg~nia, wh'lt would be the limit 
of tho plaintiff's recovery? · 
A. Under tho Federal Employers Liability Act (which governs employees of railv·).ys 
engaged in interstate commerce ), contributory negligence of the injured party is not 
a bar to un action, but may be shown in mitigation of damages. · Hence the company 
should be allowed to prove the rules, as they ar e relevant on the question of contrib· 
utory ne gligence. The limit under the State Act is $25,000,. bl.lt Stat e Act applies 
only if injury occurr ed while engaged in intrastnte corrrrnorce. There is no hard and 
f ast llmi t ·under the Foc1eral Act, the ordinary rules as to damages applying. 
TORTS Contributory Negligence 184 Va. 94 
p r eached the D Filling Station at i2 :30 a.m. and asked the attendant to fill his 
gas tank. P got out of his car to go to the r est room. He asked no one where it 
was, opened a door, f e lt ar ound for a light; and f e ll into the greas e p:lt and was 
s eriously injured. 
He ld: P is barred by his contributory negligence . He ho.d no implied invitation to 
grope around tho premises in the dark. 
TORTS Contributory Ne gligence V#5 6-416 · 185 Va. 908 
p was injured in a grade crossing railway accident at a public crossing. The D Rai . 
way Co. had not given the signals required by statute. V#56~416 gives the injured 
party under these circumstances a cause of action in spite of his own contributory 
negligence (unless that is sole proximat e caus e of the a ccident) and concludes "but 
the f ailure of the tr ave lzr to ex:ercis e (due ) car e may be considered in mitiga.t·ion of 
damages." --
Held: May means mus t in the above cas e t aking into cons1idoration the purpos e and 
history of the statute . Hence a written instruction t e lling the jury that it may 
take P' s negligence into considenttion to mitigate the damages is r ever s ible error, 
even if court has told the jury orally that it must do so. Th~t written instructions 
go to the jury and would carry more we i ght than the court's oral stat ement. 
TOR TS Contributory Negligence 186 Va. 106 
A municipal ordinance r equired trains switched across Ma. in St. to come to a stop 
and for a fl abffian to signal traffic befor e tra in proceeded. The D Co. failed to have 
a. fl agmru! ther e . P was injured when tra in struck hi s truck, although tra in was in 
clear view. If he had been looking , ho could ha.vG s een the tr ain more easily than 
ho could have seen a flagman who would ha ve pointed out the obvious. · 
He ld: P i s' barred by his contribut ory nogli gonce a s a. matter of l11w. Note: In 
t his cas e t he doctrine of compar ative negligence (wher e r a ilroad f ails to give stat-
utory signal s , negligence. of pla intiff is not a bar but go0s in mitigation of damage s . 
V-#56-416) was not r elied on in tria l c ourt. Hence it cnnnot be urgod f or the first 
time in the Supremo Court of App.oals. 'rho court i ndicat ed, howevor, that the s ol e 
proximat e -c aus e of the acc i dent was P's driving in fr ont of the train, in which evont 
p could r ecover nothing . Not e: "Noithor go ngs or go.t 0s r e lieve a traveler from the 
exercise of or dipary car e o.nd caution •. I n 160 Va . 633, it was he l d that even though 
a fl ag;rnan. on th(; cros s i ng s i gno. l ed t ho t r :wdur t o cr os s , the tro.vo l er was not r e -
lieved of t he duty of l ooking ." 
TORTS Contributory Ncgligonco Muni cip r:t l Co r por ations 189 Va . 576 
Pl aintiff knew of a. depr es s i on i n a s i dewal k i n Ri chmond but t hrough inadvertence -· 
0r f or getfulness he stepped in it, slipped , . and br oke his L g . Is he guilty of 
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c ontributory ne gligence as a matter of law? 
!-Ie ld: Yes. He OY'f0S the city the duty to us e his s 0ns es and not to walk into defoc ~ 
that ho is familiar with and could easily avoid by the exercis e of ordinary care . 
Otht~r case: P knew some boards on a board sid ewalk were loose. She stepped on a 
bo8rd without first ascertaining whether or not it was s e cure , and it fl ew up and hit 
rwr.- in th:c; face. He ld: P's action is barred by her contributory negligence, llO Va. 
296 . 
TORTS Contributoi'Y Negligence Railway Crossing .Cas e 191 Va. 212 
Decoasod was kill ed when the garbage truck he was driving collided with e. train. 
The a ccid0nt occurred at a crossing used by the City of Pete rsburg , with the a pprova l 
of tho railroad company, for access to its city dump. When not b e ing us ed by city 
trucks, the ·crossing was barr ed to prevent public uso . On the occasion of the a cci-
dent d e ceas ed should have s een the train coming . His administr ator, howev0r, con-
t ends th,a t tho ~ailroad did not give statutory signals, and tho.t unde r the Vir ginia 
statutrJ, dEJc oas ed' s ne gligence is not a bar but only oper a t es to mitigat G the damages 
He ld': The statute (V-#5 6-416) is applicable to failur f3 to gi vo the si gnals r e quired 
by · l ow "on approaching a gr ade crossing of r, public .highway 11 ::md has no application 
t o a non-public crossing used only by the city ii:lmployeos. Thus the contributory neg-
ligence of deceased i s a bar to any action. . 
TORTS Contributory Negligenc e 193 Va. 579 
S 's truck had mechanic .,1 troubl e and wo.s forced to s t op on tho highway. No fl ares 
were put out, 9. lthough fhl.ros a r e r .oquircd by law. Ten minutes l a t e r P approached i n 
a truck and did not r ealiz e ~J.t once that S ' s truG:k had como to a stop. When he was 
about 30 yards fr om the truck, h8 r en. liz od t h e true s t at e of affairs. However, wh0n 
he went to .put on his bra kG, his foot slippod, hitting the acc 0 l e r ator and causing 
P's truck to plow into S 's truck. Estch sued the other, and the jury r eturned a ver-
dict in f avor of P. S a ppeal ed, cl a imin[ th~t tho verdict should have been in his 
f avor. 
He ld: Each is b o.rr 1:1d by his c ontributory negli gence. S's negligenc 0 wa s of a con-
tinuing nature ri ght up t o the mom0nt of tho co llision. If fl a r es had been placed 
as r equired by statute , it is pr ob abl,') that P wonld ha vo c ompreh ende d the situation 
sooner. While he was und oubted ly inattentive , .? ' s noglig·.:mco cannot be r egarded us 
the superseding caus e o f tho accident. 
TORTS Contributor y Negli gonc 0 194 Va . 572 
P wa s D's invitoe a t its studio whero ~he h <.1.d gone to t ak e part . in a f ashion show. 
Shu was directed by W, an empl oyee of D, t o p <t s s i n sing l e fil e thr ou gh o.n entrance 
a t tho loft of tho r oar of the s t age., tl-t0 fl o•J r o f whicl~ , as cons tructed, had two 
l ev e l s , the l owe r of which had n dr op o£' from four t n s:·.x inches . This drop was 
l o cated just a stop or two f r '1m the cnt .:-nncc . T -1.0 f l oo r s <; f ea ch l ev e l wer e b oth 
mado of hi ghly poli3hed oak . Ther e wuo bright :t. i0hts .'lbove cmd no s i gns or othE:r 
indication o f the chan e;o in l ev E: l .. ') thor tha n tho urop itsolf. P inadvertently 
stepped over the dr op·, l os t ho:r ·on.l ance , and f e ll. ·:'1:-H;; t ri o. l court struck out P' s 
e vidence on the gr ound that sho wa.s contributori ly ncg.J.l c;ent as a matte r of l aw. 
He ld: Rov or sed and r emanded . It was nt l eas t a jury ~ u estion ns t o whether or 
not sh e was oc ntributorily n t;gli g;.; nt . A jury c ould find '..hat tho s ame type of fl oor 
and the r ofl e <Jtion of tho brigh t light c t oge ther, with no 'Pnrnin~; of any kind , ab -
so 1 ved hor fr o.m ony ne[~ li gonou (m h ur part. 
TORTS Cont~ibutory Nogligcnce 194 Va. 670 
He ld: . A biowclis t who i s r iding 0n t he s h0u l d or of a r oad , l;u--ns into the r oad 
in fr ont of a ~ar, a nd f ails t o f~ivu th0 s i gnal fo r n l e ft turn 1\S r e quir ed by stat-
ute is barred £"rom r .::. cov ering; ag;n. ins t J. mot c·ri s t who s truck hh1 immediate ly ther e -
after, b ecaus e .h e i s guilty of c ontributor y nogliL~en co n.s Lc ma~~or of l aw. 
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TORTS Violat ion of Statute Contributory Negligence 12 S.E. (2d ) 833 
In violation of a city ordinance X made a U-turn in the middl e of a block. His ca .t 
stalled on the street car track, and a few minutes later a street car came along and 
r :m into it, injuring X and the car. What ar e X's rights ? 
l!eld: He has no ri ghts. While thi s violation of the ordinan~e was not mat eria l, 
s .i.nce n was not n: proximate caus e of the accident, he was negligent in not getting 
out and pushing his car off the track. · He had just as much chance to do this ~s the 
street car had a chance to stop, and .one cannot shut his .eyes to danger in blind r e -
li u.nce upon the unaided care of another without assuming the consequences of the omis · 
sion of such car e . (Hudgins, J. dis senting) 
TORTS Vio~ation of Statute -- Contributory Negligence 
Hot e : By V'ff 46-247 a pedestrian may l egally wa lk on e ither s houlder of a hi ghway. 
TORTS Last Clear Chance 186 S.E. 13 
1. Def endant is liable under l ast clear chance doctrine both wher e he actually s ees 
Pl a int1ff's peril and fails to exercl.s0 ordinary care to avert injury, and a l s o wher e 
De fendant, be ing under duty to keep proper lookout for Plaintiff, by exercise of ordi · 
nary car e should have seen Pl a intiff's. peril in timo to avoid injury by use of ordi-
nary car e ( at l east when Pla i ntiff is helpless). 2. Fact that chauffeur was act ing 
gr atuitously i s irmnat er ial with r es pect to owner's liab ility. 
TORTS Last Clear Chance 189 S. E. 169 
P was standing in the midd l e of the str eot t a lking to a fri end. D negligently r an 
into P, who had his back t o D. Is P barr ed by his contributory negligenc e ? 
As D in the exercis e of due dilig~mco hn.d a last cler:tr chanc e to avoid the acci-
dent, contributory negligence of P i s not a bnr. 
Cf. · Hfld P been walking t oward the path of the car, then bot h would have been guil-
ty of continuing nGgligcmco th '1.t contributed to the occident to the vory time of the 
· a ccident, and m s contributory nogligonce would then be a bar. 
TORTS Las t Clear Chance 189 S .E. 342 
'fwo cars appr oa ched an i nters ecti on, each having ~ plain view of tho other. Ne itho~ 
driver wo.s keeping an o.doguo.t o l ookout, o.nd as a. r esult ther e was a collision. Dis-
cu-ss fr om the s t andpoint ·or the "last clear chance doctrine . 11 
"The doctrine of the l a st cleL"\r chance cannot be succes sfully invoked . That n.venuo 
of esco.po is not 2:_ ~-wa.y r oad. 11 1Jiiher e en ch has a l as t clea.r chance , each is 10qu a ll~ 
to blame in not t aking advantage of thD.t fact. 
TORTS Last Cloar Chance 194 S .E. 665 
(a) Upon whom is tho burden of pr oof of wh EJ ther or mlt def endant had a last clear 
chance t o avoid .the accident? . 
Headnote 5 r eads ' in part, "Plai nti f f cannot r ecover under th'l l ast clear chance 
doctrine on mere per advent ure , and h:.\S the burden of showing u.f f irmati ve ly by a pt"e-
pondera.nc o of the ev{dence that def endant had a l ast clear chance to avoid the injury 
by us ing ordinary car e ." · 
(b) A boy was walking westerly un th o l eft edge of a r oadway f or west-bound trnf-
fic. Ho r an diagonally i nto tho r oadway dir ectly in fr ont of a west-bound auto on 
hearing the h rn ther eof. · Driver had l ess than a s e cond t o s ave boy afte~ his peril 
b.e-c a.me known and could do nothing but sworve t o the ri ght, which he di d , striking the 
boy. I s l ast clear chance doctr ine o.pplic F.tblo ? 
No . The l ast clear chanc e do ctrinu prosup~l s o s t i me f or eff ective action and is 
inapplicable t o sudden emer genci es aff 0r ding n o time t •J av'l i d the accident. 
TORTS Last Cl aar Chanc e 8 S.E. (2d ) 301 
Plaintiff's intestnt o Wf'. s r olling his bicycle up a hill em t he ri ght hand s~de of 
the r oad when he was struck by De f endant , who fnil i:ld t :> koop a pr opor l ookout.. What 
ar e the ri ghts of the - par tios ? The so l u proxima.tG cause 0f th o accid ent wa~ D~fend­
ant ' s f ai lure t o koep o. pr oper l ockvut , ns he ther eby precluded hims e lf fr om t a.k;ing 
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advantage of the last clear chance to avoid the injury. Hence it is unne ces sary t , 
d e cid e. whethe r a bicyclist, upon dismounting, should walk on the l e ft as a pedestrJ_-
::m . It makes no difference whethe r deceased was negligent or not negligent, a s t he; 
last cle a r chance doctrine he r e allows a recovery, oven though Plaintiff's intestat •. 
vms negligent. 
TORTS Last Clear Chance 178 Va. 207 
P was walkin g a cross a brightly lighted street a t night in the middle of the block 
and without looking out for traffic. D did not s ee he r ~nd r an his taxica b into h e r 
with gr ev.t force while trave ling 40 miles per hour, thG spe ed limit being 25 miles 
per hour. P was seriously injured , and the jury awarded he r $15, 000. I s th8 vordi c 
contrary to law? 
He ld~ A good verdict. D, if he had b een keeping a proper lookout, would have had 
a last clear chance to avoid the accident. He is not .:mti tled to run into her mer e -
ly be cause she was negligent. In Virginin. if defend n.nt did ha ve , or, in the exer-
cise of a proper lookout, should havo had; a las t clear chance to .avoid the a cci-
dent,•then he cannot rely on P's contributing n0gligonce . 
TORTS Last Clear Chanc e 180 Va. 1 
P was a gratuitous gu est in D' s car, which was full of womon and children. R was 
proceeding east on Vn.lley St. , which was an a rt eri a l h i ghwo_y. D was proceeding 
south on Court St., which inter se cted Valley St. at ri ght nng l es. vVhen D r each ed 
Valley St., ho stopped his ca r and thEm stnrt ed it age.in. R's car a nd D's c a r col-
lided , and P wa s seriously injured. P was sitting in the b o_ck soat of D's car nnd 
saw R's car approaching some - 150 feet away . Neither D nor R was traveling a t a n 
excess ive rato of speed, :1nd n e ithe r smv the other until th0 moment of tho cra sh. 
What ar e the ri ghts of the parties? 
P can r e cover fr om D only if D has b e en gr oss ly n egligent . Hold: Driving a c ar 
a cross an arteria l highway without keeping a l ookout when the co_r is full o f women 
and children is gross neg lige nce . R clc~imod he had tho r ight of way and henc e was 
n ot liable . He ld: First, D must havo ente r ed V ~llcy St. b e f or e R r oached the in-
ters ection, o_nd the one who first enter s the inter section has tho ri ght o f way ; s ec-
ond, even if R did · h ave th e right of way, that _ does not '3-bs o lvo him from his duty t o 
kee p o_ proper l ookout. 
, Note : Tho fact thnt each party h o.d .a >last cloar cLo.nce t o avoid the acc ident pre -
cludes tho applicat i on of th n.t principle , n. s · it rlo os nr)t lie in tho mouth of e ither 
t o blame the other for the samo thing that he hims e l f 1s guilty of. 
TORTS Last Clear Chance 182 Va. 746 
peceased wo_s wo_lking down tho r oc.rl on hi s ri ght l eo_d i ng a !~0r so . D r an into the 
horse with his co.r, ct:Jusing tht3 hors e t o strike dc:;coased . It l s a violation of 
statute t o wa lk on the hi ghway with ono '1 s b ack t o traffic. Is D liable ? 
Hald : Yos. He h o_d o_ l o.st cl0ar chance t o a void injurin t; do ceosed , o_nd his fo_ilur€ 
t o avai l himself the r eo f wa s tho cole proximate cau se 0 f the a c c .ldont. D's contrib-
utory ne gligenco as a matter of l aw wus a romot e c n.use nndhenco not a bar. 
'l'ORTS Last Claar Cha nco 184 Va. 984 
G' s truck broko down o.t 11 p.m. Tho <'.river the r eof mado no e ffort to get it off 
~he highway. Ho d id not light flar es o_;; r e quired by statuto . His t ail lights did 
not conform t o statutory r oquir r,;mont s . ?i ve hour s l nt cr H' s truck r an into G' s 
truck. Tho driver of H's ·truck was not k ~ eping: a pr op0r l ookout. What a r e the 
rights of the parti e s? 
He ld: Both parties a r e bo_rr e d . G' s nogii e;onco Wl .S g,r oss and c ontinued t o the 
time o f the accident. G had five h ours in whi. ch t o prev ent tho o_ccidont, H only a 
f GW seoOiids. G's truck WO.S 0. tro.p , rmd G ought not t o be allowed t o coll e ct damages 
fr om one who wn.s injured by his tr a;:> . G i nvited ';_hv d is as t e r and should boar his 
own l oss. · The l ust clonr chance do ct rine J oos n" I; npp ly whor e ' the n egli genc e o f eac' 
e ffici ent ly contribute s t r) the accirl.c;nt t o thu v e ry moment t her eof . To ho l d otherwi: 
wou ld pr actica.lly do away wit h tho l rw 0f contrif•utory und c oncurring negligenc e . 
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TORTS Last Clear Chance 187 Va. S!J 
P owned a farm through which ran the tracks of the DRy. Co. P's hovs c and barn 
were on one side of the tracks and his pasture on the other. He was killed while 
driving his car across his private crassing. The only eye witnesses were thf; eng;:i -
neer and fireman, who both testified they saw him near the track and gave a warning 
·,vhistlo. The jury found for P on the last clear chance doctrine. 
Held: The trial court properly set aside the verdict. There was no proof the D 
Ry . Co. had a last clear chance to avoid the accident. The employoes could assume 
that P would not l eave a safe place for one of danger •. It was impossible to stop 
tho tr-ain; whereas, P could have stopped. The sole proximate cause of P's death was 
his own continuing ne.gligence in crossing in front of a train in full view and in 
bro,J.d daylight. 
TORTS Last Clear Chance 187 .va. 820 
p was crossing a street after dark between the wpite lines in that portion of the 
street marked for the use of pedestrians. When sho was thro e-fourths of the way 
acros·s, she saw X' s car one-half block 8.Wo.y a pproaching at a. moderate rate of speed. 
She quicken0d hor steps to get across first. X did not s ee her "becaus e of the 
glare" of a street light until he was .practicf'.lly on her, when he turned the ca.r 
sharply and applied his brakes. P was struck by tho right fender of the car, which 
caught her by only a few inches and s eriously injured P. X died shortly thereafter, 
and P sued D, who was X's personal r e proscnto.tive . Tho jury found that P was barred 
by her contributory negligenc e , and the court r efused to give an instruction on the 
last clear chance doctrine . What result on app0al? 
He ld (3 judges diss enting): Affirmed. When P misjudged the speed and distance 
of the approaching car and quick.onod hor steps to pas s in front of it, she was guil-
ty of negligence in walking in front of an appror.. ching danger. X could not ·be ex-
pe cted to for es ee that any pedestrian v;ould be fool enough to cla im the right of 
way over an a.utornobile , 0von n.t an intersection whore pedestrians theoretically have 
the right of way. Her negligence continued t o tho very moment of the impact, and 
X never had time for eff ective action t o prevent the injury. Hence this is not a 
last clear cha.nco cas o . 
Dissenting judges argue tha.t P ha.d ri ght of way and mot orists must r ecognize such 
a right. P could assume X would keep a proper l ookout and slow down, v0er, or even 
stop, if necessary. ThE') dissenting judgas thought that the "glar e"· of a street 
light increas ed visibility and that the real caus e of the a ccident was X' s failur e 
to keep a proper l ookout, and that o. jury might have found, if properly instructed, 
that he did have , or should hn:ve had, a last clear chance to avoid striking P • . 
TORTS Last Clear Cho.nce 189 Va. 712 
0 was driving his car on o. dreary December morn just o.fter daybreak. His wind-
shl.alci was for the most part covered with fro st, which he had negligently failed to 
r-emove . P was walking on tho right s ide of tho street on the hard surfo.ce thereof 
with her back t o D' s approaching car. The paved portion of the street was only 15 
feet wide, and a truck wo s approaching in the oppos ite dir ection. D did not sea P 
'Cm:td.l it was too l ateto avoid striking her. Is D liable t o P under the last cle o.r 
~ doctrine? 
!ffild: No. Up to tho very moment of ·tho collision P could have avoided the acci-
by stepping off the pavod portion of the highwo.y. The last cle~r chance doc -
.- · is not a one -way street. · She w~~s not in a state of he lpless ness. Hence she 
!_s - orred by her . contributor y ne; gligenco in (l) walking on tho wr ong side of the 
·~~t a~d ( 2) not keeping a bolcout. for tro.ffic coming up fr om behind; es pecially 
whe she s aw that tho·. t:t;"uck appr oach2ng hor was nbout t o block the other half of 
'the·-s et. Three judges c oncurr ed specially. They 'lgr eod with tho r esult in this 
cas-a. b e caus e D did n ot know in timv t o avoid the accidont thn.t P was unaware o~ 
her . danger • 
Last Clear Chanc o 194 Va. 47 
·De>QeD.sed was one of f our men who wer o pushing a s t alled co.r a l ong the hi ghway in 
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tree dark. Be was on the left of the car toward the middle of the highway. D was 
driving his car at a negligent rate of speed, and he did not see deceased in time 
to avoid striking hirri. Ther e was a conflict in the evid ence as to whether or not 
the stalled car had its lights on and whether or n&t it was over the center of the 
road. The trial court gave several instructions .on the last clear chance doctrine . 
7'l>'\S this proper? · 
He l d : No. The sole ques-tion is whether deceased was guilty of contributory ne g-
ligence or not. I.f he was pushing a· car without l ights .and over t he center of the 
r~ad, his continuing to act in that· manner was a proximat e cause of the accident. 
If ho was pushing a car with lights and on his, part of the hi ghway, he. was not guil-
ty of contributory nogli gence. 11 Tho doctrine of l ast clear chano.e is to be applied 
with caution, and 8. plaintiff is not entitled to recover under it on mer e. per adven-
ture . 11 Here there was no time for effective s.ction after deceased's per .il was dis-
cover ed or should have been discovered. Henc0 no instructions should have been 
given on the l ast clear chance doctrine . 
Note: In l94 Va. 116 the . same principle was applied. In that cas e a drunken man 
suddenly appeared on a crowded highway. De f ond •:mt was unabl e to avoid striking him 
within the s econd he had at his dispos a l • . It was D. lso stated that the law of ncg-
ligm:ice as to intoxicatud persons· is _the s nme us that t:lpplico.blo to the sober. 
TORTS Last Clear Chance 194 va. 374 
P was driving his car north on W Stroot which meets at right angl es, · but does not 
cross, H Street ., which l atter street runs east and west. P was attempting to make 
a l eft turn, but his steering gear brdke , and his car went straight ahead. He 
stopped in such a .position that t ho r oar of his ca.r projected over tho north half 
of H Street. P got out of his car t o size up the situation, and his wife als o got 
out. The wifo ca lled t o ? , who was thon standing to the west 9f his disabl ed auto, 
tha.t ·a car was approaching fr om the. otls t but that she thought it was go ing to stop. 
Shu thon lo oked t o sue wher e her pet dog had gone . Tho upproaching car did not 
stop, ran into P's car with gr oat f orce , and hurled it ag'linst P with such violence 
that P was killed. P' s wife is suing f or his wrongful death. She is the s ol e stat-
utory beneficiary. 
Held: ( l) Whether P was. contributorily negligent i n r e lying on his wife 's state-
ment that the car was going t o stop, and t her eby f ailing t o stop back out of harm's 
way, was a jury question. (2) Tho wife is not barred as benefici ary on the theory 
that she was guilty of net~ li g(mce . Hor husband was not under h 1.;r control, and she 
owed no duty t o keep an eye on tho appr o'lching cc.r t o ~ee if her first hunch was 
the right one . (3) Tho court orrod in giving on instruction on tho l as t clear 
chanc o . If P was negligent, his negli c;once continued t o the moment of the impact, 
and he is burrod. D could not soo P (who was behind the s t a ll ed car) in time t o 
avoid injuring him; nor was P at that time in a hel pl ess condition. Note : If an 
action had been br ought f or dam11 ge done t o tho car, it. s eems that tho last clear 
chance doctrine would apply, for D, i n tho exorcise of duo caro ,· should have s een 
tho holploss car which P had not yot hn.d time to r emove from t ho hi ghway. ( 4) This 
is not a case of harmless error, · f or undor the court's i nst ructi ons on the l ast 
clear chancEl doctrine the jury wore t old t o find f or the pla intiff e··\en }:;hough P 
wero negli[~0nt. \ . 
' I 
TOR'l'S Imputerl Noglig0nce 189 ti_.E. 339 
X borrowed .a truck which, with the holp of P, he bad loaded with crate~ of chickem 
X then asked P to accompany him to he l p unlo ad same at des tinat i on. Du~ ~~ the com-
bined ne gligence of X and D, P was injured when X' s truc k and D' s car c ~llided , each 
having a clear vi ew of the other. Can P r ecover from D? Can owner of -~ck recover 
from D? Yes . X's nu E,ligenc o i s not imputed toP, s i nce P nad no contro1 over tho 
driving of tho truck . Negligence of driver is not imputed t o ovmer of th~ck wher e 
driver is not under owner's control. In this case ther e i s a bailor-bai~Je r elation-
ship r ather than an cmploy •~r-cmployce r 0l at ionship. ,; 
\ 
\ I 
\ \ 
\ 
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TGHTS Imputed Negligence Joint Enterprise 200 S .E. E.144 
Persons are not engaged in joint enterprise so as to impute negligence of one to 
t !1e other unless each has some right to manage undertaking and a community of intere 
in object of undertaking exists. · The fact that on e sister might defer to the wishes 
of anothe r as a matter of courtesy rat_~e! than of duty is not enough to establish a 
joint enterprise~ That qccupants of a.ut6inob"il~ ta~ turns .in_ .driving does not of it 
sc: lf make the enterprise "joint" so as to make driver's negligence :imputablo· to-· -the 
other occupants. If r elationship of parties is doubtfu~, tho question of whether it 
is one of joint enterpris e is for the jury. (Accord: 11 S.E. (2d) at p. 646) 
TORTS Imputed Negligence 181 Va. 800 
P was a nine-year-old girl who crossed a city street in front of her hous e in the 
middl e of the block on th_e way to school in violet ion of a municipa l ordinance . Her 
mother, M, know that she habitually did this but never tried to correct her. She 
was struck by a car driven by D, who failed to keep an adequate lookout, and perma-
nently injured. M, who was a widow, paid out $2,000 for bospital and doctor bills. 
What ·are the ri ghts of t ho pl'l.rtios? 
Held: . The mother has no ri ghts, us sho is barred by hs r negligence ~n not correct-
ing her daughter's actions. Tho no g~igence of the parent is not imputed to the chil< 
A nine-year-old girl is pres umptive ly inc11pablo of being guilty of negligence , and, 
unless this presumpt.io.n oan be r ebutted , she is entitled to damages for pain and suf-
fering and potential loss of aarning power oi'ter be coming of age . 
TORTS Imputed Negligence 187 Va. 759 
F and S wero f ather and 16-year-ol d son. F was driving, · and S was sitting beside 
him. Suddenly F r emember ed that ho hn.d forgotton tiJ buy any chicken fe ed, so he madL 
a U-turn acros s a much-trave l ed hi~Shwo.y, giving no :;;igno.l in spite of the fact that 
D's c-ar was approaching r apidly. F's ·c::tr WFlS struck by D's car, which was overload e< 
and traveling at an excessive r 8.te c i' spo.;;d . D did not apply brakes or diminish 
speed. F' and S wC::Jr e both injured . S sued D ond r ecover ed a ver dict reas onable in 
amount, which the trial judge s ot as ide. V'that r osult on appeal'? 
Held: Verdict r e instat od . Her o both F and D wero guilty of negligence contribute! 
to the accident. This makes D liable for all the damages t o s. F's negligence is 
not i mputed to s. Note that in cases c f this sort D is not entitled to sue F f or 
statutory contribution, f or, if he were t o sue , D would st11nd in S 1 s shoes, and S, 
who is an unemancipated minor, cannot sue his f ather fer a personal t ort. Of cours e 
F cannot hold D for his injuries because of his own contributory ne gligen~e which 
continued to tho very mom0nt of the impact. 
TORTS Imputed Negligence 189 Va. 459 
p was riding in X's car in the fr ont seat as X' s guest. X drove across the tracks 
of the D Railway Company withc;ut l ooking, fl.nd P wn.s kiJlecl i n a collision with a 
tra in trave ling 30 miles an hour and wh ich gave statutory sj_ gnals. The train was ap-
pr-o aching from P' s ri ght, and P d i d not warn X of the danger until the -t;rain was - pral 
tically on top of the car. The jury awar ded P ' s persona l r epr esent at ive $2500 to be 
paid by X and $2500 to be paid by the D H.ailway . What r esult on writ of error'? 
Held: Reversed. If P' s represent r~tive is entitled to $5 , 000, the verdict should 
be fo r him for $5 , 000 as aga inst X and thEJ D Railway Company ( assuming that X wa.q 
guilty of gross neglie~enc e ). But the evi denco shows t hat the D Rn.ilwuy Co . is not 
liab l e at a ll, as it has violat ed no ·.luty owod P. It was a l s o hel d that while X was 
guilty of gross neg li g:tmce , P was guilt;r of contributory ne gligence as a. ma.t.t er of 
la.w in not war ning X of th0 o.pproachinb train . He coul d sGo it Ootter than X could 
see it, o.nd he was undor ':l duty to look oncl war n the: driver. While the negligence 
of X is not imputed to P, the pr:1.ss0nger m.1st exercis e r eas onabl u car e for his own 
safety . 
TORTS Imputed Ne gligenc0 193 Va. 330 
M was D' s moth<:: r. M owned ~ car, and V was t aking her for a pleasur e ride in it 
on a country r oad 17 f eot wi de . P' s tractor with a hay bal or in tow was o.pproaching. 
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The baler was 9'8 11 wide and was protruding over the center of the road. D pas sed L 
tractor but ran into the hay baler, doing $1,000 worth of damage to it .• The c ar w.·. ~ 
damaged to the extent of $170. Assuming that the last clear chance doctrine is not 
r~pplicable (neither side relied upon it in the trial court), what are the rights o£· 
tho parties 7 
Held: M is not liable , re gardles~ o;f the ne gligence of D, as D wa s a bailee of tl: 
car and ~h0 negligence of a bailee is not imputed to the bailor. It is a jury ques-
tion as to whether P and D were ne gligent. Instruments of husbandry may be moved 
along the road even if they will take mor e than half the road but nm~t b e kept to 
the ir right as far as practicable, and due qare must b e taken for the protection of 
us ers of the highway. See V/146-326. If the jury find that P was neglig.ent, then M 
is entitled to a judgment against him for $170, regardless of D's negligence or l ack 
of it. If tho ,jury fj.nd P was in the exercise of due care a nd D was negligent, ther1 
M cannot r e cover from P, but P is entitled to a judgment against D. 
TORTS Imputed Negligence Joint Enterprise 193 Va. 840 
H ahd W wer e husband and wife . He alone h ad income . He bought s evera l cars over 
the years in his own name , and, b ocaus u his wife wished to say she owned a car, he 
bought the car in qu estion and had tho title put in his wife 's name. She operated 
this car ·as she did the others, and so did he . He bore all the expenses of the oper 
tion of th0 c •J.r. While they were . on a. pleasure trip to a mountain cabin they owned 
and while h e was driving, W wo.s injured 'ns .o. r esult ·of H' s nogl igcmco a nd the n egli-
gence of D, who was driving another car. Is H '· s nn gligenco imputed to W? 
Held: No. This is not a joint enterpris e , as W .did not .have the right to direct 
Md control H in the oper ation o f the ce.r. They do not stand in the position of 
principal and agent. H, in furnishing recreation to the family, is merely fulfillin 
a marital duty, nnd in so do ing , he is acting for hims e lf nnd not as his wife's 
agent. He is the baileo of his wife 's c ar, and the n cglige nco . of a bailee is not 
imputed to the bailor. "It is not unusua l for a husb and to buy a car for tho use 
of his wife, title to which is sometimes r egister ed in the husband's name and s ome-
time s in the wife 's name. 1J'Jh en a husband is drivin t; an automobile so acquired and 
registe r ed, the prusumpti on is tha t he is in absolute c ontro l, ev en though his wife 
is in tho car with him, and in tho abs enc e of evid onc o to the c ontrary, h o is solelJ 
responsible for its operation." . A $12,000 verdict in f avor of W, which the trial 
· --court- -hacL .s.e_t _o,sJc!o 'fl.S c ontrary to law, was r e instated . 
··-· -. . . .. . ... ' . 
TORTS Wrongful De nth . I9oS.-E-. --a:t·-J;>..----6.5l __ __ _ 
-. In a _d~o::j:;h by wrongful aot cas e Ins truction G wo.s give n as f oll ows: "The -court in 
struct:rthe-_:·j~t:-i:n;- ti~ing. tho damqges (which are not to exceed $ 25,000) 
it ~ay consider: 1. Th0. pocuni'y.gJ:o&a ..:.su,sta:incd.. b~ -t~e w~fe and child of Dea.v?rs, 
fix~ng such sum as would b o e.51ua o t h o prob~bl e oarm.ug s o:t -ttre--deceaaed.._. tab.ng 
i to c nsid eration his a e iritolli once o.nd honlth,_ during what would ··have-=-::been -
his lifetime if he had n ot b een killori . 2. In ascortr:tining the probability o f life 
of tho 'deceased, tho jury ho.v e the r ight to determine samo with r efer ence t o r eccrg-
ni~ed scientific t able s r e l ating · t o the expecte.ti cn o f hum!Ul life . 3. By adding 
ther eto compensation for the l os s c f t ho care, .a tt cmtiop ond s oci e t y J o s+=:l:l¥=-hi,s wU 
o.nd chilcJ.., 4. By t~ddl;g such furthur suin n.s they may deem f o.ir arid just by wo.y of 
s o lace and comf ort t o his wife and child , f;or the sorrow, ...Rll .ti' ~ r i~;; aFld ~c.>nta.Lan­
..{;.'"Uish occasioned t o wife by his de ath." Obj octed t o bo caus e it a ll ovrs a r e c ove ry f o 
all tlfa t Deavers would ha ve eo.rnod during his lifetime , without t aking i nt o cons i der 
tion the f act that it is t o bo presently ::laid and n ot t o b e paid in instalments fr om 
time t o time , and without t.aking i nt (, c onsidor :::.ti on t ha t Deavers, ha d he lived , woul 
haye oxpewl ed o. porti on of' his ear niP.gs f or his own us e . 
He l d: Obj ections overruled . Tho jury in M y such act i on may award s uch damages 
as t o it may s oom f a ir and j ust, · n ot exceed ing $25 ,000. H0 haw hold r e c ently in 
c onstruing tho statuto in an acti rm f or wrongful de ath that t he amount of r ec overy 
is l oft entire ly to the d i s cr e..tion of" the jury, as l rmg as it d oc s n ot exc eed $25,00( 
W.e h ave s ustained for s o many year s th rule tho.t i s app liv l t o the instruction her e 
excepted to -that wo prefe r t o o.dhor o to it and f o llow our own preced~nts as evidencer 
by tho many Virginia C8_ses in which this instructi on h as be.::n o.ppr (we d . 
ltJJJ~ hev·:L::Jed. August l)~ (i,, 
'!'CRTS l:vrongful Death Bar Exam, Dec., 1943. 
Q. z, while driving his automobile in the city of Richmond,Va., ran over and killec' 
~Q A duly qualified as administrator of Y's estate. He instituted an action under tht 
.e.<rt h by wrongful act statute. Y left a widow, a son, and a father. At the time of 
his deat.h Y had no assets. There was a duly docketed judgment against Y in favor of H 
f or the sum of ~2,000; Y owed C ~11 000 on an open account. The undertaker's bill for 
f uneral expenses was :~1,000. The widow, the son, the father, N, c, and the undertaker 
:c.ll claimed the money. Who is entitled to the $4,000? 
A~ Be sure to learn the important things about the Virginia Death by Wrort_ft.l Act 
Statute, often referred to as "Lord. Campbell's Act11 (V#8-633 et seq.). Here they are: 
Under the common law personal actions die with the person, but under the Virginia 
Death by Wrongful Act Statute, a new cause of action is given the personal represen-
tative of the deceased party for the benefit of the statutory beneficiaries, who are 
divided into classes as follows: Class 1. The surviving wife, husband, children and 
grandchildren of the deceased. Class 2. Parents, brothers, and sisters of the de-
ceased. The jury are given the discretionary power to specify the amount or portion 
to be received by each of the beneficiaries, provided, however, that nothing is to 
be given to anyone in class 2 if there is any member in class 1. If there are no 
members of either class 1 or class 2, the amount recovered is assets in the hands of 
the personal representative to be disposed of according to law. If a person dies leav-
ing a widowed mother and a widow or widower but no children or grandchildren, the 
widowed mother is in class 1. Note that the statutory beneficiaries are given the 
property by force of the statute and don't claim the property as distributees of the 
estate of the deceased party. Hence the creditors of the deceased have no rights. The 
widow and the son are in class 1 and are entitled to the ~~4,000 in such portions as 
the court or jury may deem best. If there is no one in class 1 or class 2, then the 
sum recovered is part of the estate. The maximum statuto~ amount that can be awarded 
is since July 1,1958 $30,000. It is immaterial whether the tort-feasor or the injured 
party dies first. Since July 1,1958 the action must be brought within two years from 
death of deceased. Note further that if deceased would have had no cause of action 
because of his contributory negligence or other reason, then the personal representa-
tive has no cause of action. 
TORTS Wrongful Death 181 Va.911. 
p was a loader in D's coal mine. While he was waiting for the cutting machine to 
cut out coal to load, he decided to do some personal exploring. He entered an unventi-
lated portion of the mine which was not being used at the time and in which gas had 
collected. The gas exploded, and P was killed. His dep8ndent was denied workmen's 
compensation, as the accident did not occur during and arise out of the employment. 
His administratrix then sued under the death by ~~ongful act statute. Is such an 
action barred by the workmen's compensation decision? 
Helds No. Even if P were a licensee or a treepassGr, he had some rights none of 
which were meant to be covered by workmen's (~ompenaation lai~S. In the instant case 
it was he~ that D had not violated any duty it owned a licensee, and hence P could 
not recover. (Brol·~ing, J. dissenting.) 
TORTS Wrongful Death 185 Va.561. 
x worked as a driller in D's mine in 19)5. He breathed in large quantities of rock 
dust. D was negligent in not warning X of the danger and in not furnishing proper 
equipment. X died from silicosis in 191:2, t-wo years after discovering he had this 
disease. X's personal representative rued D. ~~at result? 
Held: For D. X's cause of action arose in 1935, whether or not he knew it.The then 
statute of limitations ran in 1936, and X's death does not revive the action. "The 
cause of action contemplated by ou -r· statute ls not the dF.lath itself but the tort 
which produces the death, and thl;; is the same cause of action for decedent's in-
juries, and, as such, subject t o its infirmit.;.es as an acti onable cause." The court 
holds that our Death by ~vrongfi1 .L .Act Statute :l.s not a new cause of act ion but the 
action that would have belongec". to deceased i f he hadn't died. But whe ther it ifl 
regarded as a survival of the ·.·i ght of action ·.' f decedent, as a revival of the right, 
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~s a substituted right, or as a new right, the cause of action i s the s ame , t ha t i ,· 
the wr ongful injury to t he decedent , the wr ong which entitled him to maintain an a n · 
tion if death had not ensued. 
'TORTS Animals 182 S .E. 235 
De f endant kept bea:ts in a wire en c lo s ure . Plainti f f l eaned up agains t the wi r e an 
wns clawed by a bear which had not the r etofor e s hown any s igns of viciousnes s . 
Pl a intiff sued for the injury on_ the the ory that one k . t animal s at we r e f"' r ae 
na~rae a t h is-paril. ; 
He ld: While thi s principle ha s influenc ed numerou s de ci s i ons , it is not s ound. 
Many cit i e s have zoos. The y s erve a us eful purpos e , a nd thor o i s no good r eas on why 
the owners of such animals should be subje ct to absolute li ability. I n the i ns t ant 
case De f end·ant' s ne gli gence (if any) and Pla intiff's contributory negligence should 
h ave been l e ft to the jury and treated as any other negligence c as e . NQt e : Qutsj d0 
Vir ~inia and West Vir ginia the gen er a l rule is a s per Pla intif f' s contention. 
------- ----- -
TORTS• An ima ls Suggested by 195 S. E. 4 96 
Pla intiff's l and is not enclos ed by a l awful f ence . DErfendant owned cattle and 
turkeys which went on Pla intiff's l and. Is De fendant liab l e for the · damuge done ? 
Nqt liable for t hfl. damage don e b;y cattle , horses , mule s shecp,_ go§.t §.., or hogs un-
l...O"~ Q.intiff's _ l a nd wc.s enclos ,Jd by a l awfu Uv_rlC8 .iyjj-·8- 874 ), or Defenda nt d ~ove 
thQ... anima ls onto the l and. But iher e a r e no s tatute s with r e f er ence to poultry. 
Hence the English common l aw rule a pplies t hat t he owner is m Hi e r a.-El-tri;y-tG-f-ence 
t §_ln. However, e. court of equity will not d ignify occasional t r espas ses of tur-
keys by a r estraining order whe r e damage is trifling e.nd r emedy a t l aw adequate . 
Note : The county s upe rvisors may by f ollowin g s t a tute s adopt "a no f ence l aw," in 
which case the boundary line itse l f be comes a l awfu l f en c8 . 
TOR TS Animo. ls 191 Va . 601 
In s ome unexpl ained way D' s covl (which wa s one of a her d ) wander ed onto a highway 
at ni ght. P r an into the cow and suffer ed sevor f; no r sone.l i n juries . Has h e a c n.use 
of action on the facts stat ed above ? 
He ld: No. The doct rine of r e s ips a l oquitur i s not app l i ca b l e , be caus e D did not 
h ave exclus ive control over th.o i ns trumenta litie s causing the o.cc ident. P f ailed to 
prove any negligence . So thor o c a n be no · r ocovory i n s pite of our s t atute , V#B - 886 , 
"It sha ll be unlawful for tho owner or manage r o f any hor s e , mule , cattle , ho g, s hoe; 
or goa t to permit any s uch a nima l •••.• t o r un at l a r go b ey ond tho limits of h i s own 
l ands ••••• " This l an gu age i mplies · knowl edge , cons ent, or a willingness on the p n.rt 
of the owner, a nd d oe s not cover a sit u rttion wher e t ho owner has us ed or d i nar y c a r e 
keep his ~took confined to his pr emise s •. P ho.s the burden of proving D's negligenc e 
TORTS Nuisa.nce 1 S . E. ( 2d) 305 
A l a r ge ca nning corpor at i on , in sp i t e of the ex er ci s e of duo ca r e , d i schar ged ve;go· 
t able r e f use into creeks tha t e nt e r Ches a peake Bo.y . Pl a i nti f f owned proper t y nea.r by 
The stenc h i n tho sunnner timo b<:::co.me unbour ablo . Has Pl aintiff a caus a of acti on f ol 
do.ma gos? 
Hold: Yes . Def end unt is gu i lty of ma i n t a i n i ng a pri·rn.te nuisance . He mus t use hi l 
own l and so o.s n ot to in,j ur o . othc) r s . Stat ute of lii'!'J.i t ~~ti ons di d not run f r om time o j 
e r ecting ·t h e f a ctory, but fr om t ir.lo of tho in j ur y . Not .; , however , t h at i f a city gei 
· the pormiss i on of t he l egisl::l.t ur e to d i scha r ge r r:J.w s ovmle i nto tho t i da l wat e r s , no 
othe r u s er of tida l w-:tter s c o.n ob j oct ns l one a. s nav i gat i on i s not int erfe r-ed with , 
s ince t he St a.t o , as owner in tho exer cis E! o f i t s jus pub:icum , may d ooid e as t o t he 
best u se of its pr ope r ty . 158 Va . 521. 
Nuisance 
D er ectod a building t h ,, t 
a bill in e qu i ty askin~ f or 
m~nt . P did not o llego any 
of tho pub lic . 
187 V'FJ. . 4 22, 431 
~;ncroachcd on Pi ne St r eot s o~,; e i ghteen inchos . P filed 
o. JOO.nd o.t or y i njunct i on di r e ct i ng D t o r emov o the encr oach 
pe cu l i ar d8.mage t o himse l f TI 'J~ ; suffe r ed by other member s 
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He ld: For D. While the encroachment. is a public nuisance, an individual cannot 
ma intaiJ) · a bill to enjoin such nuisance unless he can show he has suffered, or nt:tll 
suf f er . t.!\!;)refrom, special and peculiar injury to himself, a.s distinguished from !t!-
jury to th~ public in general. Moreover, such special injury must be direct o.nd no t 
putoly consequential, and must be different in kind and not merely in degree, from 
~hat ~ ustained by the community at l arge • . 
TORTS Tr espassing Adults 
A railroad company is bound.to 
422) and licens ees on its tracks 
. . 
~s like ly, 
193 S.E. 491 
keep a reasonable lookout for trespassers (8 Dig. 
where there is reason to suppos e that their pre s ence 
TOR'f8 Trespassing Adults 189 Va. 341 
As a r esult of poor visibility, P mistook a private railroad crossing ' for a public 
one and started across the tracks. There was a locked gate on the other side, which 
had been erected to keep the public from using the crossing. lJllhon P discovered his 
.mistal.to , he attempted to back out, but th~i r ear whyels got off the narrow road, nnd 
the·. C'lr s~alled on tho tracks. A pass enger tr ain demolished it some 15 minutos l n.t er 
'ij,e ld: P was a trespass er, or at b es t a bf.l.r e licensee. .The railroad company ha s 
not violated ,any duty owed such a person • . Judgment for p r e'vcrsed • 
.... :,;.··· 
TORTS·~· Tr espassi~g· Adults 190 Va. 605 
· P,'~ and R wer e enga ged in unloading lumber from a box car. They wore all omployod 
by'.the X Corporation, which do o. l t in hardwood products. It became necessary to shift 
some cars, including the onG in whicii. P, Q and H wer e working • . They were told to dis 
continue the ir work while o. N & W Ry. Co. locomotive shifted the cars. In violation 
of instructions and unknown to the r a ilroad crew, P stayed in the car while it wo.s 
be ing. switched. It was shunted into (.tnother c ar with considerable force, o.nd P was 
killed instantly when the open door in which he was standing suddenly clos ed when the 
car . r an into the other car. P' s pers bnal r epres entative r e cover ed a ,judgment, which 
the trial c ourt s et asidu . \¥hat r esult on appeal? · 
He id; For the def endant. P was a tre spo.ss er. The defendant . owed no duty to s earc . 
· the cars for trespassers be for e switching them. It owe s him the negati vo duty not to 
. ihjur.c ··him wantonly or wilfully aft e r h:wing di-s-cover ed ~s pres ence or after having 
·rioti·ce o_fr _wh'llt would caus o o. pers on, in 'the 0:xercis e of ordinary caro , to be alerted 
.t o the -O.ange·r • .. Afte r such notice they must exorcise ordinary care t o avoid injuring 
a · pt:Jrs on; oven though he be a trespas ser. 
TORTS · ' · Trespassing Children 7 S.E. (2d) 119 
D ? wried a t oo l hous e in a vicinity whe r e childr en of t ende r years were accustomed 
· to_~lay,· as he knew. He habitually l oft tho door open in spito of the fact tho.t dy-
n~Cil, aynamite c aps, alcoh ol, and acid wer e stor ed ther e i n . P, a lad of e i ght 
ye~ · of'. age , saw a box on the floor which conta 'ined r..~ri ght mot a llic objects. P was 
an-:uns a lfi~Ht boy, s o he gave all the children in the neighborhood s ome. He was als o 
an. .i.nqui~~ l ad, s o he picked one of the s e obj ects with a pin, and l ost his hand 
s o inst~ti. P sued D. Result? 
Hold f or P without mentioning the uttr-activo nuis ance doctrine . Groa.t care is r e -
\.uired where one has s uch danger ous instrumontalitivs as oxplos i ves or e lectricity 
u~o.P ~s premis es, and the · fact that tho injured pe r s~m was .'3. t e chnica l trespasser 
. will nat excuse l andowner. A gre at er degr eo of ca r e is owed an infant than un ad~lt • 
.. Cas-e where child broke into l o cked stor ehous e and t ook dynamite cn.ps clistin:guished . 
TORTS ·Trcs po.ssing Children 182 Va . 30 
A t.e.n--yeB.r-o l d._ -child was struck by a stroEID'llinod ga s c>line rail bus while he was on 
. a tr estle ove r a ravine . If t he mot orman had b oon keeping an adequate l ookout, he 
would have se.en·· the boy in time to stop. The boy cou l d hav0 s avod hims e lf by jump-
. ing . Is · a $5,000 vord ict sustttinablc ? 
.He ld: Yes. E'<ren if the child had bcon a tre spas s er u pon a limited a r ea, thor o was 
. a :d~y on\tho part of . de f endant t o koop a l ookout and try t o avoi d striking child , 
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us i ng Whatever instrumentalities it t hen had availabl e . (Note that if brakes had 
br:Jen de f e ctive but an adequate lookout had been maintained , ther e would have been no 
Hability.) 
TORTS Trespassing Children Legal Causation 183 Va. 1 
In violation of ordinance D enclosed a lot in Norfolk with a barbed wire f once. P 
a five-yoar-old girl, while a t echnical trespasser, climbed upon the f ence to see bci 
t or a hors e that was running loose inside the f ence. SJ::te f e ll, and the barbed wire 
11toro an ugly scar in her f ace. 11 She r ecover ed a judgment for $500. Should it be 
s et as i de ? 
Hold: Yes. Barbed wire f ences are not inherently dangerous or attractive to. chi l-
dren, as ar e dynamite caps. The trespass of tho child and her fall were the sole 
proximf;l.t o causes of the accident, for which p was not to blame . While the question 
of proximate caus e is for. the jury wher e reasonable people might differ, her e ther e 
is no r eason for differ ence, and the verdict must bo set asido. 
TORTS' Trespassing Children 187 Va . 76 7 
D owned a quarry from which l ar ge quantiti8s of rock had been removed. Water had 
run in and seeped in. A third party had built a r aft, and many boys came to pl ay 
ther e , all to D's knowledge . Ther e was a heavy r ain, and the waters of t he qua·rry 
wer e so mu<ldi0d that one playing ther ein could not t ell sha llow wat er fr om deep wat e1 
by mer e ly l ooking. P, a nine -yerll"-o_~~ - _l:>.~y_, -.v:as-.-d:rowneder-~ His -person fl_ ] - ~9..P.f~ ... ~~nt~ti Vl 
sued D. Result? - ·-·--- .. --·· ---·-- ·· ··· · 
Held: For D. Vir-ghrin. does not r ecognizo the attr active nuisanc e doctrine exc ept 
in cases of explos ive , gasolino--;-Eil EJ ctricity--cas os in which the danger _is latcmt unc 
not commonly known. Her o the danger was no wis e differ Emt fr om that lurking i n n o.tu· 
r al lakes , creeks, and rivers. Every nine-year-old boy knows of the danger of drown· 
ing, or, if he doos not, the duty of war ning is on the par ent. No sign and no ordi-
nary f'enco would keep a r edbl ooded boy nwo.y from t ho danger. Ther e is no r eason why 
the owner of a natural l ake should escape liability while tho oY..'ller of an artificial 
lnke should bo hold. Honea D has .vio l atod no duty, and tri al court correctly sus~ 
t aino<l D' s demurrer. 
TORTS Licensees -Invitees 179 Va . 139 , 1:47, 148 
· K was in:jured whon she tripped over o. eable in im amus ement park. Is the f ollowing 
instruction corre ct? 11 The court instruct s the jury that if they believe from a pr e -
ponderanc e of the evidenco that the l ocation , oonstructi (m, and maintenance of tho 
cables over which K f ell creat ed a dan11~erous conditi on · at a place where patrons had . 
a right to go , then it was the duty of the dof ondants t o warn the patrons of such cor. 
dition, unless K knew, or in tho exercis e of r easonable car e on her part, should hav( 
known or discover od su ch condition . 
Hold: Rever s ible error, as it places t oo great a duty on K, who is in her ri ghts 
in assuming that h-er sa f ety has bu0n pr ovi ded f or unl ess she can plainly see the con· 
trary. 'I'ho word 11di s cover" imputes r, duty t o us e ex-cr o.or dinary care--to bring t o 
light things which may be hidden or l at ent. K' s only duty wns t o 1;seo " or "obs erve" 
. thoso things which wer e obvious. 
· TORTS ticons eus - Invitoes 18? Va . 365 
D ran the Sto.to Fo. ir o.t which thor o wer e o.ut;) r aces. He negligently allowed some 
o],d na ils t o r emain on tho r ace track. T wns in chur go of ·t ho r aces as an independ-
eht contractor. E wns giving his co.r n trial spin . It picked up a nail which punc-
tu.rod a tire , and tho car r un into tho crowd , killing P. His per sonal r epresontativ€ 
sued D and E. Tho jury found -.for P as against D, but it a lso f ound f o'r E. D claims 
that whor e tho s ervant i s f ound not guilty, the muster must a l so be f ound not guilty. 
Hol d: 'l'his principle i s not npp licabl0 wher o one r elies upon the negligenc<;J of thE1 
principal tS in tho above case . Not e o. ls o that tho princi pal ca nnot es cape liab ility 
f or the condition nf the pr omiflos s0 f!:l r ns business visitor s ar e concerned by turn-
i~g thlllm over t o tm indep~ndent . 9 QD.t~tor-, -as the pd .ncipal owes a non-d~ legable 
duty t o us e due car.G W- keop 'them r oo.s 0n1.1b ly safe . 
- - -- -·- ~- ------·------J--- -·- - · -·- .. . ·-·- .. '1 03'7 . 
TORTS Licensees - Invitees 182 Va. 713 
A mother and her 3-year-old child were guests at D's hotel. Upon arrival in theiJ · 
room , the mother went to the bathroom to get a wash cloth. The child climbed into 
trlC window, the screen of Which WaS unfastened, leaned against it, fell out, and WD.f.: 
k:illed . The judge sustaineda demurrer. 
Held: Error. The hote l oweq a. duty to the child to have its screens fastened. 
The mother could reasonably suppose the screen was fast ened. She was l.ulled into a. 
f nls o sense of s ~ cur.ity. At least thes ~ r a is ed jury questions. 
TORTS Licensees - Invitees 182 Va . 876 
P, a paying . gu est at a hotel, sat in a rocking chair from whi ch one of the rocker s 
was missing, rocked back, and turned over. · She was s evere ly hurt and r ecover ed a 
verdict of $6,500. 
Hold: Questions of negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury. She 
owed no duty to inspect chair unles s danger was obvious. The missing rocker was on 
the side away from her as she approached the chair. The hote l-keep roJ r owed a duty to 
provide a safe chair~ She was invited to sit in an unsafe chair • . Verdict proper. 
TORTS Licens ees - In vi t oes 186 Va. 1022 
P bought a ticket to D's show. P annoyed others by coughing and spitting on tho 
floor. A, D's manager,suggested toP that he come outside for some air. P struck 
A, and A and his assistants e j ected him from the theatr e with consider abl e forc e . P 
hung around outside and picketed the show. When· A went out sometime l ater, P ca lled 
him a vile name , and A hit him so hard hr:) had to go to tho hospita l. It was not po s 
sible to show how much of P's injury was due to the first assault and how much t o th 
second. Discuss principles involved. 
Dis liable (1) if A did not r evoke P's licens e befor e ejecting him, (2) even if A 
did r evoke the licens e , if A us ed excess i ve force in e j ecting him, (3) if A was acti 
for D when he struck P during the s econd a lterc ation . If he struck P becaus e P was 
t olling people not to enter the show, then A's t ort was committod in the scope of hi. 
empl oyment. · 
D is not liab l e f or · th8 first assault if A r evoked P's licens e and us ed no more 
force than was r easonab ly necessary to e j oct him. D is not liable for the s econd ns· 
sault if P brought it on himself by calling A a. vile name and A struck P primarily 
becaus e of personal animosity. In the latter evont D would not be liable even for 
the f ir st assault, f or, if a pers on brings an injury on hims elf a.nd cannot show how 
much of the injury he caused hims elf and how much was caused by someone e ls e , he can 
r ecover nothing. This is like the cas e where plaintiff and defendant both polluted 
a. stream and plaintiff could not show how much he was damaged by def endant' s pollu-
tion and how much by his own. 185 Va. 758, 771. 
Of course A would be per son~lly ~ liablo for the s econd a.ssault, as words alone do 
.not justify a batt ery. ·.)l.nd~if A's fir s t a.sso.ult was not privileged , he would be lia 
ble for a.ll the d~~· done P. But in tho instant cas 0 P did not · su e A, so A's lia-
bility wn.s~-JUcticia.lly considered. 
--TORTS' Lic ensetJs - Invito0s ' 189 Va. 229 
P's husband was a pat i ent at tho D Hospital. Prior to 1941 ther e had been an en-
·"tra.nCe used by all at the end of the hospi tn.l when :J P ' s husband occupied a r oom, and 
there was a s idewal k l ending fr om the street t o this entrance . P had known of this 
qondition . In 1941 tho outs i de door knob was r omaved, and the 'door was us ed only fm 
M..-.emergency oxit. A cha i n was str etched across tho sidewo. lk, but P had nG""Ve t been 
not i f i ed of' these ohanges. P went t o visit her husband at night and tripped over th• 
chain in the dar k. The jury r eturned a vt: r dict in f avor r:if P, which was set as i de b: 
the trial judge. 
Held: Verdict r eins t at ed . Tho jury could find t hat P was an invitee , that such, ar 
ac.cident could have been for es een, and that P was not contributorily negligent. 
\ 
TORTS License es - Invitees 193 Va. 400 
p , a mn.ture woman, r ode on D's mer ry-go-round with htJ r fi ve -yoar-old niece, Ther<:l 
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was a· sign reading, nRIDE AT YOUR OWN RISK. DO NOT STAND ON HORSES , CHANGE HORSES 
OR GET. ON OR OFF WHILE RIDE IS IN MOTION." This rule was violated for several mb · 
utes by some small boys, one of whom bumped against P, who1 in turn fell off the 
merry-go-round. The violations wer e in · plain view of those in charge, but th ey t oe•. 
no steps to enforce the ~ule. 
Held: A verdict by the jury in favor of P should not be set aside. P was a busi· 
nos s visitor or in vi t ee to whom D owed a duty · of due care. D. cannot evade this dut;y 
by posting signs, He owed a duty toP to enforce the s afety rules. She is not guil 
ty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Sfte was standing on a platform, 
moving round and round at some speed; holding a child seat ed on a hors e going up anc 
down. She was not in a positionto maintain n. perfect or norma l equilibrium. Under 
these circumstances a jury' could find she was not guilty of contributory negli gence. 
TORTS Lessor and Lessee 185 Va . 333 
L l eased an old hous e to T for $7 per month. It was obvious a f ew years later th:· 
the porch needed r epairs, and L promised to make them. He negligently failed to rna~ 
them, • and T' s wifo f ell through tlle porch and was injured when it gave way. Is L l ~; 
able for the personal injury? 
He ld: Not in Virginia. In thtJ .: abs enc e of fraud or concealment a. l andlord is not 
iiablo for personal injuries caus ed by defective promis es, ~s the tenant takes thom 
us they ar e . (Note that rule is differ ent whor e ther e c.r e common passageways . in 
control of landlord.) If L promis 8d to r epair Qnd did not. damages ur e limited to 
cost of repairs and do not include pers onal injuries. Ther a is no moro reas on to 
hold a landlord for pers ona l injurL.1s than a carpenter or contractor who has broken 
his contract. There should not be t ort liability f or a mer e breach of contract. ~1 
the instant case even if it should be conc eded thor o was tort liability • plaintiff 
was bnrrod by her contributory negligence. 
TORTS Lessor and Lesse e 
Befor e L r ent od an apl).rtment to 
pounds, over the kitchen sink. T 
on T, injuring her. Sho sued L. 
Held: A l andlord is not liable 
l ently conceals them. Hero L had 
'J!.' s safety. Tho t enant takes tho 
concealment rule . 
19 0 Va . 207 · 
T, he ho.d had X install a cab inet, we ighing some 
fill ed the cabinet with dishes. The cabinet f ell 
What judgment? 
for def ects in t he l eas ed property unles s he frau t 
no notice of any def ect. He is not an insurer of 
premises as he finds them subject t o the frauduler 
Note : The court distinguished this case from 144 Vu. 473, whor e the l andlord en-
t er ed upon tho l e~s od property after t ho tenancy started and l e ft postholes ·uncover, 
It rained hard, and the t enant's small child fEJll in one that wa.s partially fill ed 
with water. It was ther e he ld that tho r c:J l ation of ln.ndlord and tenant had nothing 
to do with the law of the crts o . If tho l rmd l ord unt ur s t o make r epairs after the 
t enant has takcm posses s i an , he must us e r easonable co.r o in making them, just as mu· 
as anyone ols e . · 
TORTS Lessor and Lessee Business Visitor of Tenant 192 Va. 540 
T, a tenant, lived upsta irs in a brick building owned by D. D had made two steps 
from the ;:;.troot sidewet lk t o r each the outsido door l oading to an inside stairway, 
which served T and no onE- EJ l so . Thes EJ st"Elps h-?.d been na iled t o the brick wall but 
soon broke away and wer o then un~tt~ched t o anything. T had moved them about fr om 
timo t o time . P visited T or. businvss . As hu was l eaving, the steps tilted forwar 1 
and he was injured. He s ued D. Vfuat juugmont? 
He ld: For D. A business visitor cJ f a t vnant stands .in the shoos of the t enant S • 
far as u suit against tho l rtndlord i s con cerned . Her e the entrance was under tho 
so l e control 0f th0 t enant. Thor e wo.s no agr eement 0n the part of the landlord t o 
repair, and, he owod ll'J duty t o T or P. 
1'oRTS Misrepr es EJntat ic;n Scienter 200 S.E . 624 
Q. In Vir ginia if a defu ndant makes 11 mat eri n. l fals t stat ement r easonably bel iev· 
ing it t o be true , is he liab l e in ,_ t ort Flction at l aw for deceit ? 
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A. Yes . The fraud in such a case is called constructive fraud. 11 In a long line of 
cases , we have consistently held that when one represents as true that which is not 
true, and another relies thereon to his damage, the latter may recover for the false 
representation whether it was knowingly or innocently made. 11 If innocently made, t t e 
fraud is constructive. There is no reason why the rule at law should be different 
from the rule in equity. Hence scienter is not an element of the tort of deceit in 
Virginia. 
TOHTS Misrepresentation Scienter 11 S.E.(2d) at p.625. 
In most American jurisdictions the intent to deceive is an indispensable element in 
an action of deceit. In Virginia, however, we have consistently adhered to the 
minority view that the intent or good faith of a representer is not an issue and is 
not controlling. "The intent of the party making the repres entation is wholly im-
material. The point is whether the other party has been misled. It is sufficient that 
the statement is actually untrue, so as to mislead the party to wllom it is made. 
The party making it need not know of its fal.sity, nor have any intent to deceive; 
nor does his mere belief in its truth make any difference. A party making a statement 
as true: for the purpose of influencing the conduct of the other party, is bound to 
l£now that it is true. 11 
TORTJ Misrepresentation 181 Va.824 
A, the general manager of the D Insurance Co., told P that he had submitted an 
application for a ~25,000 loan to the proper representatives of the Company and that 
p would know within a few daJS whether or not the loan would be granted. A then Wlent 
on a vacation. P did not hear for sometime, and then investigated only to find out 
that A had falsely told him that the application had been submitted. P then procured 
funds elsewhere. As a result of the delay P lost ;:n,ooo rentals and had to pay higher 
prices for labor and materials due to war conditions. Is the D Insurance Company 
liable? 
Held: Yes. All the elements of the tort of deceit are present, and the principal 
is responsible for the fraud of its agent committed in the scope of his authority. 
TORTS Misrepresentation 182. Va.567. 
In this case the Supreme Court of Appeals unfortunately revives a principle that 
has been almost wholly discredited. Said the Court, quotine 1rfith approval from Coole:y 
on Torts: "Where ordinary care and prudence are sufficient for full protection, it i s 
the duty of the party to make use of them. Therefore, if false representations are 
made regarding matters of fact, and the means of knowledge are at hand and equally 
available to both parties, and the party, instead of resorting to them, sees fit to 
trust himself in the hands of one whose interest it is to mislead him, the law, in 
general, will leave him where he has been placed by his own imprudent confidence." 
In other words, it is legal for dishonest persons to prey on the naive, the foolish, 
the inexperienced, and tlie trusting, in spite of the general rule that contributory 
negligence is no defense to an intentional tort, and the sound principle that no one 
should profit by his own Hrong. 
Note: Fiduciaries are not protected by the rule laid down above by the Court; the 
party for whom one is fiduciary need not use diligence to detect the fraud. 
TORTS Misrepresentation 190 Va.247 
p wished to sell a brick house to D. She told her it was substantially built, easy 
to heat, in good repair in every way, and that there was nothing to worry about. Jusi 
move in and enjoy i.t. D inspected the house before agreeing to buy it. After moving 
in, she found that t he sillies were stopped up, that the oil burner needed a new gener-
ator, and that there was a bad crack in the wa11. D moved out and refused to pay the 
balance of the contr3.ct price. P sold the house to X at ~P4, 000 less than the price 
that D had promised t o pay, and sued D f or that amount. ll>]hat judgment? 
Held for P. The statements made were matters of opinion commonly regarded as puff-
ing or dealer's talk. There was no misrepresentation as to a material fact. It is 
common knowledge that sinks get stopped up and oiJ. burners need repairs after a few 
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y~ars of use. As for the crack in the wall, it was perfectly obvious, and, since she 
inspected the house before agreeing to buy it and the parties were dealing at arms 
l ength, she is not entitled to avoid the contract for that reason. 
TORTS Misrepresentation 190 Va.788 
D sold P an agency which he had conducted for some 2.5 years and under which he had 
the exclusive right to sell the products of nine different manufacturers in the Rich-
mond territory. The contracts between D and the manufacturers were on an annual ba-
sis and could be terminated by either party's giving 30 days' notice. Such contracts 
were ordinarily renewed as long as the agent sold his quota of goods. D told P when 
P bought the agency that, D, was tttn good standingtt ld th all ni ne manufacturers. If 
this statement was false, would P have a cause of action? 
Held: Yes. D's statement is an opinion of what he thinks the manufacturers' opin-
ions are of him. Whi~e a statement of opinion rather than of fact is not ordinarily 
material and hence not actionable, there are cases in which opinion is material. 
This is such a case, for the chief value of the agency was its good will--the like-
lihood that the manufacturers would keep giving their business to the agency, and a 
false statement as to that likelihood would be most material. 
TORTS Misrepresentation Property 191 Va.505 
G was an unlettered farmer. He thought that T, an attorney-at-law, owned a 30-acre 
tract of land. T enjoyed a good reputation and had been Commonwealth's attorney. 't 
sold the land to G for $1,500 and gave him a special warranty deed for same. As a 
matter of fact, D owned the land; T did not even have color of title and must have ~ ~ 
known. T later became insane, and G wishes hi.s $1,500 back. Is he entitle to it? 
Heldt Yes. This is not a suit on the special warranty but one for fraud. T has soL~ 
0 a ngold brick." He impliedly represented that the land was his to sell. The deed 
is sufficient corroboration to satisfy V#8-286. While more than five years had run 
from the time of the fraudulent transaction, that period had not run since the dis-
covery of the fraud, and the action is not barred by the statute of l i mitations. 
TORTS Defamation 3 S.E.(2d) 385. 
The News Leader, the defendant, published a statement that Mrs. Plaintiff of 2317 
Floyd Avenue was arrested, charged with the opera·tiion of a clearl ng house game. The 
Mrs. Plaintiff actually arrested was one living at another address. The reporter was 
negligent in not noticing this fact, although the name was an unusual one. 
Heldr This ie libel per se. But there was no a.ctual malice. Hence there can be 
no punitive damages. General damages, however, are implied from the constructive 
malice which the law implies from the publicati on. ~1t it is error to instruct the 
jury that substantial con~ensatory damage can be recovered, as this overemphasizes 
the idea. One would not say that slight compen3atory damages could be recovered, as 
that would underemphasize the idea. Note: Three judges dissented on the ground that 
.substantial meant "not merely nominal." 
V#8-6J2 provides that in actions for defamation against newspapers and periodicals 
the defendant may introduce in mi.tigation of punitive or general damages their good 
faith, an apology, freedom from negligence, lack of actual malice--but not in dimi-
nution of actual damage. However, such evidence is admissible only to the extent 
that it is included in the grounds of defense, which must be filed in writing at 
least ten days before trial. 
TORTS Defamation 7 S .E. (2d) 133. 
The D Newspaper in good fai th published a story about a lawsuit against the City of 
Newport News growing out of the killing of one woman by another in the Newport News 
jail. The story stated that Mrs. Futrell, mother ann administratrix of deceased was 
the party plaintiff. As a matter of fact Niss Futrell was unmarried and had never 
had a child. She charged that the a.rt:l.ole was defamatory in that it charged her with 
fornication. The paper published a cor rection and an apology. Verdict for plaintiff 
for $500. What result on writ of error? 
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Held : (three judges dissenting) that the verdict was unjus t and should be ~et a" 
side . No reader could think that any insult was intended. The innuendo cannot en-
l o.r ge the meaning of the words 11Mrs." and 11mother" to mean anything immora l or in-
sulting. The court has the inherent power to set aside the verdict "in order to cor 
r ~ ct any manifest departure from right and justice." 
Ground of dissent: "I can conceive of nothing . better calculated to give trouble 
than an erroneous statement to the effect that an unmarried woman of good character 
hb.d e. daughter, therefore illegitimate , who died in jail." 
TORTS Defamation 182 Va. 512 
P bought goods from Don credit and paid for · them. Later P's brother-in-law, with 
out any authority, bought goods on credit fr~m D and wrongfully charged them to P, 
who r efus ed to pay for them. D thon wrote P 1 s employer that P owed him $16 which wa.: 
l ong pas t due. T sued for (1) libel and (2) under .the statute of insulting words. 
He did not allege any special drumages but attempted to prove that he had beon shifto( 
from an 83¢ an hour job to a 67¢ an hour job. 
Held: (1) Th~t no evidence of special damages is admissible unless alleged in tho 
notice of motion so def endant will be on notice that such · damages aro claimed. (2) 
That the l etter is not actionabl0 per s e , but only if · there was somespecial damage . 
Here the court cited 5 types of oases in which ther e could be a recovery for s~ok2~ 
defamatory words, and concluded that tho instant oaso crunu in none of them. The 
court failed to notice that the words in this case were written. At common ln.w ger·. ·. 
era!'drunages are presumed fr om written defamation. (3) The l etter was .not privilef!:·-l• 
as it was not s ent t o someone with n cormnon interest. (4) The l etter was not def:"Jl•ll 
t ory. Lots of people owe bills th at are long past due. P wn.s not a merchant, an:i 
credit was not necessnry. Creditors hn.vo to write· dunning letters, and to hold t L1 t 
such l etters are defamatory or insulting wo.uld work a great hardship. 
TORTS Defamation 185 Va. 516 
p was a white man with a dark complexion. He nsked D's f ountain boy for a Coca-
Cola in a glass • . The boy r eplied, 'twr:-) <.bn 't s erve Negr oes Coca-Colas, and we don't 
l et them drink out of glasses." Later the boy nnd D apologized for the mistake . P 
sued D under t ho Vir ginia statute of insulting words. The court instructed the jury 
that if a r easonable man would think that no insult was intended, thoy should find 
f~r D, and they did. 
Held: Revers ed ~~d r emanded. Insults can be insults whether intended cr not. In 
t ent is important only on is sue;:; a of mali co. or punitive damages. It is only where th. 
words ar El runbigurJus or capable of mor 0 than one meaning that there is a jury questiOl 
as t o how they were meant. Under ~ur statut0 words are not t o be construed acoordint 
to the secret intent i on of the user but acc~.)rding t o their tl sun.l meaning o.nd common 
acceptation. 
TORTS De fo.mati r;m 193 Va. 529 
P was an insuranc e ad juster f •.)r sevor al insurance companies. D was a car dealer 
who sol d and r epaired automobiles. X was a purchaser of a oar fr om D on the ~ondi­
tional sales plan ~ V was vico-president of the B Bank, which finances car pur~has es 
o.nd insists on insurance f or its protection. X was in a wreck. P, in attempting to 
adjust matt EJrs, asked D, E, und F f or es timates of costs of r epairs. Although D.was 
the l ow bidder, the work was given t o E. This infuriated D, and he said in the p~s· 
once of V und of X, "I am not g·o ing t o do any mor o busines s with the B Bank as l ohg 
a.s they us e t hat damn drunk, P, t o handle thttir ad justments. Ho is taking ·money trm 
other garages in exchange f or giving them his insurance companies' r epair work. n.~ 
is a drunken son c,f a bitch. I run go ing t o drive him out of business." V t old P'4 
superiors what D had s ai d , nnd s ome of them then r efu sed t o a llow P t o handle their 
adjusting work. P was given a verdict f ~1r $15,000 which included damages · r esulting 
fr om V's r epetition. 
Held: Vl:lrdiot wo.s a proper one . A jury c0uld find ther e was an abuse of a privi-
l eged occas i on. The gener e. l rule that one who is guilty of libel is liable f or repe• 
titions, but one guilty of slander is not liable , is subject t o an exception when it 
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was intended and contemplat ed that the s lander be. r epeated. . It was by r epetition c . 
the s lander that P was to be dr i ven out of bus iness. 
TORTS Dofamati6n Privilege 186 S .E. 42 
X, an agent for the D Insurance Company, was charged by his superior with doing 
under cover work, i.e., writing anonymous l etters to the officers of the Company crit 
i cising his superior and the way he managed the business. This charge was made in 
the pr esence of other agents at a meeting and after an honest investigation and com-
parison of handwritings. X sued for slander, denying that he had written tho anony-
mous l etters • . 
Held: That the occasion was privileged; that in order that ther e could be a r ocov 
ory, malice would have to be shown; that the evidence fail ed to show any express ma l 
ice ; and that the burden of pr oving malice was on the pla intiff, X. 
TORTS Defamation Pri vile go 198 S .E. 461 
Plaintiff was in charge of the meo.t department of Def endant chain store . One Dil-
lon, an inspector, said to Plaintiff, "You ar e checked out. You got us for $100 
1ast week." Dillon's cousin than got Plaintiff's job. Dillon told numerous persons 
afterwards why Plaintiff was firHd. At the t rial Def endant pleaded the general i s su 
and put nine witnesses on the stand, who char ged Pla intiff with the commis sion of 
some 14 different crimes. Verdict for Plaintiff for $10, 000 . Was this error? 
No orror. While charge was privile ged, ther e was an abus e of the privilege in ex-
ces sive publication and .in ca lling tho nine witnesses when De f endant did not evon 
plead the truth of tho char ge as a defens e . While damages wer e high, Plaintiff's 
char acter was blasted, and ho was unablG to get othor employment. Ho had an ex ce llcs 
reputation up to that time and had just been married. 
TORTS Doi'e.mation Privilege 182 Va. 200, 205 
P wa s ~mployod by D to edit a trade publication and agrood not to edit any competi 
publication within five years. In violation of his promise , P r esigned and started 
competing publication. D sought an injunction, nnd during the progr ess of the suit 
fals ely and maliciously s t at ed that P was short in his accounts, had robbed his cus-
tomer s t and would "sting" o.nyone who advertis ed in his publications. P sued D for 
defamation. Result? 
-Hold: For P. Since the above statements wer e not pertinent or r e l evant to tho ir 
junction s uit, they wor e not privileged. The Vir ginia court is committed to the doc 
trine that abs olute privilege protects an individual against liability f or defamator 
words spoken in the course of a judicia l proceeding when such words are .pertinent a~ 
relevant t o tho subjeot of inquiry, irrespective of malic e- or falsity • . It is immat€ 
ri al whether the words ar e in writi"ng in n pleading or made orally by counse.l or wit 
nesses. Note : But if P's integrity had been even r emote ly in issue , then the stat E 
mont would have. been abs olute ly privileged no matter how f a l se or malicious, a lthoug 
of cours e , if knowingly fals e , tho party making tho f als e stat ement while under oath 
might be guilty of perjury_. · 
TORTS M~licious Prosecution 186 s .E. 45 
1. In a malicious prosecution suit, wher e f acts o.r e not in dispute , the question 
of probable cause is f or the court, i. o ., a question of l aw. 
2. In the ins t ant cas e Plaintiff charged that Def end ant maliciously pros e cuted a 
cas e on a not e . Def endant · c lo.iins that there is no ·,caus e of action for malicious pro 
ecution of a civil c as e in Vir ginia whor e thor o has been no arrest, s eizure· of pr ope 
ty, or special injury. On this point the. court sb. i d , "It i s not conceded (by t he 
oourt) that an acti on will lie f or the ma.licidu~ pros ecution of a civil suit in this 
jurisdiction in a cas o similar t o that presented her e . The question has never been 
b r:3 f or e this court f or decision. Courts of ot}?.er s t at es differ on the subjeot. It i . 
sufficient her e ·to r est our decision on other gr ounds. 11 Thes e other gr ounds were 
that there was no proof of want of probable 9e.us e and no proof of malice . 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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TORTS Malicious Prosecution 191 S.E. 678 
Retail grocer gave wholesaler, who sold for cash only, a bad check which was not 
made good within five days. Vifholesaler instituted crimina l prosecution, and retailE 
was acquitted. Retailer then sued wholesaler for malicious prosecut1on. 
Held: Since after 5 days there is a legal presumption of fraud, wholesaler had pr 
ah l e cause~ also, that in an action for malicious prosecution guilt o.f Plaintiff of 
acts charg•:Jd by Defendant may be shown, notwithstanding Plaintiff has been a.cquittod 
TORTS Malicious Prosecution 185 Va·. 497 
P bought 5 gallons of gasoline on credit from D. Later P gave D a check for $ 22 
dr awn by X in favor of Y. The payee should have be en P, but by mistake it was Y. I 
indorsed the check in his own name only, and D gave him money for the difference . 1' 
dre.woe bank refused to honor the check because not indorsed by Y. D swore out a ·.var 
rant against P for .obtaining money by fals e pretens es . When tho case cra.me for tria l 
it was mutually agreed with consent of the court that P was to get a . check for $22 
from X payable toP's order, that he would indorse it and givo it to D, and that tho 
criminal case was to be dismissed. P did as agreed and then brought this action 
against D for malicious prosecution. Assuming D ·acted maliciously and without prob-
able cause, what r esult? 
Held: Verdict for P for $2,000 mus't be set aside. 
promised (permitted by V#l9-12 with consent of court 
ris e to civil actions) the settlement thereof by way 
malicious pros e cution. 
Where a criminal case is com-
in all misdemeonor cases giving 
of' compromis e bars an action .f c 
TORTS Malicious Prosecution 187 Va. 485 
H bought e. sofa on the conditional sales plun fr om D for $93, of which $3~ was pa i 
in cash, balance to be paid at the r at e of $10 per month. H made no further payment 
although he wa.s billed monthly. Finaliy a l etter s ent to H was returned unopened by 
H's wifEl , with the notation "Mov0d to Oregon." On inves tigation D discovered that t · 
sofa had been sold by H t o X and re1noved in the nighttime , contrary t o the terms of 
the conditional sales contr!lct. By V#l8-178 this is larceny. D also received word 
that H's wife and H (who had not gono t o Oregon) were about t o go t o North Cnrolina. 
D procured a criminal warrant f or H's arrest. H was ~cquitt ed, because it appeared 
that H's wife made the sale . H then sued D f or malicious prosecution and recovered : 
verqict for $1,000, which the trial court refus ed t o set aside. What result on appo 
Held: Case .revers ed and fina l judgment for D, who had probable cause as a matter 
of law. Also there wo.s no evidence. of malice. Hence two essentials of tho t ort of 
malicious prosecution were lacking. 
TORTS Malicious Prosecution 189 Va. 624 
p of Virginia gave D of .Kentucky a bad check for $90 . D asked a lawyer what to do 
about it, and h,e was adviS ed to swear out a wctrrA.nt in Kentucky and then to se ek ex-
tradition unless P- settled pr omptly. D did as advised, came to Virginia, and showed 
X, an officer, the Ken-fucky warrant. X arrested P and called up T, a trial justice, 
who t old X that he had no extradition warrants at his homo Md just to hold P in ja.i 
until the n~xt morning. While the criminal proceedings were still pending 1 P sued D 
for malicious prosecution, false ar·rest, und abuse of oriminai process. It appears 
that D t old .X . .thnt all he wanted was his monoy, and , if ho got that. X need take no 
further st.eps·. The trial court dismiss ed P' s case against D. 
Held: (1) The trial court acted properly ns t o the malicious prosecution count, b· 
c..ause -there had not yet been n. f avor able .t enninnti·Jn, D acted on advice of· counsel• 
and·there was no evi dence of malice o (2) Tht:l.t, even assuming thnt P was falsely im-
pris-oned by X that Sunday night, D was not a party t o that act and hence is not guil"' 
of fals e impris onment. (3) But cas tJ r eversed , as ther e is at l east e. jury questi on : 
t o whet her or not D was gu ilty of abus e of criminal pr oces& . It could be f ound unde1 
the evidence that Dinstitutod extradition proceed ings not f or the purpose of bringir 
P t o justice but as a means of c0lle cting a privat e dobt. If so, this would be an 
abuse of criminal proces s and actionabl e . In such a cas 0, P1 s guilt is immaterial, 
and the fact that D noted on advice of couns ul is not a bnr but may be shown only in 
mi~gation of damages. 
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'J.'OR~.' S Malicious Prosecution Pleading and Practice 190 Va. 701 
D had been P's client, and P as his attorney had properly entered on D's pr emis 8s. 
Neverthe l ess, D swor e out a warrant charging P with a criminal trespass; P appear 0d 
and was released on his own r e cognizance. Befor e trial D had the case dismi ssed pur· 
suant to the t erms of V#l9-l2, which permits certain types of minor crimina l cas os tc. 
be dismissed within the discretion of the justice and upon payment of the costs by 
the defendant, if amends are made and accepted by the parti es involved. As a matter 
of fact P had made no amends; nor had P paid the costs of the criminal pros ecution. 
P· sued Don two counts: (1) for malicious prosecution and (2) for insulting words, 
and r e cover ed a $2,000 judgment on a general finding of guilty. It was contended 
that the words wer e not insulting. 
Held: The statement that P had made a criminal tr espass on D's property for which 
he had made amends is insulting a~d a pt to l e ad to a brea ch of the peace and is the r~ 
fore actionablQ. It was ~lso . contended that the proc eedin gs wor o judicia l in natura 
and absolutely privileged. He ld: This contontion is well made . The justice is ex0r 
cisin g a judicia l discretion. The f act that he did not r e ce ive costs from the def end 
ant ih tho criminal cas e dia not go to . his jurisdiction, but wns jus t a mistake on 
the part of one having jurisdiction. So the cas e w0s r overs od and r emanded on the 
count for malicious prosecution only'· as tho court could not t oll from a gonero.l ver-
dict and judgment how much of s ame was for the s e cond count. 
TORTS Malicious Pros ecut i on 193 Va . 381 
A illegally practiced l aw and, on forma l compl aint by D, was i nd icted for a mis -
deme anor. The indictment was d ismis sed becaus f; the s b c,tuto of limitations had run. 
A suod D for malicious prosecution. Result? 
He ld: For D. "It is we ll s ettlud that on0 who was in f act guilty of t he off ens e 
charged aga inst him co.nnot ma inta i n an ncti on for malicious pros e cution. The bas is 
of the action is injury t o o.n innocent pers on. Proof of the actua l guilt of the per-
son accused is o. complet e def ens e , even though the pr0s ocution may have been dismissE> 
or the def endant acquitted. The ~ction f or malicious prosecution does not lie in 
f avor of a. guilty pers on." (Mor eover, dismissal of a crimina l cas e f or a pure ly 
t echnical r eas on is not generally r egarded as a f o.vor ablc t erminati on, which is one 
of the e l ements of a caus e of action f or ma.licious pr os ecution.) 
'.PORTS Workmen 1 s · Compons ntion 180 Va. 345 
P l ost the s ight of one eye when he was 'l child . Ho l ost t ho s i ght of the other 
eye while attempting t o put a drunken guest of his employer t o bed , on which occasion 
the guest kicked him in tho eye . P sued the guest nnd r e cover ed a judgment f or 
$2,000, but the guest had no property. P then demanded workmen's compensation . f or 
t ot a l disability. Is he entitled t o anything , assuming his employer t o come under 
the l aw? 
He ld: (1) The r ocovory of a judgment by P against the guest does not discharge tho 
0mployor except t o· tho extent that his statutory right of s ubrogation may have been 
interfer ed with. In this case ther o has not boon £\ny i nter fe r ence wi th that ri ght. 
(2) It is nocessaty t o l os e both oyos in the same a ccident in or der t o r e cover f or a 
· t otal disability on tho theory of blindneSS: Otherwis e the employ c1 r would r ea lly :to 
he lu f or other accidents not c -;nne cted with tho empl oyment. 
TORf'S Worlanen 1 s Comp (;ms ation 186 Vo. . 116 
p wo.s killed whilo in tho employment of X, · a subcontr actor, wh8n D, the c ontrnctor, 
negligently dropped o. heavy pioco. of timber .• . All parties came unde r worlanen' s com-
pens at ion. P' s wife colle cted her compensati on fr oi'l X and then sued D. ·What r es ult1 
He ld.: For D. Under our s t atuto ther EJ i s a right t o suo "nny other party" who 
negligently injures an employee while at work. But the principo.l contractor is not 
such other party . (nor i s o. f e llow empl oyee , 185 Va . 96 ). The "other party" r ef erred 
t o must be a stranger t o thu emploY1nont, so tho.t as t o s uch othor party the accident 
is not an industria l on t> . Hence both tho contractor and subcontract or c an only be 
pr0coeded against as per tho t er ms of t ho o.ct. 
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TORTS Workmen Is Compensation- 192 va.. 518 
In Virginia, at common law, if D ne gligently injures P, and P is further injured 
oy the negligEmce of his doctor, P has two several causes of action and not one join 
action, as follows: One against D for all damages since there has been no break in 
the causal connection, and another against the doctor for damages due to his negli-
gence . If he has already recovered tho whole from D, he cannot get a double r ecover : 
from the doctor •. . If the cas e is a workmen's compens ation case, the injuries caused 
by the negligence O"f the doctor are included and are payable out of compensation fun t 
pt,rrsuant to the pro:visions of the statute. · In the instant cas e P was injured while 
at work. The doctor s el e cted by the employer negligently treated him. P, aft er ac-
cepting full workmen's compensation, sued the doctor, who demurred. 
Hold: Demurrer overruled. The doctor is not a f e llow servant. The further injur~ 
by the doctor is not an industrial accident. The doctor does ·not shar e in tho bur-
dons of workmen's compens ation and is not entitled to its benefits. The actual com-
pensation received by un injured employee is rare ly, if ever, complet e compensation. 
(SoP may sue the doctor. If he is successful he reimburs es the employer's insurance 
carrivr to the extent it has already paid for the doctor's negligenc e , and keeps tho 
balance hims elf.) 
TORTS Federal Employers Liability Act 183 Va. 162 
X, a railroad empl oyee , fell from a bridge while engaged in the act of switching 
cars. The bridge did not have ::;, walk:wr:w. It is the cust om of r ailroads not to have 
walkways f or t heir empl oye es . X'·s personal r epr esentative sued in the S.tate Court, 
alleging that r a ilroad was negligent, in that it failed t o furnish deceased with a 
reasonably saf0 place t o work. Tri al judge struck out plaintiff's evidence . 
Hold: Error. Custom is evidence of due care, but custom cannot itse lf make an un· 
safe place a safe place. ·whor e employees must use bridges oft en, as wher e they ar e 
near .switching f acilities, a jury might find th!\t due car e r equired a wa lkway. It 
was orr or to t ako this qu estion o.wo.y fr om tho .jury. · 
Not e: By the Feder o. l Employers Li ability Act, 45 U. S.C ., Section 53, assumption of 
risk i s abolished wher e i njury or death r esults in whol e or in part from the negli-
genc e of the carrier. Under tho ~bovo Act contributory negligence of employe e is not 
a. bar but diminishes t he damages, and the f ellow servant doctrine is abolished. It 
is still necos.s ary, however, t o prove that the Rr.ilrond Company was negligent. 
TORTS Plead ing end Prn.c ~ ico 189 Vo. . 1 
D ne gligently r an _int<J-r'' s car, injuring the car and also P. P s~ed D f or the dam· 
ages done; th~_~r-~·-·-r e c over ed a judgment, and collected s ame . Then P., sued D f or his 
per sonal ;Lr:rj"uries . D contended that he should not be twice vexed f o~ one and the 
same _.wrO'ng nnd that a cause of action cannot be s plit. \ 
· Hold: (2 judges diss enting) That while tp.o ma.j ority rule is as per\~· s contention, 
ther e . i s a growing minority contra . An injury t o property is distinct fr om an injurJ 
to the pers on. A c o.use of act ion for the f ormer may be assigned, whil a oa.us e of 
action f or the l atter cannot be . Tho statuto of limihctions is differ t .. I f . no 
action f or pers onal injuri es has been instituted and P dh1s fr om an ind$pendent_ c aus € 
the action abates for the per sona.l wrong but survives as to the pr opert~wr_on·g · 
Hence P has two ca.us es of action. Since they ar o both i n co.se a.t comrno law~ he 
could j oin thom by having two counts, but he i s not r equired t o do so. 
. \ 
TORTS Pl<::ading and Pr acti ce · 178 ~a . 343 ' 
A' s attorney i n his clos ing ar gwnent s o. i d in Qn action f or damages gro~ing out of 
an a.utomobile acci dent, "Any jud gnont will hnve t o be paid out of my clie~t ' s own 
ha.rd- oa.rnod vra.g0-s . 11 Was this pr oper ar gument? 
No . It is only t elling the jury indirectly t hat tho dof end a.nt carried o li abilit~ 
i nsur ance , and whether he doe s or not i s i~~at orial. I 
TOR TS Pl e ad i ng and Practic£ Evidence Mi sc ullaneous 187 Va. 53 
P, who was a pass enger i n D's t ax i, suod D f or d?..magos as a result of injuries sus-
t a ined when D's t o.xi collided with o. pr operly parked car. D was oxceoding the speed 
I 
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limit by some ten mil0s an hour. According to D an approaching car suddenly swervs; 
d ire ctly in front of D's taxi. To avoid a head':"on collision, D turned to his ri ght 
into a parked ca r. At the time of the accid ent P stated that D was not to bla.rno am 
that he ran into the parked car to avoid a head-on collision with a ca r in motion. 
He r epeated the statement a we ek l at er. D stated in his grounds of defens e that he 
had not b een ne gligent, but fail ed to ' state in thes e grounds that he was confronted 
wi.th a sudden emergency for which ho was not to blame . On tho stand P stat ed tha t 
he did not know how the accid ent happened a.nd that he did not s ao a ny ca.:r swerve sue 
donly in front of D. He was then asked whether or not at certa in time s he had made 
tho sta t ements s e t forth above . Objection to this question we.s sustained on the 
ground tha t since a sudden emergency WJl.S · not stated as a ground of defens e , ovidenc( 
on tb.a t subj e ct was inadmissible. Discuss the points invo lvfJd. 
(l) Tho tria l court got off on the wrong foot. Whethe r or not D fil ed as one of 
his grounds of defense that he was confronted with a. sudden emergency is irrunateria l. 
His stat ement that he was not ·ne g\igent wa s notice tha t he wou~d r e ly on P' s f a ilure 
to prove every el ement of his case. Tho sudden emergency was not an a ffirmative do-
f onsG which D must s e t forth in his grounds of' def ons o if ho wishe s to r e ly on it, 
but a fact showing th :1t D used due c ar e under tho circumsta nces and hence was not 
negligent. Matters which constitute pl aintiff's prima faci e c a s e a nd . which ar e de -
nied by de fendant's pleo.ding n oed not be stat 0d s pecifically in his grounds of do-
f ens o , for the ple ading donying :them is its e lf sufficient notice that d ef endant r e -
lies thereon. 
(2 ) 
d onee 
(3) 
siblo 
( 4) 
P' s statements at tho time of tho accident wor e admissible a s s ubst antive ovi-
as part of the r e s gestae . 
P's statements a week l a t er wor e 
as substantive evidence und er an 
P 1 s stat ement t o the e ff oct thnt 
ndmissions ag'l inst inte r est and hence admis-
cxce ption t o tho hearsay rule. 
is not subject to the opinion e vidence 
D wa s not t o blame , when us ed as an admis sior; 
rulo . Tho f act thatPdrcwsuch an infer e nc e 
when it wa s ago.).nst his inter est t o d o s o is evidence that thEJ infe r enc e was · justi-
fied. 
( 5) And all o f tho a b ove sta t ements a r e n ls o admi ss ible t o impeach P by. showing 
tha t he made prior inc onsistent s tat ements. 
( 6) The fact that D was <Jxccod in r, t h u s peerJ. limit n:i ght vr mi ght not have b een a. 
proximat e c aus e of P ' s injur~ and should be l oft t o t he jury. 
. ----- -- -·- - ' ' TORTS Plea~ Pr actice Find ing Instructions 137 Va . 181 
P su od Jl...ft\r" da.ma ges r ocoivod when D's t ruck und ertook t o ma ke a l e ft turn a cross 
· tho~so of P' s onc oming car. Tho c ourt ins tructud the .jury tha t D wa s und er a 
.~Y (1) t o givEl a. si gm.l, clearly visible t o traffic, of his i n t enti on t o make a 
l eft-hand turn, (2) t o drive s a i d ru1tomobilc as clos e us pr actica l t o the ri ght of 
tho c e nter of said i nt e rs e cti rm bof or e ma ki'ng a lf;ft t urn, (3 ) t o s oc th11t said l e ft 
hand turn can b~ mado in s af e ty; lll1ll ' if y ou b e li•J VEJ fr om tho evidenc EJ t hat the de f er 
ant f a ilod in the ,a bove particulars <:..nd tha t s uch f a ilure was t he sole proxima t e cau 
of the accident, thoy should find f or tho pl'l.intiff. The .court a lso instructed the 
jury in another gon or a l instruction that t he over-a ll dogr eo of c a r e owod by D was 
or d ino.ry ca r o undor tho circumsto.neos • . P wa.s g;ivon a ver d ict, .and .D -s ou ght a now 
tria.l. Should tho trial c ourt g i ve 1.\ new tria l? 
· He ld: Yes . The inst:ructi.Gl'l- :tho;.;t-D---ahoulct s 0o t hat sa.id l eft-hand turn ca n be mo..do 
in saf ety s eoms t o sta t u that h0 i s an insur er that no ono will be injured ; wher e as, 
he owe s only a duty of du o c ar e . This vice is not cur od by the other ins tructi on, 
since the first instructi on was a find i ng instructio n complot o in itse lf, and the 
s ec ond ins truction i s n ot oxplan~tory of the f irst but i nc onsis t ent with it, and 
the r e is n o way of t <:: lling whethe r t hu j ury b~ ied th e i:r· · vo:rdi :ct on tho erroneous 
finding instruction or tho corr ect gon or a l i nstruction. 
TORTS Misce ll Rn oous 182 Va. . 573 
P' s ca r and D' s bus c ollided a t a s treet Jnters e ct i on. Ther e was evidence th 'lt P 
was traveling at a moder a t e s peed , a nd th~re was e'llidence tha t he was go i ng a t a 
speed well in excess of tha t a lloweu by l aw. P w.s on D' s r ight~ The court i ns truc -
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ted the jury that the la1oJ of this State pro·iTides 'that where two motor vehicl~s ap-
p:roar.h and. enter an intersection at approxi.mately the same time, the vehicle to the 
left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle to the right. Was this e~ror? 
Held: Yes, because it does not tell the jury that if P was exceeding the speed 
limit he forfeited his right of way. 
TORTS Dead Bodies Damages for Negligent Interment 191 Va.43 
Plairr0iff hired Defendant undertaker to disinter the body vf her husband and re-
move it to another cemetery. Upon being informed by Defendant that this had been 
done, Plair~iff paid a bill of ~S3, covering the charge for the reinterment and a 
new wooden case to cover the casket. Later Plaintiff discovered that all Defendant 
had done vias to dump the body in a shallow trench at the new cemetery and spread dirf 
over it. Plaintiff got another undertaker to perform a decent burial at a cost of 
~~135. She sued Defendant for this pecuniary .loss and mental suffering. From a verdici 
for Plaintiff for ~1,000, Defendant appeals. 
Held: Although there is no property right in a dead body in a commerical sense, 
the rjght to burY. an resetv t ·ns will be p;otecte as~asi-property 
righ£; and an action ex delicto will lie against a wrongdoer who interferes with 
that right.There is a conflict of authority as to whether or not recovery should 
be allowed for mental suffering alone when unaccompanied by pecuniary loss; but herej 
where the~~ was an actionable tort and a pecuniary loss over and above the mental 
anguish, -the mental suffering of Plaintiff is a proper element to be considered in 
assessing damages. NOTE: ,;rn 121 Va. 284 it was held that a mother was not entitled 
to damages for mental anguish where the railroad negligently failed to notify her of 
her son's death and the mutilation of his body on the right of way, since the 
mental suffering was not accompanied by any physical or pecuniary damage. 
{;, ... §,).r\ .)rfrflnctfX£· e]:~ ~~ Ry.C o. h~~~~\hoi.l::JOl.vos, t ba t is , tho '(}<:nllj>ffil~' ~~.- ;~~-. ~ : ;·dc·rtal;c to prc·v:l.de their ucals . Durinr.; tho hm.'.r of recoG;J for lunch the ha:: lCl ::; ~i.Jt. 
a. f ~ro 1.1.pon tho ric;ht-of--way of t!1e cm1pany·to ui:n:m tl1cir cofJ:'eo. In so cl o]ntt t b.c 
.~:- ,_nl Hprr:w.d to e.d ;.ioin:iJ::JG prope:H.y c•.n(!_ djc1. danago. 'Ic; tho .c a Lhm.y c oinpa.ny l::Ls'bh::~' 
.l.'lc• t or.t ()f ncglic,ont:L}· build:i.nt::; a fire WD.s not cor1nH.tcr~. u:Lthin the scope of · ~o· td ' 
·:,·:.x!.. I<Jr .ity . Hcnr::o +,Jw Co!:::pany is "lot l b.ble. IJoto, ho~·rev,;r, if, a:fte:t' r8svuinE.; 1:f •)J:\.; 
t;; ._, Jtmdr; negligently failed to extingu:L~'lh the fire it js <'.rglcablc that it H <W 
· Hithin the .::co~)e of tho:i:r duties to cxtinguis~~! fi:r.•or:; on t ~:to r·i e1t of vay '· rt.~lcl en 
/et/::5tr·ry_,:f -:: ;, ~·,:·1 ;x:J-uoW:./)0-/;::':::·: 5 r f t4 s e_ ·~f. d/ . · . . . 
2 , A 1 ~; and C ,J O:! .. citt!r co;.!,f,tt; a tort a.c.:dns-t. 'l. A pafs P ,.·100 for a rol0aso .o.f !-1:ls 
r;lvtre of thQ dar1a.;;c: . D thereupon ·fmos B and C. Car. ho prevr:J.:Ll? G:~ve . tj.w, reaso n . 
'[ 'I ( ' ~ 0 'Jj1 / / rJ ~ ' . } lei. , ' t 1 ... , • ' • ' f ., . . ·~, \ 
.. .11 ... v<~ .~· . >•:-..). :n; Has. 1c T.na , a ro. ease; o.:;: ono JO:U\ 'f, ·i;o:)rt Cl:tsor ,. even '-TJ ·t.,n au 
c·:X:r•rr:•';"' 'J"P':l(' I'Vrrt·inn o·-r. i·ir~·n' ·:·,, ni1a·l·"'·"Ji_. · ·thr~ otlJ-"-' J'';. '·1 .. ; ;_.- r ·r.:-o-l. ·e· ; ;::,-. o·f ':tll' I... .  .: j .n " ~ ~ · ~ . .. ' • . :-: .. e' JJ .. ' - ' _ . _v _..,_ . " - ".i .:cJ J ' · :::. ---: -~ ·~ : ·~' \ '-- • ' _·-~ . '-:- ''"~ . ... ' .. c " ~ ' 
J:;>,. ~ . /l V I 1 ~ -. . (. • ,, • . , , , • , t.. , L ~ 
.. ' . .t~fJ ~oom Lund CoJ;p'):} l'\'" 8.uve r;1scs a~ aerrJplane: Ill;)-: .-:- o::1 1~hrJ propm:·-s:,r ·v:·, ;:rt., :i't ·J.:3 
d:;.et-:.or!ln r:_; 'f. or th:) .!-il'.T'.!IODO CJ:l attract:m;~ a cro\.1d .to ·tJ·,o rJ <..J .o .- The L ·..;.1d Contpan:· >~'.1.> 
nc control •jver the J.VJc•.t or, or h:;.;;; _;) r or;c;rty , (V' c:.s :>i.stri!1'Gcl. ~ .'J: J ,~it tho ::teropl ano 
"t.:trtc, ono of tho :3 pcctc..<. t or 1 ::> j n inJured l)y ·t,;·io !.:.::::((l.L;_;u ;."l·c j :i~!Ti . Dtd.a.tion of -tl't c 
maeh :Lno, and f or the Jn.im~ios ]')rin.•;;s su~t ;.t[';o.:i .c·l;:;t .. tl.oc:: Land Co: .J;~any t o·rccov 0r dama -
gof.J . lle.rJ tho GpoGi;.•).to:r a ric ht ot :lc ~-,:Lo:•1 a::};"l:~ ~ist. :uw JJo.Ud Coi::t:tXHJY . '? Give r eason •. 
Ye:·J. Tho:ugh t!,e ;.~viutor :i.r; <! l! ir;cl.0)pendont c ·;;') ~.r.::.ct c-r, :t-.he m.m ;;-r of ~he · prenisos 
mms ·jmrj t~CJ'~~l}::: 1r)10 ~:; .'. tc:b:J. c, :.l 1 .• i: \. \.i f~ • . 0~-! C cf t ' · ·~-~ C: O c:l ~_,- ;j :J.c s i13 . t o protoc:t 
l:nm fr om n r:r: ·J ·i rr rort. ·iri]'<r:'' r' 1·)v .. ,, ... _, ·' c·t "'Ofll' "c···l·pr~ '·J i-!1'1 t1lL' ''IT I···rt'· Hh~ch .- 1-:e per- ·· 
• •• • • • • .J ,') ' • •· ' •, , I \,,.. • . 1 • • • - r • . v' " .,J L ,..l •.J (~ ~ -' .._, ' . I~..- ,• v ,_, ., : • R • ,I J ~ • .J ,I. -: .J j - • , , • .. . • ' 
mi.ttod anoth0r to c~.() , Soo 45 C.J.:::·r; . ·, : · 
_M, fAltt-l ~ . { L[f ~,. · s · . 
/+• In what Cll'<R.• r.wt~';}ch 5 \r:i~ Jt' ::1 p1;n ·rn :.t : .. !".iCU.r ljcib :iJ :l. L .~~ fo:c ri lioriatin[~ ,tLc Ed:'foc -
t:i.o11S c·f ;:t uar r. iorl. ('1.m·: e-h to:;T in "'ctj.on b-.. ·oLt~ht h / t:· ..;, lw:3h::t.nd '? · 
1-Jhore t.J:...o alinw~-L :i. on of :.:tf.!.'oct.2vnG :i.8 fror'l. mc.'.l l c o .1r1d c:r::t i':t.' Ol':'. a bona -fid e 
do.sirc to aid thoir. cla~. ' ::;htor. . 
~; -~ t>f · 'Du-tJt /AJJt- CkefJI~ ·. _. · 
:J. _ J:.l.on _ &nC~1., " o.r;\_ r:.·.~ n::: ~· ~; , ,r_; ;· \:{t ~~~;~- :~:il ,·_L~~c ~ ;.: r~ L'.] i!_ :• '-'· :.: L:. oc .. :r: i n ~Lo .c~t~ '-.,. of,, Charlot-.te .. ,v:t._1.J . .rno.i d•:.; ...... t J ... Ll ..!..Lc.u ,; L-.. d ::... .. , , 1 00 ;;h'~ ..i' · c :·' o::_' t :·:o ca;nto:'l.l · .:.o t ocL, of 
tho A1bo:mrEJ.c ·H:l.Jl:(.n;·; C o, ~pD : :". · 'l'lwy r c:prcs c. ;1t t o ·n.h1 tn:•.t tl~o t otaJ. l:iabiUty- ':·'!.' 
the Irl'i.J.J ing coJ~lric:my c'h.·clicJ ncrG oxcc:cd 0:~12,('00 . B::·.rni:: s rc'l~l :J _ j~· :~-; ·,!.'. m:t til~. ~:; _ntat.o.mo'(rG 
plxtcha iwr:; th..:, r:;tocl< ... It d.cvc:1o~x: ] ,·.t e-l · t !." .c.d:. t:!\l c :'Tl (1:1 n t' is .imk:~tC'd to tb . ..-o ext(mt 
of ~:aoo ' 000' . au (:)'V'idonc.:;d ry a docc~ of t.rurr t of r•.:Cbi'J :Lr~ t hr: cle rk I .s offic e of 
AUx;!lW.rlo c olm-~y, ·Lbc r o1w lt. b0 :i.n ~~ t :1at ·the c ~td. t e·;J s t oGl' · :Lr~ -~ >o ·c~ :UJ.ing c ompany 
\-n:w Horth (JO i .• h.i.l1:[( rd ; -~lto--Li;K, · oi: !;he ~;aiu . . byA=J.l on L Co , I n iJ.:.1 ac·c.i.c>JJ for deco:it 
l:I:ought b;;- Barnc.: G ; ' r:.·r:.:.n::;t AJ.:!.•)l!·E. Co., tho J ::~c -;:.dr"do:oy l :i_ ,;_l-.iJ. i:Lf 1.:.p--m the gro:mnr:l 
t ~ at the ])'L'!'cr·w.sor i . J :·.~ll.c r,o i nqu:t i"'' ; •) t. c . q ;, ~~ t. i ;::; ~~01-r o ·:jr) iorl a.s t o ·(·,he soundnoG .~ 
of t.hi~~ defcmso '? · · · 
It in g onorn.lJ. ~L' hold t.h<·r: :it <:. oos ~wt J; ,; H:l. t ~ ~ :!L \'. ~ , ,~ ; ,!n~.-t of h in Hho ul:.t o:..' ed 
fa:Lr.0 statorao:nt :?. t o s ;·ty t1.· · a~; . , .lcl i nt J .'~.f .-:w~:ht n crt, t c, 11r:t:Vc ·;:>•·)1.-l.uvod thcu Hitl:out i n -· 
vonU.r.at:i.c.n . Corrtr· :i.bvto:ry n o rr:L:L!_>; C)':l CO :i.:; l) :') clr~~(:~j ; : e 'G"l ::-.;::.' .i. ntGJ!'C J.Oilal t 0rt. But 
' . , ,; . ....-... 
·w:, f·vrt' ,lnnl " l 'y· ·in ·L: ..' ') : r._J ':;6? ., ., .. , ')TL ·i t i ' ' c":t ·i.c' · 11 \·J}'.n r•c• Coi"~j;l ·:trv care ancl r .. r ;l-
·• · J ., , , ' '·' ·, , _, • , .),. ,.. 'J( . O,/ '· "'.J . ~~ ~ . I 1 • 0 t JC. J' "' · ·'- ,• -' "'• ·-1- . . h, · -· 
d c_nco ;)..r r~ t)l .tffic.h n 1 f o!' .i.'v:U _;::r • 1 ·(..-; ...: · l; _ i.on ~ :i.t :L' t bc.J {IL: 'L:.' c:~- ·V·:c:l ~x.'.rty t o n D.Jw l ' se 
of_j:Jlrll!l. ~'hcroforo , -;_:r i'c.'.l~:c l:'(:prn:..: ont .. \t :i.o:v_; ;:;_ro c r:Kc rle c.J ! ;:·.~·d :L:w nat;(. o·;_•s ·of f;!ct, 
~d the .'mc;a rw· uf J;.~ oJLotl:.o <::T l ! Lc :I bi1;1d r.mcJ. eo_l.'. ~'JJ ~ - ''I.Vci.J ;.-l ,J.,; ".:. ; - ]_,~t ;1 · j11l rtic::.> , and 
the· pf,lrty, ir,ol:.r;.J.d. _l){ rr~~J o c · t j n£; ~·) t b•:::·.l , ;.; oc;J Li't t o i: :n 'r,;t ;·d :,.).D ·Jl:f :i.l'l the han:'l s of 
one ¥ThOi.lCJ :intrn ·c:;t ':i ·i, j r.; to m:i.::;J. .-;o.cl. him , t i.tn J.aH, in gcnc .~.-,, J i 1-J:i.ll ] r_) ave hi.!:.1 Hhr;;r e 
ho haH bu r.m plrL (; ()C\ hy l:.\ i.s 0Hn ii'' n1:udont c 0rli:':Lll.oncr:: . 11 • I11 o t:.>.cr v1urd :·J i c i rJ v.1 \oT&yr; 
O'Xm :3 oas0n for c r. ook::; to rJ.ro .r u 1 t.l.w trl':J t ir: ;- ~ ; th:: c:c· ccln: .. c; t.•o, -the .i.no:x.-pcrio;·l co , \ ' t . •. .I • • • 
. . aml UJc foolish . J. . . . . · · ,1 ~~~~- i ~ ~~v, Cr:t ?r~:·el~"·J ,i~~-; : J~: l •X;1 .~.%~ cdr.~{:/:/tf./t . ~o{ U:a t thr: dcr-
'f ,~;Jda.nt \o!ilS ac tu8.t<:d 'by l'lu.hcc! 1.1nd LJ w ~r :i':t.J ;j1.'.c.J :·;r: i:: , s t.r i. : G <~ CJ cl 'li }l•-~ _j1_1.ry t i'. :-: t hucl. ·(,he 
· . I . , 1~ '\ ll' .r' t : ' ·1· '' .L ' . , , ., r "tlllbt 'L0 infm• ·. 1t ho \f O.l'lt U i f';·o Xl i) • .Y C.. G.t ' :-;o J .. ,. ·.-t •.:. :; •-·G . .t.:tov ::; 11'0",] lo ::JC OV:LO.Ot1CO ·vne 
· c\ofe.ndant wr..:.n l.'lC ti.:\,_ t :~!d bJ n:1.l :i c o , l;~ ·Lh:i ;; inctrl' C' t i o:-~ rJr il ' ll(~ '? / 
.'2. 
, ··J. i' ;:;.J.ico 'C:l:Y be ,;rom.::.1nd. frc;·_, w :nt Q:Lp.:r:nl2.e::l21.D_~l'.(Je, b1 1-i:; pa;.rt,__cf_ 'l2.bl.e c rtt.::·;o 
: .. : '1G'[(~.:r:...-..:t..o. ·hn p-t e:-run.c.d. · '~J&].i, Q.Q . Tho reason :i..c: thxt. ono, Hithovt !·.w.lico,uo'.'ld 
,r ,. ,L .: :c :t chare;o o.:;:.:ii'wt ;;~~1othor vn1ess tl'.'.ere Hi:1S probub1e ca:c:.se , but lll.t.·lr:V'. na.t:L~::-·o 
· · ·, ' 1·· c l' ~-J • ·b "1 ·1 · · ·. t ·'·'.-, ·r'·1o·~ 'J'"' ·'· ]' ··1 1· 1-.,. i""'e , ...... ~ ·1c · :- . ~; [~~~c:J. T·!.lD.-G 0110 ·· re ~l j,~rru._J~ i3C.TS !.:a. lCC aga.:LD.G v .. .i. ose \ · ~ . . [i.1 . . ].,-;• V! .. • .t..~. ~~ Lc.:A.~o · .:.I. :.. J ... .;_) - .. 
. ' ::~Ll / inju;:·t:d biln.. 
:~/{'~i-~~t:! ·:;, l 'or :>'(:,_~Jl.~~'~,_.]h~ Zote:r.i .. l;:;;;:,1i·l~ ~ ;~L8c3tiJ)IJ of 11 p:d.v:i.lo[',8 , 11 :::nd. \vho 
· :_,J·:: .. ;; :,,~· •. j_uc: s i:-ho quo~1t .ion of ilnalico 11 ? 
~Jh,;t £:cr thrJ occe.sio:c H2.:.'l pr~()d i ·s a c~'-'.ost:io:1 of Lar, c·.r.d. hence is doten;l:i.:·~oc~ 
~Y:' tho c:u,;.::·t. 1Thct1:or ;-~c e:x:iqtod or :1 ot :Lr~ a Ci_'\.'ostj_c,r\ of .H1,9,.t 7 E·.nct :1m:.cc ·is 
~e~~;' ZCC:Jb;y t.bo ~Y·/;·- ~c·~ · {) . d_; /J' ~) . ii1c1c~~ irc..:: :~ lo:: c2 ::: .: .1ay eontrit .tory ncgli;,;o:oce lx~ .::,_-;:i.:r:!.brd:.cd to <3. child? 
In Virr,;in:la G.!\(:1_ c.·. f:~v.r ot:"J.cr f.lt,·.C.eG c\ ch:Uc~ L'nctor 7 :rc!~:±.rrJ of J.{'/3 i<: c q_::-w 1usiv.;ly 
; 'Y.'C\:olTUd to ·::c j nca1J~cb1c: o:::· l~:.<:lic;o Ytco; bct\r~)';·: 7 and J../. ·: .l· r::•~c :3..c <".. .cc h.ct:i~alJ1Q 1);rB··· 
3 1 'l:·:,Jt ·L;Jn ti1.::.t h(! 1-1 ~:.;:; :l. ~tr~ c:>)C1.b:! .. o uf i10f-?;1i · a~·l ~::.i.'.: . .Sec~ 1"".:~ S I' J~ ~ :~J22, also 6~j ·,S., 3" at 1~J2.<~o 
].06:~ . I n tho na j m:·it.;r .:-.:1C1 :!..:·.1 D.ll ,iu:t':~r:d:J.ct.i r:mr; ui ere t~. : .:; cL :~lc~ :i.s lJet\!Ocm tllc ':~os. 
~Jf ? 3J~d 14 a chJJJl. F1~_G ~;_ O(J~·} :·' ::;t ·u.t!O ·t lJ.at do[·;rcr~ o:r:· c c.:::c t h::·-. t· ca1c cf t~.at ·a::-:0, 3<-:c-:, 
~l.ntcJ..ligcn~r-:, ~. :.-.ld r~J~_,cr :!. c;~~! C O 1-:o~' ~i!. : .~ 0 0 ir:: ~;u:ilty ... of c ol~·L~ :~"~;..bu.tcr~r ~·.togligo~lcc, .D.f;O 
f~;:/£ or"JoAl~k_co J: cof.:;./:Tcc~rl. cj; kJ WJJ~ s.~ ~~~lc({ v . -~ . 
9 It 1~ r.nn t.J·cts lnto ~1. r cn.-r ~T2 t .:·: . . :::. ·:·::·.'!:. G o:t. l; ... l)orc:c~;, cn·: :.~.nc: ~~ o :l.~: ·~s,_• J.-c,:.Ln c_: l2.i1£~1..,.c_ ~;e t'.S iJd 
~J~r J1irJ +.c. -~:~o : .. ~_7 (:!.:lr} ;~ :-~ c~;- <.~t.t~:,_e]o: ~.1 j_j :n . ~j.c ;::c,:) , :~ tf"'Lccn ~. ;-c ;:'.I\c.:~ oJ/ t, Doc.i11g bitl S1.1~~rotrrLc1-
crl 8.11(1 'be in~·~ r:-.. SEi cll.,. l."~~Cd ·b;.r t~:~ ~ :·:., y ) :~~C} ~ f; 'l.'!'[) 2. e;tTl ;,~ . ~ :·d ;::: ·(:.c,c;·;:~[~ ·ZL!'l( :.:·.:i_1ls ODO Of tJ~.ci ·.~., 
I fJ tho f.:'.t ho r J.·.i:...L:~ ) for t/.c: ::_ ;:;-:: t.L :Ll r' c l.vil c:~c >.en for r::.cc::.le{;u;:;? 1Thy? 
no~ _ ;:nlos~ "h,~ /<~-:~ ~.cr · ~ ~ : ~c; c'': .'::~:- ~ :L.f :, (~c~. 1 1:;>' ,~!:-o;~~, .·:,c~~··:· ~:~ .~ ~~: F2.>~c~~ _ i ~~ - j~ ot _1 :lc~~c 1 :·:·or LL ... tort., o_ ' 1:. ·.: · c ._..w::._ .J .• ~c. . . : . ·L-C, .. .. . J.o <." t, .. ,_. y .. _,L.t..'. -"J-> ..... !._' .1 )J_ ~_,,_.,r , ... 1t an:I c_1_lc. 
10., .A. hiros 2... cc~I·riLgo :Cr ::X!..l 2 1 ~:l·~~ :·3 'L2p:·:1l<~~~ -: .. ~:i. .J :~~=~~:vel~. '::l,_:i.Jc _I\. i.:J :in the: cnr::ie .. :o 
t ho driver m.:c:):i::;m::t.J;,r rnlil ovo:· ''. I ;o. .A. eo~ B :U.c·.hlo? 1iJ::y? 
B is li,~blc since B ·Ho.s 2.:! J. r! c· : c~~Jc: j t:.:;:.:-rt co~:.-~.r :: c:~ c r :-.~~ !.) · ~:.3!c (Ji.'":.i,.ro.r- J. i3 1.1I!C}c:c· tho 
control of f.: :c c:: t l,u r tl:<:.n L. If A t~'l c'l. ·i;b ·.: c~r·~ vo.r +. o r.':.:·:~.vn f~ ~r.: ·t·.:)r tha:.1 11<:!.G pi'~. 'dc.r,:t t, 
: .. nd tJ_;) driver cl.id c o ·thor: <:~ll ti::r-c ... '.Jor.1rl be Ji_ ~· ~)l() . 
itj;G-..,6~1f!;!l rh,~ ~rc1~ ~~v~rGi.n ia c.ro .;.c [:. :~c;·J(lblo ::: Q: :~.£? 
All 1.-rorcl i3 t ~ •.a t, <-'- r r.: 9 u: •: cgJ.:· rcJ .rt1 ,)d '··R in s ~.) t.in,_; t'~tclcr :::l; ;_\t\.~to of :iwJr~lt:i.nL?: 
1 V 11 • ~ s ~.: i}.IJ • (vr ,_. ~ 17 et 1 "-.S ·-1-'CJV N"""-<; 9!1 .·.._ ~;~~;~~~ ~:~t f:r{:yL,., "" '''•·''"''"· c:csc . :ov ,,,., c '·" '"''• :~'· :'ou:· trmll' is 
d astro:·red in 1;he i ':\.r.; . , :·'.'.;:~t ~:::i r:;>t; :i.f :::L~. - :· >.o.\ ~: y;ot' a.:;;:~:.i.:l r:;t tl 'C _prop:r·iotor? 
., ... 11':·· • . 10' ·' f ~j -) ~ .. ·,.C'\1.:'-"·'\'(' ~·r, ···r·L <-o .... . , .. ~..,. ; ·,,.. ')' t ' r i r • ·1 .- .... . ·t··,r·, ·I· ·''· ')h.Q · ·n C ... , .. t:'\ Of' DJ viS - . ? ~ - ... c .. :.·.<-":.. _,_>'-· . -'-•' .. . ·.Jl• " : . .!< .. . f.; l.o !. ,, .. doO __ _., __ J.: . .. L ·L-•. " 0 ,.'.-:c ) . l c , f> Y.. ... 
fi r o . Hot •;; f;~r V}15 :.; 5 c~ i•.o·i.•::l is :::.1~~; 1c'. ·1)1ic l oCJ.gj_-, ., :; ''cA:S c) c,; :~ : :c.r- o tba::•. 5 bcdroo~;s 
,~rr1Ci:'O trc..:.1sic11t ~;u.oc·;:.s c.:~' o fed. ()r l 0C: .. ~· · ·: ;d fo:r ~·x:.'l.:f . /1. trGn~;j c:~Jt :<i.·:o ;:;t is Cj:l0 \ ·J ~1o 
t ;:· .J ,,., tJ. l ... r" }·· · --r·l • .., .· .. ~ ·L· c ·,, '·· r ··- ~ ·1 >;' .... ;r•;, 5 1 '!·1 -1,.,,1-o ')--' rl·l''lJ ' '· ~ l, .~ J ·1 Dll. 3 l~lJ .LOr .-o~Jb .J1L ... l _l .:. ........ , u .. :.~,. ~ ..... , __ ·, ... . ; ; .; uc ~ - · ·;_-/ .· .. oc:.1 - • . .:. _c· ... . ~_., ..,_\. ·. C 1 . <; .·~ ,:J .. ..... __ ~- :. .1. v _a 
ii:: .hLc. in n. gr(:G. t.· ;:;_· ::n.': ' t :·,::li:. ,::JCC -f'or tl-:c l or.;;; of LXf 'T'~ <:!·· ·:: .:'.::1)Crol 9 or }_x:.;_.~~;.:::.c;o 
vhpn -n ch l o ·;·· -:· ··':·cr·l ) l c'.oo p., .. o .. : (·,:1o ; .. .., ...... ,.,_ ::J.or :u(:.~~1o for- a:t.;·lo i:J.:J of ;j ~l '.:o l:;~:.r, c r 
~]OnG} i f nt.~ch ~:ccpc~c r::L~-~.' .. 1 .. }-tr:.-:.t c . ·)o.::·;:,.:-:d. i n · : : ~:!? :J ... oo~.: ['l.~l!C:~_ :~::. _ y~ho of .~tco 2~ ;~~:o ··~i?o -~b;::.:t 
v .:.l1.1 2.bl e3 ~Jil) ~) t ~')0 c.:r..~ ··:·r) ; ~D .'C0( .. :·-~2 Y~l~:_; (, .:~ ].CO . T.: ('! tee~."):) ~~., eb.:.~_l _ L DOt t~ (') 0 1) 1 1"od r.Q TC:'-
· ... , · .. ,' ... · . . ,,., · i · r'·'·"~ c , ~ .. .... , ,- r'l ·; .,~ '' ~ .. ' ... ' ., •. , , , ,. o'' ·'I'Q("l fo-r OJ:10 -·'1o r."' ' ·t CO :) ·!O :_.; ;'IT prr'·.~· , '(. ./ l " ,, 1.-C .•. '. J...l. . O ,_ ;_,_, , .,.: .. .... , ... , .. . uUL ... .L ; .. : .• ,_; . o, >J • - OL G- 03, 
By 1/ 35-1:2 i f tl·1c ·;~oc-~:· : ::..: t '.l'C ·:·· r'J''·t:!.~~-.Y ~. \·r:j_·~~~1 !::v ::·:~r-.~·10 l t)C~:t:; ·t· .. >ci""O CDJ1 be j: o :-ocovor:r t~1-
'1 . · ' ] ., 1 ~· r" .J..., ... .. . . l,-0 ...... , , , .. 1 ] ., , •• ,, -. ) ,. .. ()"( . , .. . ·~ - • ··L; .. ... . l· c·1 ......_ ., b'Y.,r ~ ·1 "'r11)] ""··r,-,o 
__ QGS g;_~cs·c .OC . .'.8 C.. 1)CrLi :...:.Y.L·. L• .•. ·~·· .:. , · ~ .. . ~) ! .. . U , : ,~ _ . .s. . • J \ .J u~· . ,_, .:. .. . i ... ' ... · .. ._, t.-~ ~ -'~ .L .v.: .,# • 
}7(~A d5 1 · ,J~ , ~ 0f.,~)1'-4-rr'·~/!f::;, : ~ ... C:-f1~r-,,~c1 ·t.~fc : 't~(~~c.~ .. J., .~ .c, .-.o: .1 n·1t +h-·'· t•1o ~- .... • C } C ..... !,Q . ,,J~.!.f.t._t __ ,. ·-·' ''--· -~ J. ~ ... .. - ~. 'oJ.... -· . ···. '/·· .1 ~.# c.. . .:' ·' ~v w u "-' ~---Lt ~ ... _..J. v :.Jc1. V ··-
'(,r· .. :i .. I! COl1J10 C<;ccJ . .-:·. t 2. C< . ':"t;:·.:.:e~ ·.· .. o::.:·:c· F:,_t [t r ;w ·:;v.i ::c' t,r) )':(;l' ,· ~ ,;~;t:i.::Jc,t: C:cl. The f:1t!.:'. 'GCJ·.:ent 
·" .. ; : _.c.~ \~ ~ T'Cl1g , ;:~· ~ tl1G -~~ : :·t~.i.~l ::; t'~..:d l--:. (J· i·~ C03Jl2C C·;:, ~ .~.~'l f · ~.:.~,.~~~· · .. r.~·.:~. t].~;_;~· f('l:C [.~o: 'c\ -(.~j·, ·o') S~.'! O ~?~C'OCl:.rc(l 
.... u b1 :.~-;.;·~, - ;-.;. r:CI c~ro-vc; ov ... ~~ :~""ct·~.-·~· i ::--o:-:.cl . . ~~~·\ ·C,l·!.G · : --\·_:-~:1 tr:. :·· ·.-r do{~ t~.:~·. c~:ti~·,n/ :.·o t3L']:G:~. ~1C: i:1 
ir;~t...:.. ir: .~.: :·d~ o:;.,. ::1ur 'Lr:.:~· ·.ltl,_ .. I ~; t~·~::· c Oi.,. :!;ie.~ 1:J ·· 1 :: .. :.1-.: I c ;e;·i."' fn.:cJ.:. ~i.n~1LrJ·'l 1.Th:·r? 
1h . Tho r:.;:.::~·Jt 1 8 J'l ( . _:). :i.~:;nr.t c·i: .-.t.c ·.:-..;n-t ,_,:,·.;.; 11c,t t 1 ~: ): .:ox~~ .~· ·.«.tc c<~X J::: of :i.!1j er y. i:~ oto; 
Jn nr :_~_;r +. o : .. t~Ll\. (; ot:t n -~~·:!. .. ::.:.:(, ~~·~::.c 5 .... C:::.'.:·: .. ~; :~· c::' t~. ~.n -~ r':.:··C r..~ :C :.~c:g1i :;cnco, -~. ;. a; :f. oll Ol-d.nu; 
:1.:~ n<Jon ~- ~~. -.r:;r:(' i_ ) '."C:"· ... ; ,·,::dr:."c'.cn.cc c~ z t~·.--v_,- C~)Vivl~·.t .. i.~ J of ·:.ho d,1: t " ;, ... ('. f :··:il·m·o t o 
~t : r~Ji.TS ( c'mtinucd) 
.. r · :lu.o r;r.:To, L o. thr:tt u.L1 N :nt o:~' co.-;:·e Hk leh c.. n orcUnc..r;r pl'l' C~cnt nan uc·1.1ld usc 
{•JvJ.·~):r. lil~o circt•itw"Go.ncos . ( 3) Tl:w i'a :i 1t!ro to n;-;o ch;c QJ;.ro :.nt·.st b. O.V(~ been t~o 1) T IJXi cr i .e; 
1pr::1~;;:. of .:~ Af;~· ~~o ;;;J:~::_bcJ/~~t~s1t:t :i{i dacw;c. 
1/:.a .A :' toj:' o. ci·t:r :! :'~lj_c;cs t ho grndo of [.~ Gt~coot, etn · abuttij.1e: prc~qort:r 01..-n.1 e:r cr:)ct:J c~.l 
~;~ .s l~;.:cd, rw~r and. nar <.tllcl to th.o stroot u. grc.n:i.to 1!o.l1 7 fl;:.~t on top, i:·.bo1·t -Li-r C• 
.,·. ·· :~t h-i.r.]:"[l··r- ·(-1-1 ' 111 t}i(J cotroc·t'· 1Jc·'l·1·1·0Q"" l' t ··•t"d tho do~Po<•<•·i (J "l ·j ·, h·;" "l o·l· C'"" .'"C' L"I 1 <' t -i-h-, 
'· . .... · -··\.:'\ ~ -· ' _, .. ~ ' · ..:J • ,.; } · , ,. ~ J. .1 <... ... ..t ~ j·' - ...,u,~-- J. _ _ ...... •.• -.-.J - v ·•·'- '-"' ·' . '·· ~· .......... v 
fiJli.l·lg . l-1. ch.ilc.l. ; G .:1.x ~v~t:.rs old, co~:::i.ng u.lonu; tl1c r:~ tr-') :.rt, cl:Lt". 1b~3 0 11 t!lc) \·!~:1.1; o.L!c3. :i .. l'1. 
·:Tc:.J.l::\2 lt; :..1 one it~ f ;:·.1.lp ovor :Lnto tJ.1c dcpross :i o~!, .:t~·1d i~' :i. :·1 .:]c-:-' "~ · I[-; t,;-,c:.-c r ..  c::-
li~l:d.lity? If Go , uho:n.::'? 
No J.i.u.bi1H.y. The l~'.ml m.r.;.1cr had tho right t.o , ,l'i~ . c'"c :~Lo ~rcJ_L 1·,c C:~1 :·c~· :·J.c: .. r..: ' .::;0;:. 
viol<:ttod. T~w ch:U.d 1 1'1 injvry· H : s <: n :.·.ccidcnt. Tho 11 c:;_.·;::r; ··.ct:.i .v o m.: ·i :>~1;·1con doc:"Cr:i.:·10 i s 
Yo '· 1 '· ·~ V.· .. :., .• ,, ,. . ,_, \ ',... . 'l +hr· '· . ~ . 1- 't· -1 .!.. ~ .., .~ .... ' .,.. ·-, 1,. .-..c, ~: . . '' •"' ,-1 , .. -'··- ~~ ·f ,.., ..,...... .. _. ·!' ~ 
" .. O"G . . 1. T J ..... 1 .LT(1, .L!l .L..:. .J1J l_,flc t,TOilYlC-. ..... ,ht, ,, ,,£, , COCvJ . .. l!O -' ]._.._ ,,_._, · '··'' CfhJ ... _, . V.-T 0 _ vVO .. ;O:' O 
C:~~V10 ~)r.lr' ()l'!'t "CO '\!C.tc:l t"~l . ~ t foy· t !fC L:H:.f(,t.·L-Qi' ~:_hr; C.~.'?:: J_r~~ J31.J t l .:-.l::1c101·1l'!O T.S !-1~·\i"c 
boon hGld l:iablu i~o in~·· :·.nt .trc;SJX'.;.;3or:: :u:•. ·.he c. :.•.i-'' :' c:f r: . i o.:i. h·~: c ·::.o ;:.so r c2..Gc~1abl o 
C :":r· r~ to. protect t !Kr::·. :f.'ro·· ' \)J.oc"i:,:;:·ic::i.t~r ;-'.J1d <~Xplosivn:J uf!·:;!! -~ }JC~' !.nd :CQ2, ;J.D7l , to SUI.)POSC 
t!:1:1t. cl:.;1_1C"1ror~ :-.l :l<)·:rt l; r.~ T~-.r:r:· ·::~~")l·~. t . 
~h?.; ill /."'. tOi:·t? 
A tort is a civil Hr(n:.';., :..nC.:,n,;n(! c :.lt ot ,. ··r.· D.grc;c, -: :-,11 h 
••<• 'l J.•p·.-;pdy some co·, .. ·l')Y' 1 ··n ~- C; .. : 01• f , .. ". <'~'' ~·1· .. ,;.,<, (· r··.;o ·l·-~ • i·Jr, 
... ~w c . ..--..... ~ ~. · ~ ~ .... ~---· _ v-- _:_· .. _ _ ._. .... • ...... · '"-", .:rJro,.t.J . . •V , .a. . ...... 
!L1:o.r~::;._ #~d c~ t;~~. )~- ~A~~ .- /;~bit-
16 I s "" j"J" ""···n · 1 - L '·· ~ ··.,- , :J "'J c.,, . ., ,,. (' "' ·J- · -~" l>1 ' ' · , . -. ~ -.-. ~·.--· ·t ·i ,.., :· · ~ ·: r . ..... " -..A. v..L. ._. j __ I , • ..J .• ~. · .~ .t t .. . ~.\ ) #• •. \ . . t . . 1 ... ~ ~ ~, I_. I ..J • . ~.- -L .. .... l.· . .. IJ 
;i,' c.y- 1-T :::.id ! ·(. ~10 l ('H gi V~S 
e':'.()L'"i:. C~ c.~ f.:i ::.!ition of <-
~Lc s J t 'hot:~:.·~ :: t> :l~ r.J ~cr~:.:_ . ~ :1~-. :::; {Jnu~" rmJe}~ c!.~itici .. ~::od ~.:·.( · 1. is ;:·:\J c.~r.~ ~ ~.!.r::..lot1s or1o . It i0 
historl.c :.~.~-J. :r <.~n (-,?;'Dhoot ci:' ·: .!.~u cJ_,_., cr.>L.~ .l'm. ~L::.u :rl:lo ·i ·._(-1.: · ~, 1 ~ r ._; \Tho ::_;:; c.1lll".li.lf.':C,c1. mJ..r_:;ht 
t o be rcCOi}l~)OrJ:3 cr.' .• i: I-:~ :: ·.J..r~o c.:;;JG.::; to ]iiC.' c . ,'·::x:r; ·.r>.o FiJ:1. :i:.·;' :~T:!.~; t]1Q pro:x Tt2.' o:r 
tlr:;:;;;mcjJ:::_ ~-~d: c;:;;fl?~~~~-{. x'·';:,~~~-::;p·~ u J;J;::·;~iOJJ . 
17 A t'"~"Ot" 1'·.-. tc ··· t •··· ·r- ·r ··- \T~W_ ,, "f-' \ ,., cl• ·r ~--. - · ·f··..,. (1 . ...... ( ·1 c··· ' J.l ,- .,:> " - iir_1; :.:J.i10C~. lv·;·,r· • . ::.> u .d 1 J ~..:· ... '-~~.. .:. J. ) .1 • .·~ . 1 . . .; 7 .... ~ .J. .. .. _ ·-- -t:~ .~ .t.v - .. L· ..... .,; _ _ ~. _,. .. 1.1 -~ _ ...... .J .1 . .l...:.:J 
c- c•ou;·1r"ro·l 11 B '·>tr:.' :·( ·~ l ,. ,111 J r..-to f~J.- · ·· i.1· : i!r,n -·.- ~ i: 1-, ,.., . .- .,., : .. ; -.' · i·• t"' 1 ·' ,,·i.i>l~:- r.: ·•r; c·.l's ·in-·~ ~ • ....l. ..i • • - ~I~·:·"'"-" - ._.~"' · .... . - .u · : ~ ·~ ..... :.I. J. . ·---1 ·. ·~ ·-~ · '· ' · R • • • .,1. ., -·- -·· ..l..I . , - ...L. 1 Q . ...... "': . ~.. ...... ~ -
JUI'lC~S t 1pon h:.>D • .1:n r::. svxt : "J~·.-· A .~:.· .-·.:c.n s t }; to r Gco-rul · c't:~:·-.·,_,:;·:~; fo1· tJ·I .") JilJ1.1 I'~.cs Jn·-
flict .:; d., c;;:.:1 tl"lr.) :i 't1riU.ltii'l;~ ].. .::n .. :;·~H~·. (~ C) ·;)() ~=-· ~ .. r:"!V .-Jd - ;~ 0 .. ~l.t~~ · ~~:i _ :~ : . '[,..~1l: :~'. St.: J.l~lt;, L'..l1C~ Q3 2w b:_'..T 
to tho 1:ccovc:cy'? 
l'IO. vJorcl:.: nJ.ono do m.:lt jF; :·:;:i .. :.:/ :.'ll ::•.:-;::;xult. c.n.:l ~.n '.:·.-:;u~·y . 
1:-> . If i:.hc in:~,-~J..t:i.n :i; J..:_4.11;_;v; ·-~; l) cc.n ~ .• r; ~n~ov::d j_ ~l c , '. f.~, :J "i:.;.:.~ ·8~:t El tl"o :f orq;oi.;1g ~.1wnt:Lon 
for \lh<::t.t '),_:rpc•Do c<:·.~~ :i.t 1-;:; prov•xl'.? 
Jn •:ti.ti .r; ~~t.ion uf nc:l5. tivo CLU-<·:(.; :~; . 
-~.9 . sR(~ .J· :>1->t C)~!_·M..·r .. <;._,·r o;;_1· }~h'f-1_1,,~, _ .. :~·.·, ·.·. · ~··.! .,c.~ l·' ,,· .• c~t : J. Vi I -· tr. -- v i • ' - - - - - - o? 13 [ ..i1 C.1 t!_;"\;.1w> D I ~3 c:r. r.'p ~ nd Hh ile d o:Lng such 
l1nmo.e;o to B' :"l cr.:r·~, on )·: ' :J :k;!c''. , D ,t;ljock> ;_-.nd ) ~ ~-J..J.s 11. 1 ,":.; ~·:(;g~1 C;:u1 I~ r e cover of B :for 
Jdllh1~; hL ho;~;s? 
Yo:.::. On0 hc'.O no ..:·:i:;:·Jrt. to k:i.Jl tr0s ~ - li::J i_.-J:; <:'..i : -'! ·'.r.L:; l.'J1:. :)~_: :=: thc.t i[; t};o onJ.v r ~ "' :1o.bl 
\J<lY t o 'I'O~, o c ; ones -Jr• ' ''"':!: · .v ::J c · ·,·,. •.c·.t'C :u:; ~;o;·. :.:; 1· z..:~~i:'nTW.tL : rc __ z: :, J _ c,:~ ,)o·bmon tl-:o v~ll1 (' 
o 'the, pr ':>pcrty ·p:::·crLc.ctc 'J. :·::1.d.. Lh'-.:.. v :-•.h•.,::_of U-·c. ~:-:dX: I::::!.l; : , ;~.~: In ir-.rjn16. tl1o -c~1on 
J. r.'.vJ :r.u. o r cou·1 :r. .~ rw ·c lC: :::' "' ':.:;· · C·:." c: .-:·;C o t. .-, :j · .-n c -~: ;:.h::;-.! :J.n L:.:.s 1 ... ")c, ;- ~ ropcal ::,d l:mt if one 
has US fJTOport~.- ".JlCJ .'y; .;:;('\ ·!··~· : .• .l::: J?VJ. f or:c ;:.· t:'..i.!. r:~ "i:.'- JC C'.il:i.T.J..:.:J .G s·t:-:!.11 broo.1: in the Ovi:!Or . 
of tho .::.~nj;_,_o.ls i:3 1:\.o.b::"o ; or if' cmo cl.rj v :;~; h -i_;:: c.:_-:_-.;1 .-; on :.: ::;; ·. ~c , o!10 el se 1 s Lmcl. ·(h c 
0\mor of ·:·,he catU o J.s l:bbl.:.· . i·[or•::ovc,r ':_:,· :· ',R....,(r)'C' t·,;·Jc c o-:..~nt:~vs h_:vc the i"J0\-101' -~ o ca~r 
thu:t :in thc:..t co1mt or n O! .. :(: .JoY.'tOJ o;·, t: .c·:-,;r,\ fh;.:; bm~nd:_T · line D. l one she.ll bo a ·1 :-: 1- i\:J. 
fonc_g_. "Lh -La iG d on.·:, ·c'!cm. ·Ghc c, :~'l' r.:c l; :i.;:; to n. :_V ·; the) (. :r:;:- of the c::Lt"G.lc li::,.'blc 
···.s 2-t c:.o;::.:1on lm·r,L o . c. '-,wl:!_lxkly l:tD.1)Jc, :! '•:;r <:·.::.:..- c\ 1 ... : ·,: ·-'•mo to c.!·o:Js or ficlcJ.s of 
othors ovon t:•0 '.1.gl1 ·(,be (.)l.r;·_, ,_;·,:· ltun :·! ot. ;::,,;o;-, nr.;:) . i:~:.::.. ·· : · '·,, Jn t,.:··o c c.: ;-;o of pot~ltr:.:r tho 
P tll"c•h c·o·· ,- ·lc)l" -L''\·' ... ,,·1 ·• .; .., ' ;-,---." j ·i c· l.·' , IL· · \,) .. .L • .L.. • . .... ' ... ~ ~·-·' __ ............ · - " · ·~ · • l 
. ff~1.tt0~!? V:."l.ylrl l:ff-.,/t;,_~~.i-: c.r ;; ~: ~-i'l'C:.: by :::. ·y:.~:;· ::i .• l fi; ·::.:~·.:.:i:·· .'.t ~ I' '"'-·.i .luc~:;r cros;::d.~1S . 
Tbu :fo t!tor, 1:Jl"IO vr. ,, •lr iv_;_:\[,· .:_;, :.t1 ""l0i 1.0b:iJu, ,,, ::: (;1,.~_:' . -G:· oi' !!<;li:~·on r~o \.,r>:i.c\1 rrr.'OX:iJi1rd·.cJy· 
conLrjbul·.u} to tho .:'. c c:i_C:.o;-rl~ . Tlw r~kdd cLc c frc;,; ~ -! i . :: :i_j~·jt'.:c:l.·;c:, lco.v:i;1,~ hiD flc.thor 
TOHTS ( c ontinucd) /.1 • 
~: ~; the.; s ole bcnofiuia:r.y. In an o.ction by tho infant 1 s u.dli1inis i:.r2.tor, · docB the c en·· 
i.Ti:hutory nogl,ig,pnQe .. .,of · thB ,fa thor b.::tr a rocov0.ry? 
!1l!o,.,cnw-should be allmwcl to profit by hir~ ovm urong 11 .so tho fo.thcr c o-u.Jdnot 
ccjJ .oct. Soc 125 Va. 781. Hotc-(1 ) Gonora1 rulo-·\oThcro plaintiff is guilty of con-
i·.r fi bu7JOIJ' ncglic;oi1Ce l .. •hich proxL1atol y contl·ibutos to his injury ho can not r e cover . 
i !~j\;o~:?.~ T~oro <..tro som? ~c?ptions to tl:is ruloC:t )\B-64£. p:co~ide;; that ~ :n1dor ~ho _ 
'v :U:'I?:J-m.CC ;•xu~)loyors 1 LH1.0lllty, Act-o.pplJ.eD.blo to cor.c: >on co.r·. ~J.ers by rallrond 1n ll1·-
t;r,~<utd.o corJTicrco {~ tho L.~ct thilt st~ch o:·.:ployeo ma.y llc::.vo boon gt<.ilty of contr:i.butor:;,r 
nogl:l 11r.mco ohD..ll not bo.r recovery, but tho dalim.gos shall be diuinirJhcd by tho ;jury 
:i.n proportion to tho <lilOunt of negligence o.ttr:l butablo to or~ch Ol!lployoo, but if th e 
employer sha ll havo violated <'--''1Y statuto enacted for tho snfoty of the employee 
iThich violation sho.J. l ho.ve contribute:d to tho injury, tl:Jon c ontri butor;y- ncgli&;onco 
can not oven bo s hoHn in ':1:Lti ~CJ.tion of dmnc:'.goo .(b)V56-4J/0p-rovidcs tho.t if th o 
crcM of a tro.i.n ft.i l. to p;ivc st::tutorv s:l..cr:nc.: "' c'n et ;>;;u:_p.Jlchiru; __ g,_ g;rad.o_ c:rQSsi!::tg of c1 
public hic;lmay tho f ac t that o. tr<lvo11o:c on such >:L[Jn•o.:r frdlod to oxorci~c duo ,car·o 
in o.pprou.chj. ng such 8ros r3 ing ;::hall not bar rcccvcry but tho.t such failure mo..y bo con-
:::idorod :in mitigo:t:Lo::l of d01!JC.:.~·; n . But if tho nor:).igtmc~:: of tho driver of the c o.r :is 
tho solo prox:irJato c o..usc of tho i:lcc:Lclont thoro c~~n be no recovery . (c ) Undor uorb.non 13 
coiL1~)onsation contribv.tor:>' llt)gligoi1CO ho..s no ol:'foct Pnlof3f. it o.mounts to a ui:Lful 
disrogu.rg of <..tn o.p p:..~ ovod rule ::'ndo for the Gc.foty of the <)m.p1oyoo, or tho inju.ry 
p~~~~to: fntf~iz:l,:: or c.s r.. r on'l t of int0xicnt:i.rm. 
21. Discus.s bricfi:: tho doctr~Lnr) of confusion c:~1 c1. :;;ourec of title to r.crsonal 
proport.;y . 
If X fr:::.udu1cntly Y~~.xod r::omo of hio :f\ mr,rilbo r~oocl:.; Hi t~. l th o~JO of Y 1 s, Y h~~s tine 
t o the ·.;hole . If X c~c·G cd ncg:Ligl;ntl:' Y he.,> tH.1c to r..H e xcept \lha t X can clearly 
provo to be b:~o . Ex::tT.'lplcs r .. ro m~:xtt~rcs of c;rdJ1 , oi1 ; 1u:·.1boJ.·~ctc . vrhoro each unit 
ck;~t bo di stingr~ished frorl m::: .. other unit. 
2') .f (!-~c/r. •c· on'"' ·l ·i .~· i 1 'r" :r" · .. ·•n]t ·i ·•·rr fro·1·, ,, ·r ·'-'Llrv>d C"'oc•o" ·1cr "'.Ccl'deon. t, ,"'.,l' Otl] .. d 1~.., '-• • '-' ~( "-' '-•·- ..... ... _, .. . 0 l ' Jo J .. • r • • .. ·,,, •• ~- . u.. . . (. ,,_ _ • o •.. d '> u v. 1 U<..;; 
shovm t o bo princ :i.pu1l.y due to tho nug.ligcnco oft~; () r c. 'Llw•y compc.ny, btrt il1 ~rt 
to tho concur~~inr; ncgli:Jonco of tho pl C!.int i .f:!", f0r Hb.ieh p::.:r·;;y should ;judgment be 
given? 
For the p.la:i.ntHf , if tho ncglizonco of th;; :dahro.~.' c ci1SiB t-,od in 11ot ,-:; iving tho 
proper sig1Kh1. Othoruiso ·:·.~'-' pl::t5.ntifE uovld be bo.rrcc: by his contributory nogJj_ ... 
>_:;uncc tmlc ss tho 1;:-.::: t clo.::.r ch:::·.ucc doctr·ino 1:1::ts ::.pplicahlo. Sco note (2) (b) to 
q,_r Jt ion :l~ }J.;. 1::-Jr::::-: , ~ tk Ill -A ·~ /e ~~ 1\S~o~~ons ~ U:.l~od;·'ont c o'l!tt~ fttJ.JfJ{,., :,~oo:;.tlt L~'~ n ~ird ·p~~i~·, u 
Hi\0 ~-mos one of then .:1nd sc..:curos c. judGno:c1t for 81,000. Tl~o p:..:rty t:1.gainst whoiil th o 
;j udgnont \.JG.S s ocur ed then sool:s 'i:.o hold h:i.n .j oint tc,J~ t i'c . .>.f30r :r.os_?onsiblo for ono-
}u::.lf of t he r occvory :1c;ainst bi:w . Co·dd ho cl o oo ·:· 
!.fo. Thvr o i s no c ont.ribu·:~ :: on be:tHc: o"'l j ojEt ·cort f oasors here <..tS Vfi';_r.2 ~, doo ~; not 
nppl.y '..Jr".; ro moral t urpi t1..'.c1c: is ::..nvolvod . 
ublico.Uon pJ~ivilcgoJ? 
, lS a;so u ·o y pr J..Vl 0-gcd Hhc n vsoc. b:y ..:~ l .)r,:l.nlo.tor , governor, president 
or judgo , vrhilo on1~o.~;ocl in his ofiicl:~l cc.pc~dty( 2) It i~: t:,.>difiodly privileged 
(i. o . in tho e .. bsGi.1CCJ of nc.l ico) uhorc nado in good .fcd.th to ono u:l.th like intorcot 
\
or duty . Exc.:raplos o.re; bool~ r cvim1s , co· :::onk; on a c·ts of p1..1blic o.f'.t' icinls, lottors 
frOi.l <m cx-o~;:ploy8r t o a rrocpo,:-Livo cii:tpl uyr)r a Leu L s urvo..n t·.s, c ommmica Gions bo-
t vJcon s tockholders c. bout c or po::oct·cc E:'.fi'::ir:::, e tc. 
2~: . Fho dociUcs vrho tl :~r Qr not a. 1111rt ..:.cvl o.r pub2.i.c.:..:t i. ·n i :1 pr·i vilc:r·od, a nd ;u:hn t mu_g!:, 
U:e l nin.tif f s ' ·ov in orclor i:.o r cc uvcr in c ::·.so of e. ~)riv.i.L)(;;od pubJ.ic:2.t ion ? 
c cou:t. Tho ph~inti ·:r r:1ust shou abs ;:;ilCO of o. pr o:10r ,;:: r1t:ivo . This :i.o gonorally 
J{t;;,ckb~~?·rinr:;· ·i :alicc~ .lh-.--
26 . An ompfo~"c ) ~h,nor.d· Loco1~ot:~vo 11orh' ir, i :t·.j11J.'cd i)y tho nogli gonco of' an-
p,;ra hor r; of :·,. ,,·::.•1 z in c .1.rry:.i.lll?, a lnrgc 
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iron beam from one part of the shop to another. Can he recover from the company? 
At common law there could be no recovery. Under Worlonen's tion acts it is 
jmmaterial how the accident occurred unless the 1n ur.ed party wilfully hurt himself 
or intentionally violated a rule approved by ~he Industrial Commission. The~c 
·cl1Qor;y of workmen's compensation is that the industry should bear the burden of all 
1
vt• acc i dents occuring therein.~ (1): Employer's'liability as distinguished from 
1, W0rl:men
1s Compensation Acts are based on negligence of employer. In the absence of 
SQCh negligence there can be no recovery. The employers' liability acts have chapged 
t~ common law in the following resp,ects. (a} Abolished fellow sergant doctrine (b) 
abolished the assumption of risk doctrine where the risk is due to the negligence of 
the employer (c) enacted that contributory negligence of the employee can be shown 
only in mitigation of damages. Note 2: If an employee is injured his right to recover 
from his employer might be governed (a) by common law (b) by an employers' liability 
act if injury occurred to a railroad employee. (c) by Workmen's Compensation Act. 
Note(J) ,The common law duties of an em lo er to his em lo ees are to furnish(a)a 
r~sonably sa e ~ o a reasonably sufficient number of competent fellow 
servants(c) reasonable instruction, rules, and regulations where needed (d) these 
should be prop~ey promul~gt and enforced. 
'14 f! d st (_}"'-~ ' ~cL. ~ • rl /t ~ 
7. Define the octrine <f6: last clear chance •11 In 197 Va.233 the Supreme Court of 
Appeals, "In the hope of affording a more precise method of applying the last clear 
chance doctrinett, adopted the following ~s: (l)vJhere the injured person has negli-
gently placed himself in a situation of peril from which he is physically unable to 
remove himself, the defendant is liable if he saw, or should have seen, him in time 
to avert the accident by using reasonable care;(2)Where the plaintiff has negligently 
placed himself in a situation of peril from which he is physically able to remove 
himself, but is unconscious of his peril, the defendant is liable only if he saw the 
plaintiff, and realized or ought t~ have realized, his peril in time to avert the 
ac~ent by using reasonable care. ~~~ uh~~t ~~~~~~ces, if any, is a plaintiff who has been guilty of contribu-
tory negligence entitledto recover?(a) Where the contributory negligence was not a 
proximate cause of the injury(b)where doctrine of last clear chance applies(c}the 
cases mentioned in notes to 20n 
29. In the selection of appliances, what is the test of negligence in Virginia? 
An employer 'ft onl y required to exercise such ordinary care and diligence in the 
selection of appliances as may be reasonable in view of the work to be performed and 
J:fe dangers incl~ent to the employment. 
r Y'O '1. , ... M.-Ae..- ~ '<-------
30. 'what is meant by 11proximate causen in connection with the law of negligence? 
By proximate cause is meant the efficient force producing the injury. According to 
the 11foresight rule" the test is whether a reasonably prudent man under the circum-
stances might have foreseen that his failure to use due care might produce some such 
result as was produced. If so, his failure to use due care is the, proximate cause o~ 
the injury. Under the R~~ent if defendant's negligence is a 'substantial factor 1 
l-
Caf sing the injury then 1t is a proximate cause. 
f. - f rD X. L~s. t---
:1A invites his friend, B, to take a ride with him in his buggy. While crossing the 
track of the N.&W.Ry.Co. in the city the buggy was struck by an engine and train of 
the railroad company, runrdng at a speed largely in excess of the city ordinance, 
without giving any signals of its approach. B was blind. A, who was driving the 
buggy did not look and listen as be approached the track. Both men were thrown from 
the buggy and badly hurt. Both sued the railroad company to recover damages for their 
·injuries. Are both, or either, entitled to recover? 
B could recover for the railroad's negligence was a proximate cause of his injury. 
B could also recover from A for the same reason as it~possible to have more than 
one proximate cause, i.e. more than one substantial factor or efficient force or 
event. Under the circumstances B does not seem to have been guilty of contributory 
negligence. A could also recover for his contributory negligence in this case 
'l'Oit 'J'~ (contim::.ed) Revised August 1959 Po 
f alls under one of the exceptions to the general rule, and only goes· in mitigation 
r;~a~ . ;.,~"'passenge.f o~ ,,,~::~15oat, in this State, is injured in a collision between it 
and another boat, due to the negligence of both boats. Does the fact that boat on 
Hhi ch he is traveling is negligent affect his right to proceed against the othe:::· 
boat? Why? 
No. The negligence of the boat on which he was riding would not be imputed to him 
as that boat was not under his control. Hence he has a cause of action against either 
'doth. In or~ to imp~e negligence t here must be some agency relationship. : c... l 6-«.> ry"ac;. y_ u.d~o- - e IV ,~:s,. · • A has B arrested on a criminal chargJ~ a~~en before a magistrate, who, after 
holding a preliminary examination, requires bond for his good behavior. This action 
of the justice is reversed on appeal. What effect will the action of the justice 
have on the question of probable cause in a suit for malicious prosecution? 
The Virginia rule is that conviction before a justice though reversed on appeal is 
conclusive evidence of probable cause (unless obtained by fraud or perjury), and 
hence would b~ bar to the action. Note: The elements of the tort of malicious pro-
secution are ~The ~ommencement by the defendant Q~:iginal suit. This suit is 
generally a criminal one, but if it is a civil one that ties up property or leads to 
physical restraint(as lunacy proceedings)it is sufficient. In 186 s.E.45, 46 the 
Virginia Supreme Court expressly ~ft the question open as to whether or not any 
civil suit would be sufficient; ~ Favorable termination o proceedjngs mention-
ed in (a) for the defendant there who is, o course, the plaintiff in the malicious 
prosecution suit; ~ ~alice (for the jury to determine)in instituting the proceed-~ mentioned in ~ ; ~want of probable ca~(for the court to determine) in 
instituting the proceedings mentiol"-ed in (a); ~ Special damage (unless the pro-
ceedings instituted charge somethir.g that 1-1ould be slander per se if there was an 
oral unprivileged publication of the ma·&ters involved in the aforesaid proceedings. 
If any one of these elements is lacking the malicious prosecution iction fails. 
~ f~ of J;d:~ ~ Y- 7: s-~~ §4:(a) A, who 1s twenty years Of~age, is engaged in the livery business and is sued 
in assumpsit by B, who hired a hack from him, for injury caused by negligence by A's 
driver. Can B recover? (b) A, a lunatic, deno~nced B as the murderer of C, in a 
newspaper; B sues him for damages. Can B recover? 
(a) No. This tort is so closely connected with the contract of hiring that to en-
force tort liability here would really er~orce an infant's contract which is not for 
necessities. Since the infant could repudiate his servant's contract of hire the 
whole basis for holding the infant falls. (b) No. An insane person is incapable of 
entertaining the specific intent necessary for such torts as malicious prosecution 
And defamation. See PP• 792-793 of Prosser on Torts(2nd Ed.) S"-.t~~ :· c-._ o-f f!;~.Y . 35 ~(~) -~~t risks are assumea by a servant?(b) What in general are the qytj es o! a 
m~ to the servant? (c) When is it the~ of the master ~ rna~ and promulgate 
r~ for the operation of his work? (d) When is a foreman vi...&se-principal? {eJ Who 
are fellow-servants? 
(a) The ordinary risks of that t~~e of employment. Also at common law, the risks 
from any defect which the employer after complaint has refused to fix, or, if he has 
promised to fix same, has delayed an unreasonable t i me .-- (b) See 26, note (3). (c) 
W9enever the nature of the busi ness requires such r ules for its orderly conduct, 
e.g., the running of trai ns . (d) When he i s engaged in performing any duties owed by 
a master to his servant (e) Fellow servants are thos& servi ng a common master work-
ing under the same contr ol, deriving a.uthorit y and compensa tion from the same source, 
and engaged in the same general business g although in di f f erent grades or depart-
ments. See 39 C.J. 550. But t his definiti on should exclude a vice ~prinaipal who is 
performing a non-delegatable duty of the common employer . 
TORTS(continued) TtrY'f v.. 6,.../ht_. 
.36. Dis·tiinguish bet ween a tort and a crime, and give 
which is a tort ard not a crime; (b) An act which is 
ac t which is both a tort and a crime. 
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an illustration of (a)An act 
a crime and not a tort;(c)An 
A t ort gives rise to civil liability. A crime is a wrong of such serious nature 
t hat the state is directly concerned in protecting itself and bringing the perpetra-
t or thereof to justice.(a) Simple trespass and slander at common law, malicious 
prosecution, slander of title (b) Speeding, fornication, hunting out of sea,son, 
prize fighting, bootlegging, etc. (c) Malicious mischief, libel, assault and 
battery, larcenyo 
37. Owing to the negligence of a telephone o r, a train is wrecked, a passen-
ger is injured, x ress pac age lost. The company sues the operator for the 
loss of its cars, the passenger sues him for the injury to him, and the owner of the 
package for its loss. What should be the judgment in each case, and why? 
The operator has negligently violated a duty owed in each case. The damage was the 
proximate result of the negligence, so all the elements of an action for negligence 
are present in each of the cases put. 
Note 1: Facts about the tort of tres pass ~t realty.(l) The least unprivileged in-
vasion Of another's land giveS rfi e to an a J.On Of t1·espass quare clausum fregit 
regardless of whether actual injury occurs or not. (2) Mistake is no defense. 
Note 2 (1) Conversion consists of the exercise of a dominion over personal property 
which is inconsis t ent with the rights of the true owner(2) the usual remedy at 
common law is an action of trover (3) It is no defense except as to punitive damages 
that one acted in good faith. Note 3: (1) A nuisan~t e is e.ny unprivileged act done 
.on the land of one person to the hurt of another's lands or some right connected 
therewith. (2) If the nuisance is a public one o<1ly, the remedy is by indictment or 
information. (3) If it is a private one the remedy is an action on the case, or, in 
some cases by injunction, or abatement by self help u However self help cannot 
ordinarily be lawfully used (l) Unless the party committing the nuisance has first 
been asked to remedy the matter himself (2) Unless the nuisance can be abated with-
out a breach of the peace. Note: ·rr · the one abating the nuisance does more damage 
than is reasonably necessary, he becomes a trespasser ab initio, for the privilege 
of entry was given by a rule of law, and, after entering, he abused biB privilege. 
1'0R'l'S Negligence iL j_ f D y;:c_~J9.53 .§BJPifi12,ept J.P.i~~l · 19.5 Va.l3 
A ownOO"'"a half nu.~~~vll aut6mobfle race V a'i!fr! .ri:h'er e was a guard rail and a 42 i n 
high wire mesh fence around the track for tho protectj_on of spectators. B leased t he: 
1'ace track from A who also owned and supervised the Atlantic Rural Exposition. It w2. 
in the interest of both A and B to have large crowds at the races as A charged a 
general admission and B charged an additional admission. P, a paying spectator, was 
seriously injured when a wheel came off a car, hurtled the 42 inch fence and struck 
him. The evidence indicated that in spite of all reasonable precautions wheels will 
come off of racing cars at times because of the severe strains to which they are 
subjected, and that when they do they not infrequently clear 42 inch fences, and tha1 
such fact should have be~n known by A and by B. P sued A, B, C who was the driver, 
and D and E who were the ·owners of the stock car. 
Held:(l) The case ·should be dismissed as to C, D, and E. They had all exercised duE. 
care and had nothing whatever to do with the staging of the races.(2) Both A and B 
are equally liable. They should have known of and appreciated the danger. Since they 
both shared in the gain, and bet>-roen them had control of the track and tho grandstan( 
they are jpintly liable . It is no defense th ·;.t in some other placE:Js the fenc es are 
lower than 42 inches. The question is not: Hhat is the height of the fences on other 
race courses? But, Wa5 the fence on A Is race track ccm;tructed in such a way as to 
fulfill the duty of care owed spectators? It was not. Nor has P as sumed the risk . P 
was no expert on such matters and was justifi8d in assuming that all proper pre-
cautions had been taken for his s~fe. - ty. ~ < • ' _ 
~S~r- s ._L . "'-t. {:r: t (I!J'Y" <:. .s TORTS Death by wrongf ul act lJ, Suppl&~nt :J-~& .<"Lo 19.5 Va .479. X, a 1h :~ear old boy who tQ.d be · a t'1Jon: ~Ciby <ili-s-fc~'f¥fivldle still an infant, a; 
turned over to his InatGrnal grandparents by his mother when only 18 months of age , 
was killed ins t r:mtly due to the gross negligence of D. The mother had r emarried .and 
had had .five children by her second husband. The court instructed the jury that the 
mother was sole bem)ficiary . Was this corr·ect? 
Held: No. Class 1 is spouse , childron, and grandchildren. Cla10s 2 is parents, 
brothers, and sisters. The e:Jg21'essi on "bro thers and sisters" inchde half ' rothers 
and sisteJ:.S . 
In the above case the court limited the damages to 11 such sum as would equal the 
probable earnings of the deceased". 
Held: It is- error to flx that amount as the damages. W.t1ile his probable earnings 
may be consider ed ther e are other considerations also. 
· Held further that beneficiaries may be allowed damages even though they might not 
r easonably expect to r eceive any of the earnings of the deceased. "There are other 
matters, SUCh as lOSS Of dece I C . e , at~nd_SO ' ety, and the sorrow, 
s';lfferi l}g_·and mental anguish occasioned the beneficiari es by reason of his death. 11 
TO RTS P.[.QOf of Neglige,nce To i-ft.,• 19.5 Va .576. 
p entered D's show r oom to look at a car. She had been walking on a thin rubber 
matting. She stepped off this matting on D's invitation onto a sloping t er azzo floor 
which was slippery.· She W'lS not warned of that f act. She slippod and f ell. The trial 
court struck all of P1 s evidence . 
Held: Error. She was an invitee and enti tled t o notice of any:nef_oc.t -not appar ent. 
Just how slipper y t he floo r was, the extent of the slope, and whether she was guilty 
of contributory neglig<mce were all jury questions. 
TORTS Liability of State Fr?\111:J ~,.,..,~., {:ac. d~~ ~ JJe,. · , ,.Q.. i!95 V a . ~.55. 
Case 1. Agents of the Stat e bm.lt a h1ghwa;y 1n ~awful ntrrmer. fs a &~t1tHereof 
P's l and became cover ed with soil which was deposited ther eon by erosion of the 
adj acent~ higher land. 
Held: P can compel the HighHay Commissioner to institute eniment domain proceeding~ 
to ascertain the extent to which his l~md has been damagcd(l82 Va .l9.5). · 
Case 2. Agents of the St2.te negligently oper at ed a stone quarry as a proximate r e-
sult of which P' s land was d·1maged . 
, · 
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Held: P cannotrecover. The State has not consented to be sued in tort. There is 2 
vast difference between injuring P's land while acting in a lawful manner, and i n-
j:J.rinB his land while act:Lng negligently. "The government does not guarantee the 
i nt cgri ty of its officers nor the validity of their acts~ -lHH~ They are but servants 
o:f the law and, if they depart from its requirements, the government is not bound. '1 
I n such case condemnation is not compellable. 
TOl"l:I'S 195 Va .671 . 
P was invited by D to enter its warehous e to inspect some merchandise . He stepped 
on' a power mower in the ~isle in such a way as to cause the handle· to fly up and 
knock some of his teeth out. The evidence was in conflict as to whether the mower was 
in pl :1in view or partially concealed and as to hol-r well tho aisle was lighted. 
Held: Verdict and judgment for P affirmed as questions of negligence and cont..ci.bu-
tory negligenco under the abovr: ci rtmms:t:.ances w,e:r:a_fo_r_t_h_e ~ry. 
TORTS Death by Wrongful Act 195 Va .714. 
In a' death by wrongful act case couns<=:l agr eed that iwspi tal, doctor, and fW1eral 
expenses came to $2506. The verdict of the jury was as follows: 11We the jury find 
for the plaintiff--in sum of $7500. This amount includes $2506 for hospital,doctor~ 
and funeral expenses." 
Held: Vl/8-638 r equires that the r ecovery be distributed to the beneficiaries 
"after the payment of costs and r easonable attorne:y's f ec;;s, 11 and that it-, "shall be 
free from all debts- a.nd liabilities of the deceased." "Ther efore the hospital, 
mesical and funer al GJq)QJ:lS 0 S ar:G not tCCOVerabl~ and ot J2r Op.§r el.e,!llen~S Of 
dg.mages." 
Dcc.Supplement 1954. 
TORTS Defamation Motion for Summary Judgment 196 Va .l. 
C, an at'Eorney,publi.cly char ged that graft existed i n the Richmond City Polic e 
Department and urged a grand jury investigation. Aft;~r such an investigation no in-
dictments wer e r eturned. The D Newspaper so r eported and added that the Chief of 
Police was much pleased at the vindication. It then stated that the Chief was asked 
if he contemplated filing a complaint against C with the District Committee of the 
Virginia State Bar. It then added, 11 Under the State Code , trw State Ba r as an ad-
ministrative agency of the Supreme Court of Appeals may r equest a court of compet ent 
jurisdiction to disbar an attorney for viol ation of the ethical code governing the 
professional conduct of attorneys 11 • D moved f or summary judgmont because nothing 
defamatory was stat ed, and hi.s motion was gr anted. Was this err·Jr? 
Held: Yos. A char g_o dispar aging ono ;i,n b · ro~£L.Inaei.a_by_ind.irection, 
and if so made would bo actionable both ns s l ander per se , and under the statute of 
insulting words. Since it might be a r ensonablo implication from tho above that C 
was guilty of tmethical conduct, a cause of sction may exist and a mD.t erial issue 
of f act is in dispute . Whore such an i ssue uf f act exists it is error t o grant a 
motion f or summary judgmc>Qt. 
TORTS Blast i ng 196 Va .288. 
pr s plastJ"ri~g cracked badly nft er a consider.'.lble amount of plasting had been done 
by D in the oper ation of .his quarry some 600 f eot away and one piece of rock f ell 
on P's promises. D us0d as much ns 700 pounds of dynamite in some of his charges. 
Expert t estimony and oxpGrimentat ion shotvod th::tt ::ts much ns 1, 000 pounds of 
dynamite could bo used without damaging plast er 500 f eet away, and that ~racks 
could be caused by s ettling and shrinkage . The jury f ound that D' s blasting was not 
the cause of pt s dam.age but aw.<J.r ded P $1 nCJmi nul damagE::s f or the invasion of the 
piece of r ock. The trial court s c.: t the ver dict as i de and gave judgment f or P f or 
~Pl5oo. 
HE::ld: The verdict of the jury shnul d be r e- inst at <:.d as it w:.:ts based on credible 
evid(;nce and it was f or the jury t·~· d '~ termine the f act of · causation or the l ack of H 
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'l'O::l.TS Eminent Domain 196 Va.477 • 
Section 58 of the State Constitution provides that private property shall not be 
t.::~.}.en or damaged for -public use without just, oompensation. D, a Tunnel District, 
-vrith power of eminent domain, caused the land around P's building to become saturat·~<' 
with water from a fire hydrant and from pumps PUi1lping water from an excavation. The 
building settled and cracked and extensive repairs became necessary. D defended on 
t•vo grounds: (1) that it was not neglig~t, and (2) that P was negligent in that she 
had failed to provide the building with gutters and downspouts. 
Held:(l) It is immaterial that D was not negligent,(2)Section 58 is self exscuting, 
(3) if the damage caused by P' s contributory negligence is severable from the 
damage caused by D1s actions there can be a recovery for the latter damage. The jury 
should have been so instructed. Since t aais o.f .the action does not rest -in 
negligence, P1s contri~ory- ne~ igence is no bar except as to the damage cause~ b~ 
h~r own negligence. 
TO RTS Damages 196 Va.505. 
P, c3; trained nurse, was injured in an automobile acc:J.dent due solely to D's negli·· 
gence. She testified that she was a trained nurse, that she received $10 a night, 
that she r11as on call, that her husband worked alternate 24 hour shifts as a Captain 
in the fire department, ·and that she had two babies at home. 
Held: Any recovery for loss of future earnings as a result of the accident is 
void as bas€:a solely on specuiatlon. Sucn-damages n1ust be proved with reasonable 
certainty. There is no evidence as to how many calls she might reasonably expect 
or how many she could have accepted. 
TORTS 196 Va.532 
X, a twelve year old boy, was drowned in the same abandoned quarry in much the 
same way as was another boy in 187 Va . 767. Since the prior case, V#l8-74 has been 
amended. It requires every owner of property who knows about a well or pit to fill 
the same with eartt1 after it is no longer used so that it will not be dangerous to 
human beings, animals, or fovrls. 
Held: The statute has no application to a quarry covering almost an acre. The well 
or pit referr ed to means a small opening in the ground apt to become obscured by 
weeds or bushes. Moreover the impracticability of filling up a large quarry with 
dirt as f ast as stone, sand, or gravel is carried away, is very persuasive that the 
legislature did not intend the statute to ' be applicable to such excavations. 
TORTS Public Utilities Neglige~e 196 Va. 642. 
A public bus skidded on~ wet slippery pavement while rounding a sharp curve at a 
low rate of speed. It struck the curb but continued on its way. P was jarred from 
her seat. She did not notify the driver until all passengers had departed, had no 
medical evidence to prove any serious injur;y , but sued for ~:i375 ,000. The jury found 
for the Bus Co., but the trial judge ~ et the verdict aside and entered judgment for 
$6,000. 
Reversed and final judgment entered for the defendant. Skidding is not negligence 
per sa, but only one circumGtru1ce to be considered along with all the other evidence. 
In the instant case it was f or t he jury and their verdict should be re-instated. 
TORTS Gratuitous P~~en~rs ? 196 Va.659. 
D owned a res t aura and P was a waitress therein who normally got off work before 
midnight. One night P asked D to stay past midnight to help him clean up telling her 
he would t ak e her home if she did. They left t he restaurant at 1:30 in D's car. 
He negligently drove it and she was killed. Is her personal representative entitled 
to recover if D was not grossly negligent? 
Held: Yes. She was not a non-paying guest. It was part of the agreement that if she 
would do extra work she would be t aken home . She had paid f or her transportation. 
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TORTS Vf o1ati on of ord~nance 6'~ ~~2/ ,11:#-~ · 196 Va . 703o 
"' Ar: ord~nance of the C~ty of R Jttovides-,..~.at }!o. passenger shall enter or lea.Ye any 
~axlcab by way of the left rear door except on one way streets. Pis cab came to a 
stop and the driver opened the left rea r door for her. As she put her hands on t he 
door frame to pQll herself up a car struck the door slamming it shut on Pis hand. 
Held: P is guilty of contributory negligence which bars any claim she might other-
wise have. 
'l'ORT~3 :L96 V a . 817 
P testified that before he drove l1is truck into & street intersection he l ooked 
to the rir:;ht and l eft arid. saw no cars . He HC'S struck .by lJ 1 s car as he entend the 
i ntersection . There was no reason Nhy he <J.id no t s ee D 1 s car had he looked. 
He l.d: For D. '1.'Ls driver of o. vehiclC: ap~roachinc an inter·section is under the 
duty to s ee t!1.::.t ~rhich is :i.n pl ain vim·r. If he does not lle is ~;uilty of Q01~1Lo­
ry neglieence as a matter of lav< • . 
TO~'l'~j_s:wd to s~- ho··lS(; .:md lot , and P u:i.sbed to bu~9~t~n . P8;~ked wh~r :i.t Has 
so colcl in the housL and D r e] ,lied. t hc. t there was somethi;1~ 11Ton::;; ui th t he cont rols 
of tbe furnace and that she 1-1<18 :)hysi.call~r inc'-'.pable of firing it. As a me.t ter of 
fact the furnace ua s cr<..ckcd but due to soot the c raclc -v;as not obvi ous , ~0£r.d an 
expert look C~t tht- f urnace a.nd t i1e n:x: xTt sa :i_d th.J.t if t he controls werdfunction-
ing pro:~)erl:y the mc::tter could b e e.:1.s :Lly r <.::r;icd:i e J. 'J~he e;c!icrt onl y m.:lde- a su~er­
ficia.l 8J~w-~:i.no.tion and f e.iJ.e rJ to discover- the cr2ck. ? per f ormed his part of the 
contract and i s no1rJ std.n~; fer damaces f o:r f raud. 
He1d: ( T:ro judGeS diE:senting ) Fm.' D. On ti1c~:c;c facts i.t Has P 1 s duty to ascer -
ta.in t he true condi tion. :Ie r (?lied ..nn t he ex11ert rathc tl:iaa n D. · 
TORTS 196 Va . u32. 
Held in a L t o 3 decis ion th<rt an old i.-roman 1-rho cr os ses a :-~mch tra,;elled high-
way, nncl ul1o looks befor e; she crosses , end then sh:rt.s to Cl 'oss , and tvho does not 
look a r:;ain bef or e she cros:;e s the l r. ::: t h.?.ll of tlH~ hishvJ~ry- is guilty o.f contribu-
t or ne li~Sence as a matter of law ·li>rhicl1 continues to the - moment of i mpact s o 
that the l as , C ear C ~ ance c trine is not applicGble o Judgment for pl aintiff ~~7500 
.reversed and fimU.judg:ment entered for def endant . 
TORTS 196 Ve. , 960 
P 1 s husband bou?ht a hot tlr3 of sl1mr, poo .£'ron D, t llc l-JC! nufacturer . The direc tions 
reCJ.d : 11 1\. , i·tampoo t o be used ~!Hlwut s oe.p or- Hat er . Ileat t;ntil -vmnn, pour through 
tlK hair a little a t r.:. Ume . f.ias s ac;e Hell. 11 P 1 s husband 1-ms a~') plying the shampoo 
a.ccorciinr; to directions dwn r l i ·t 2. ma t ch t o lii)1t a ci c;m·ette . The r e Ha s a sud-
den fl ;;.sl1 an c.: P 1-r::,c ser iously burned . ; ;;.~port evi dence by r.herrti :.> ts indicated con-
cl,, s ive l y t hCJ t the ::> hampuo C011lc1 not f hts h lml es.;; it '. Ja r> heat e d t o a t f)mperat ure 
of 170 ck Jr:;r ces ancl it was aclmit ·~c cl 'Jy al l \.;;:J:;, tll: .s l iCJ S not t hE. case . P :..'ecover:-ed 
a verdict anr.l judgment of ~~1) , 000 . '·!bat n ' e>ul i:. or: :.>.:vpcc:.l? 
liE.ld : r~evc· s e d and h nJl juric r11cnt . i' l :;;:~; not 11rov ecl r•ny neg.li e:ence h11t only an 
Ull£X1Jlained f ;r::e:1k. r.:.ccident. 
-
'l'OHTS llailro<J.cl Cr ossinr' J\cci clent 1C6 Va . 083 . 
P waD j_nju.r e<.l '!tihen his · t r ue)( 1r:'f> s trucl{ b7, an c n : _ i ne on t gr <olde cr oss ing in Char -
lotte.:;vil1e . lt 'IJO S <J. c1c·or , col d. nicht . He tcs t .i.fie tl thv.t no si ~nals uer e r;i ven, 
that he s topped and looked before ) roce :::C..:in :::: acro0s , and t h2t he confclsed the loco-
motives 'neadl ir.;ht Hith s tree t and ot ;tt:r li:)1tc . '1'hc G.:. t -- of Ci~arlottesville has an 
orclinanc8 [(laking crosd .rt(; s i gna l.;:; Vr r.? ). J.::·ot:.·r:ls :-'erm:i.~; s ive . 'i'i1 e .~ 1.U'Y f ound for P 
and the trial jucl.:3e re::f1.11J8d to ::;r; t 1c;i '.:le the verclic (~ . 
Held: I..eversed . 'i:hc ~;,t:~tut. c-: oi s n ot p•lnlicabl e: :i. r:; citi e s and totms (Vi;~ 56-4)1: 
H nee the doctrine ol' comparatj vo nccl:i -i.~0nce h.::w no application . Failin:; to s ee 
the train uhich Ha.s in ~')J.ain r:d .:;i:rt HCI S con·:·.rib1.1 t ory negli ~cnce as a mat ter of lau 
which w9uld, in this cc.~so , lJG a c om~lete bar .:.ven i f t llC ungineer \.J<t5 ne r~ J.igent . 
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p miss ed ~rve while aAvipg his ca.r and hit a stump. His body r111as thrown from 
the car and into the highway. A few seconds later D ran over P1 s body. It was night, 
and because of the curve, D's lights did not focus on the point on the road ;.Jhere 
p: s body lay. It is not known whether P was dead when struck by D. 
Held: No recovery under the death by wrongful act statute. There is not~:sufficient 
evidence that D was negligent, or, even if he .was,that the proximate cause of the 
death of P was being struck by D1 s car. 
TGHTS Deserting wife in adultery as benef,iciary - !lfo e:Jfe..:/197 V~.112. 
p sued D for wrong u y 1 1ng • e \v .. . as the 6nly beneficiary in Class 
I. She had deserted H and had been living in adultery with X. Short.ly__; before H' s 
death she returned to H and occup~_ed the same room 1•rith him over a single week end, 
but on Monday after H had gone to work, again went back to X. She made no further 
attempt to reestablish proper marital relations with H. Is she entitled to recover 
under the death by wrongful act statutes? · . 
Held: Yes. There is no provision so far as the death statutes go for barring any 
beneficiary unless that beneficiary t1as negligently or intentionally caused the 
death of the deceased. In this respect the death statutes differ from(a)the statute 
on dower(b)the statute on distribution of personalty in certain cases and(c)wor.kmen'; 
-~ compensation, in all of which a deserting spouse(thereraving been no reconciliation) 
is barred. Note-however that while the deserting spouse is not barred evidence of he 
misconduct is' admissible as to the amount of damages recoverable. 
TORTS 1ieftZ 1-l;~J lr Kc/ 89 s.E.2d 32, 197 VaJ.. 2 7 
X was D s- ck d~iver and had been told not to take riders. B asked for a ride 
and was informed of the ruleo X then relented and told him to get in. X had trouble 
with the.gears. He momentairly took his eyes off the road to look at the gears 
while going at a moderate speed. The right front wheels went off onto a soft shoulde 
and before X could regain control the truck went into the di:l:.ch and t .1rned over 
killing B. 
Held: B was a tresp~sser . The only duty owed him by D was to refrain from will-
. fully or wantonly injuring him . Here there was only or·dinary negligence at best. Jud 
ment for B's personal representative as against D set as ide as contrary to law and 
evidence. 
TORTS Qtild three years of ae-e injured 89 S.E.2d 40, 197 Va.; X- 6 
D drove his car to Mrs . X's house on business . He par ked the car near a mud puddle 
on the side of the road. Whe n he returned he saw some children playing in the mud 
puddle. Mrs. X told the children not to play in the nasty puddle. D and Hrs. X talk€ 
for five minutes and then D got into his car and started off. One of the children, 
aged 3, was sitting in front of D's car in such a position that he could not have 
been seen from the driver's seat. He was killed. D contends he was not under a duty 
to search out children in concealed places before starting his car . 
Held: For childfs personal representative. D knew small children were in the 
neighborhood, and he did not see them leave. Under these circumstances a jury could 
find(as they did) that a failure to check on their probably erratic activities was 
negligence. 
TORTS 89 3 • .6. 2d 54, 197 Va. ) ,:/ J 
Held, that where P negligently entered a principal high111ay f r om a pri.vate road in 
front of an approaching tractor trailer truck driven by D and loaded with cattle in 
such a way that when brakes were applied the cattle would shift and cause truck to 
get out of control, and collision was due to both these factors each was guilty of 
contributory negligence as a matter of law and neither could recover damages from 
the other. 
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TOriTS Las't.AChance Doctrine 89 S .. E.2d 49, 197 Va.233 
p was standing on the ·shoulder of the highway about a foot from the paved surface 
t a.l..king to some men in a station wagon completely on the right. shoulder of the high-
lA·ay. D was driving a truck the body of which. projected about a foot beyond the. ·cab 
p1"tion ·thereor·; lT·aa:w· Fwheri some tl"iree- hu.nd:red yard:s 'away and failed to slacken his 
speed, sound his horn, or change his direction until P was struck by the projecting 
portion of the truck. The trial judge told. the jury that the "whole thing here" was 
tJ vW much further to the right could the station wagon have been parked, and gave an 
i.ns,truction to the effect that if P remained in a dangerous position which position 
contributed to P1s injury then he is not entitled to recover and the doctrine of last 
clear chance does not apply. 
Held:(l)How far the station wagon was parked from the paved highway was irrelevant 
asP had nothing to do with the parking of the car;(2)that the instruction that if 
P remained in a dangerous position was misleading as it assumed without any evidence 
that he was in a dangerous position;(3)The court then had this to say on the last 
. ..\ [klear chance doctrine, . "In the hope of affording a more precise method of applying 
j_trf>l ~last clear chance doctrine, we adopt the following rule: . 
cJ,_v. "Where the injured person has negligently placad himself in a situation of peril 
from which he is 1?~ 1 to remove himself, the defendant is liable if he 
1 saw, or should have seen, him in time to avert the acciden ) by using reasonable care. ~\\~ Where the plaintiff has negligently placed himself in a situation of peril fr~ which ~ he is ~hysicallY. able to temQYB-hi mself,_ but is ur.conscious £f his pe~~J, the~efend­ant is liable only if he saw the plain~iff and r ealized, · or ought to have realized, 
his peril in time to avert the acciden0 by using reasonable ca.re. 
11 If upon retrial of this case there is credible evidence showing that the plai ntiff 
Greear, negligently placed himself in a situation of peril between the hard surface of 
the highway and the parked station wagon, from which situation he was physically able 
to remove him~:~elf, but of which danger he was unconscious, and that the truck driver 
saw him in such situation and realized, or should have realized, his danger in time 
to have avoided striking him by using reasonable care, then the jury should be told 
in an appropriate last clear chance instruction(embodying this principle)that under 
such facts Greear w auld be entitled to r ecover." 
TORI'S 1::"'1~ )-. . . - ;t/~fP• June 1956• 197 Va.490 . 
p wno"Jff~:cf in ~lwp;rt News ;lttended a dance at Fort Eustis. D offered to drive her 
home in his car . She accepted, and went to' sleep vlhile seated on the front seat. P 
testified that he "dozed", and a l s o that he went to s l eep suddenly while driving the 
car which ran off the highway and into a tree injuring P .• The court left the issue of 
gross negligence to the j ury and gave instructions on contributory negligence and 
unavoidable accident. The jury found for D. 
Held;(l)Going to sleep is presumptively negligence on the part of the driver . Wheth-
er it is gross neglieence is ordinarily a jury question. tience it was proper in this 
case to submit the case to the jury under proper instructions.(2)The court takes 
judicial notjce that people seldom go to sleep without any advance warning. D admitted 
that he 11 dozed11 ,i.e. became semi-conscious . A jury could find that it was gross 
negligence to continue driving . (3)The matter of P's contributory negligence s'1ould 
not have been left to the jury since there was no evidence of such negligence . A 
guest owes no duty to stay awake when she has no reason to believe that her host 
cannot drive properl y .(4)Since D offered no evidence to excuse himself from driving 
while asleep no instructj.on on unavoidable accident should have been given. These 
l ast two instructions merel y served to confuse t he jury . Reversed and remanded. 
TORTS f-rt;);WI.H/e (~,. 197 Va.)40. 
The D Electric Co. haJ-a; easement across P1s land and had dug a hole for a pole 
on which to stretch the lines. The hole was three feet from a rocky, steep path lead-
ing from P's house t0 an outdoor privy . The hole was not covered up . After dark P's 
little child started for the privy with P following. Tbe child fell down and started 
to cry. p rushed to pick her up ~ fell down and lost consciousness. When shecame to , 
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~- 33.~ l eft leg was in the hole- and her· right le.g .was Clti;:mpl:ed,up- ilnde-r her. What -is ·t-,!; <;1 
only problem involved as to the existence of liability? 
Held: The only problem is; m;·Jas the hole the proximate cause of the injury?" If P 
f ell on the path and injurAd herself when she fell thereon the existence of the hole 
v1as not a legal caus?. of ner injury .... .It .:wa.s...held(.Sprat1ey) J'l!, ·dissenting)that wheth r: 
t ho hole was a proximate cause of her injury was a question for the jury. Verdict 
in favor of P re-instated. 
TOHTS ift~ &J~ <rr.- CJt Or-J.. b. r,t;~ ,_ cf{:.. A_ ~ rt12e /. 197 Va.572 • 
D while negligently driving hi; h ar ran into a mot~cfe dri1en by A, aged 15. B, 
aged 13 was sitting on the seat of the motorcycle and was killed. A was sitting ~n 
the gas tank in front of the seat. An ordinance made it illegal for anyone to operate 
a motorcycle while carrying thereon any persons for which regular seats have not been 
provided. What effect, if any, has the violation of the ordinance on B's personal 
representative's right to recover? 
Held:(l)Both A and B were violating the ordinance(2)If B had been over 14 this 
w auld· have been negligence per se, but since B was under 14 he is presumed to be 
incapable of contributory negligence, so there was a jury question as to whether or 
not a youth of B1s age, intelligence, maturity, and experience should have known of 
the danger. -:;:;- slruc....~~s . 
Torts--Same fa~t~ as above. The Court instructed the jury that in ascertaining the 
damages, "You shall find the same with reference to the probable earnings of the de-
ceased during what would have been his probable life time, if he had not been killed" 
Held: The court should not have used the mandatory 11 shall11 but some such permissive 
word or phrase as "may", "can", or 11 are allowed to11 • 
Held also that while it would be error to instruct the jury that it might consider 
damages equal to what deceased might have earned, they may take into consideration 
in determrnrng what damages are fair and just the amount he might have earned even 
though·. deceased has not yet earned anything . It was also held that the jury could 
t ake into considerat · ' ectanc- even thou h no mort "ty tables 
w~ in ro uced into evidence. 
TORTS 197 Va.761 
P sued D for common law libel and violation of the Virginia stat.ute of i nslJJ.ting 
wo,rds for publishing of P that she and a~other were oper ating a club which engaged 
in the illegal sale of liquor and in gambling . Defense: Truth. The court instructed 
t he jury that if they believed from the evidence that ' P was owner, part owner, 
or l essor thereof and permitted, acquiesced in, or consented to such illegal use 
the jury should find f or defendants. 
Held: Error. The i nstruction is objecti onable as being too broad. While if article 
published was substantially (even though~ not literally)true in t he ordinary and 
accepted meaning t her eof, trut h would be a def ense , the difference between operating 
on the one hand anq l easing on t he ot her is too gr eat to be disregarded for proof 
of leasing is not proof of ope.cati ng. Note : The court also held that D could prove 
P's general reputation since such ev-idence was relevant -on the qu.estion of damages. 
TORT::; ~<' J D-f· cl; ( &e- 197 Va.811. 
D backed ~ car out of her gar age a l ong her private driveway to the street. In 
doing so she r an over a nei ghbor's infant child. The distance of the child from the 
vehi cle when l ast s een by D, and the time t hat e l apsed bef or e the car was moved after 
D saw the child were l eft ent irel y to surmise and conjecture . 
Held: P has not pr oved negligence. He had the burden of proof. (Thi s is not a r es 
i psa loquitur cas e f or D had no control over the child). One i s not an insurer of 
the s afet y of children t hough if he has r eason to beU eve t hat a young child is 
nearby he should be prepared f or any heedless act that a child i s apt to do. 
TOR.'J'S 'l'O!i.'r.S, June Supf.i.~95G Page 8 
197 Va.830 
A statute protibits the stopp~ng of vehicles in the travelled portions of a high-
way. D violated the statute by stopping a bakery truck to make a few sales therefr olf! 
He left room for vehicles to get by. On the issue of D's neglgence the court in-
structed the jury that if D stopped his truck in such an unreasonable manner as to 
render dangerous the use ·of the street by others he was negligent. Was this a proper 
instruction'? 
Held: No. The jury snould notbe ·invited to speculate on the reasonableness of the 
stopping. The violation of the · in itself negligence, and if this negli-
gence proximate y contributed to the death of X, a four year o d child, D is liable. 
TO HTS ;J;;<ls'i,.r .. _ ( :---._ _ rc:C.t-es..> · ju . . _ 198 Va.~2 .. 
D Has dn·ITing1tlS car at a 7reckles~'te of speed 1gnonng all the pla1nly V1Slblc 
caution and speed signs. He crashed into a concrete abutment killing his gratuitous 
guest, P. There was no evidence as to whether or not P saw the signs, or protested 
or failed to protest to D. D asked the court to instruct the jury that "gross neP:li-
gence .is that degree of negligence which shows an utter disregard of prudence amount-
i.ng to a complete neglect of the safety of another. It is such heedless and reckless 
disregard of the rights of another · as should shoclc fair-minded men." The court struck 
out the l a st sentence of this requested instruction. D contends that P was guilty of 
contributory negligence and that the court erred in striking out the last sentence 
of the requested instruction. 
Held: No error~ D had the burden of proving P's alleged. contributory negligence . 
No evidence at all does not sustain that burden. As to tbe instruction, the stricken 
sentence was merely r epetitious sayi.ng tne same t hing in another way. 
TORTS Jqi,nt Enters;rise Ale:..~) of fl d ~j· f<D tJ 198 Va.l22 
Hand W were ritts band and~ife. W owned the ~J.I. - They lived in Richmond. H was 
troubled with bursitis and ·'went to Hot Springs, Arkansas, f or treatment in W's car. 
W accompanied hi m. On the way back W was injured in a collision due to the negligence 
of H and of D. W s ued D. "[,~Jhat judgment? 
H~ld: Judgment for VJ. 3he went along with H not to control his driving but from a 
natural desire to be with her husband du:·ing his prolonged treatments. There was no 
comm~nity of interest as he went for one purpo:.;e and she Hent fo!' another. The fact 
that H was considerat e of.his wife and would stop the car whenever she wished him to, 
does not make t1im her agent. Hence there :i..s no joi nt enterpr ise and his negligenc e 
will not be imputed to her. 
'l'ORTS Dec .Supp .l956 198 Va.l54. 
D published a f air summary of a notic e fil ed in a divorce case to which the 
general public had access. There was no evidence of malice . 
Held: Privileged. Judgment for plaintiff reversed. Both privilet?e and truth ~re 
d~fens es at common 1 au and under onr statute of insulting words. 
TORTS · Gross Negligence 198 Va.J06. 
Mrs. D volunt eered to take five old ladies to t heir r espective homes i n her car. 
Mrs. A sat on the front seat on the right side, Mrs.P in the middle , and Mrs . D in 
the driver's s eat. Nrs. P was crippled and had never driven a car. Upon reaching 
Mrs. P's home it was found that cars ' rere parked solidly in f ront of it. So Mrs. D 
stopped the car in the traffic lane , put her hydromatic gear in low, turned on the 
lights, put the hand emer gency brake on, got out, and opened t he door. As Mrs. P 
attempted to slide under t he wheel she stepped on the acc el erator, and became wedged 
in between the wheel as a r esult of the j erk. She did not r ealize what was wrong. 
The car ran int0 a house and Mrs~ P was killed. Her administrator contended that 
Mrs. D was negligent,(l) in parking in the traffic l ane(2) in l eaving the gear in low 
instead of in neutral , (.3)in failing to have th t:J brake on better, and (4)in having 
Hrs.P get out as she did vJithout war ni.ng her, and that whil e no one of these acts 
in intself is gross ner,liRence all of them combi ned are . 
De•..; ... Supp.l956. page 9 
Held: For Mrs. D. She was not.., as a matter of law, acting in utter disregard of her 
g 1. :.~:;s t 1 s safety. She put on the emergency br;;.ke in part at least, and turned on the 
ca :r. lights. These act,s shovjed she 1r1as thinking of Hrs.P's safety. She was not grossly 
ndgligent. 
'WJ£\.TS L ,. +t- (.... ·- ru1 e-4~ n~ ,j f~ ~(Jy.,l-;.._s ~ B-1>-vl~ /)-«.S ~98 v~!.l32 ~<'hile, ·pr; \ an invitee r~n D's premises, was unloading potatoes fr rioat into 
P's truck, the float started to move, and he was injured. The float and the premises 
were all in good condition, and the float had been turned over to P to be ul"'.loaded by 
him. The float would not have moved had chocks been placed under the wheels thereof. 
p could have seen at a glance whether or not chocks had been so placed. It was not 
shown that it had ever been the custom of D to place choc}:s under the wheels as t he 
floats were placed lengthwise across the doorways when being unloaded in such a way 
that they could not move more than a foot without hitting the door frame and coming 
to a stop. 
· Held: D is not guilty of any actionable negligence as a matter of law as he has 
violat~d no duty he owed P. Nor is D under any duty to warn of a danger(lack of 
chocks)when such danger is obvious. 
TORTS Grossi o 198 Va.397. 
A priva e road crossed the D Ry. Co. 'rbis private road served 
s everal plants and was .1sed a great deal. The view of the tracks was quite limited 
because of curvature around t he base of a mountain. D did not give adequate common 
law warning signals, and P was injured. P had no·t looked adequately to see whether 
a train was coming, 
Held: For D. The statutory comparative negligence doctrine only applies t a-railway 
--- crossing accidents at public crossings. Those at private crossings are governed by 
the common law. Hence P's rights are completely barred by his own contributory 
negligence in driving upon a railroad track without looking , or without looking 
adequately when his view was obstructed. 
TORTS Contribution statute {;- y,J-u.; -~ C.....e-s;.+" 198 Va.425. 
F and S were I' at her and "ttdult son. The pump at F ' s house 1-ras out of order. S asked 
E to fix the pump. E agreed to do so provided S would call for him and take him to 
F's house. E expected no pay as S and E were good friends who did things for each 
other frequently. While S was taking E to F''s house the car S was drivine collided 
with P's car due to the ordinary negligence of P and of S and E was seriously in-
jured. P settled with E for .~23 ,000. P is noH suing S for contribution under the 
Virginia statute a llm.Jing contribution bett·reen joint tortfeasors for to.ct..s of 
neg1 i gence not i w.rol.:u:i~g mora l t.!lrpitude. 
1 
Held: No contributiun allowed. hlhen P paid the whole of the damages to E, he 
steed in E's .shoes to recover one half of whatever Sowed E. However S owes E 
nothing as E was a gratuitous guest and S has not been gross ly negligent. A mere 
interchanee of favors on a friendly basis is not enough to makfl E a paying passenger. 
10 . 
198 Va.490 
TOR1'S, Ju:ne Supp. 1957 
'l.'CHTS Jefl- - t•A.X"'- C,+s~ 
llf!h6~·23l . sul:Ssection 3 r eads in part., nAt. any intersection where traffic io res~:. j '-, . 
ed to one direction on one or more of the roadways, the driver of a vehicle intendL1 
t o to.rn left at any such intersection shall approach the intersection in the ex.trems 
l eft-hand lane lawfully available to traffic moving in the direction of travel of 
such vehicle -IH!-*11 • Defendant,· who was driving a tractor- trailer did not keep his 
·vehicle wholly in the left lan~ while making the turn. The evidence proved that he 
could not make such a turn from the left lane ·without runrdng over the curb . 
Held ~ For defendant. The law does not require thecrivcr of a duly licensed vehicle 
to do the impossible. He is only required to keep as near the left as reasonably 
possible to make the turn and still keep on the highway. 
TORTS 198 Va.495. 
A was driving hiS car on the right side and B was drivii1g in the opposite directim 
on his left side. Just .before the ~..?llision both A and B turned their cars in the 
same direction and B was killed. Istho last clear chance doctrine applicable? 
Held:. No. A nnly had a guessing chance as to what B was going t11 do, and a guess-
ing chance is not a 1ast clear chance. · 
TORTS--Contraci a--Q9XJJilolj racy--Statute of Lj.mitations X.tf..h j1tJ d-c::/:;tJ-8 v.l.5;j ohr--f--
A an~ f, adu t and infant, were employed separately by ·A~tnur Murray a~- danc1ng 
instructors. Their contracts provided that they would not engage in a competitive 
business or serve as dancing instrue;tors f r; r t wo years af ter termination of their 
employment with Arthur Murray . A and I decided to quit andret up their own dancing 
school. Murray got injunctive relief against A, but I won out on the defense of 
_infancy. The case was in the courts during the two year period as the result of A's 
appeal so Murray .had no r eal r elief. Hurray i 'S nov1 suing A and I for the tort of 
conspiracy. He recovered a judgme'nt for compensatory dc>.mag es of , 1~10,000 and for 
punitive damages of ~r5,000 a gainst both A and I. 
Held:(l) The five year statute of limitations for injuri es to property applies 
rather than the cme year statute for purely personal injuri es, as contract rights 
are property rights.(2) The def~nse of res adjudicata is not good as the i ssue in th. 
present case is whether A and I are guilty of a corllipi r acy which is a different issu 
than that in the prior case. (3) Infancy i s no defense against a tort, so I is joint 
ly liable with A. (h) A can be held for conspiracy to break his own contract if he 
consplred with a,nother. (There is a conflict of authority on this point) (5) Since A 
and I conspired to 11 steal11 Murray's business punitive damages were proper. Decision 
below affirmed. · 
TORTS --lR:.:.,G!ll Causation- -Evidence 198 Va • 608. 
Taxis, by mumc1pal ordinanee, were r equired to have meters and to take the short-
est practicable route which in the instant case was by way of Sixth St. The Director 
of Public Safety testified t hat there were mor e 11 blind11 corner s on Sixth Street 
than on Fi fth Street, and that he considered Fi f th Street the safer of the two. P, a 
passenger in D 1 s taxi was i njured. 'l'he jury found for P as agai nst D. Its verdict 
could have been based on the t eetimony of the Director of Public Safety. 
Held: Reversed and remanded . Whe r e two routes ar e equally available and are sub-
stantially the same(even though an expert might regard one as somewhat the more 
hazardouO) the t aking of one route r at her t han anot her i s not a proximate cause of 
the accident, but merely an antecedent circumstance . "It is clear that whether or 
not Defendant's driver was gui lty of necligence that proximately Gaused or efficient· 
ly contributed to the collision depends on the care or l ack of care with which he 
approached an.d negotiat ed t he i ntersection and not on hi s previ ous decision as to 
whether or not he would drive along F'ifth or Si xth St r eet !" 
TORTS Neg~~genc e . 198 Va.778. 
D was constructi.ng a st orm se.wer . He had the sewer p1.pe covered, and a manhole dug 
preparatory to bricking it up. There was a confli ct in the evidence as to what 
barricades had been put up . A henvy rain f i lled t he manhole and street with 1vat er 
a nd toppl ed the barricade. Chi ldren wading in t he s treet inadvertently stepped i nto 
Torts, June .SilJ:.lP. l')!:/1 ll. 
invisible manhole and were drowned. The court instructed the jury that D owed a 
dut ;:/ to take such measures as may be reasonably necessary to maintain the said stree :_, _ 
:wd adjacent areas in a reasonably safe condition while the work was in progress 
:1nd to erect and maintain adequate barricades and other 1-1arning and protective 
devices, etc. 
Held: The instruction is far too broad. The underlined words practically made D an 
:insurer to~hereas he is liable only in case of negligence. Reversed and remanded. 
TOfiTS 198 Va.861. 
D maintains a slaughter house and meat packing plant in Norfolk. A mixed breed 
Brahrna heifer Heighing 1100 pounds became panic stricken and jumped over a fence some 
five feet high into another pen. D, instead of leaving her there to quiet down,sent 
employees in after her. She jumped another fence, and as the chase continued, she got 
a running start, jumped the outside fence arufl finally ran into and injured P 'tvhile 
he was about his regular duties in a shipyard. P sued D. 
Held:(l) The statutes about lawful fences do not apply within cities , (2)That D owed 
a common law duty to use due care with respect to animals under his control,(3 )that a 
,jury could find that he did not use due care in that he should have known that this 
particular breed is highly excitable and can clear fences up to six feet high when 
excited,(li) that he sh,ould have left the heifer in the other pen until she had 
quieted down,(5) that the trial court should have admitted evidence to the effect 
that P did not lose any time from work, or any wages, as his employer shifted him to 
lighter work until his injuries were better, and(6) that while he was entitled to 
some damages for mental anguish and fright, an instruction was erroneous that un-
reasonably blew up such damaees. 
Dec.Supp.l957. 
TORTS--Fraud 199 Va.l8 
D sota-118 acres of timberland toP. D stated that there were over 3,000, 000 board 
feet of timber on the land. After the timber was cut it was found that there were 
only 2,000,000 board feet. D did nothing to prevent P from making his own estimate, 
and it is admitted that the estimates of experts are onl;y approximations. P filed a 
bill in equity for an abatement of the purchase price. 
Held for D. His statement that there were 3,000,000 board feet on the Jlamd in 
question was clearly only a ~tatement of opinion and hence there was no misrepresen-
tation of fact justifying an abatement of' the purchase pnce. (A fl nding by a jury in 
an issue out of chancery to the effect that there was fraud was only advisory, and 
the court correctly disregarded it as the statement made Has, as a matter of law, 
opinion only). 
TORTS Gross Negli~ence 199 Va.55. 
A non-pay~ng gues was seriously injured when her host drove the car into the left 
lane and collided head on with a car in that lane. The court instructed the jury(l) 
that it was negligence to drive a car on the left of the center line of the highway, 
(2)that it is an act of negligence to operate a car in such a manner as to be likely 
to endanger the life and limb of another, and (3) that it was an act of negligence to 
operate a car without keeping it under proper control. The jury were also instructed 
that if in doing any of the above she was guilty of gross negligence as the court 
defined it, the ,jury should find for the plaintiff. 
Held: Reversed and remanded. There was only one act of negligence and that was 
driving to the left of the center line. It is ~ to break: or to appear to break 
the 0 t into three acts thereb oss · bl · the ·ur:,.- to believ that there 
w~re three cumulative factors of negligence and hence gross neg igence when the jury 
might have found only ordinarJ' negligence from the one act alone. 
TORTS Death by Wrongful Act 199 Va.63 
D negngently i njured f ather, mother and their only child. All died as a result of 
the accident but mother and father pre-deceased the child. Child's administrator, P, 
sued D under the death by wrongful act statutes. D contended that since all the 
beneficiaries in class 2 (and there wen~ none in class l) had died pr s action abated. 
Held: No. In Virginia the personal representative is the plaintiff, and if all the 
members of a preferred class die before- recovery is had he can recover(if dec.erlent 
TO TIT::: , Dec , 1957 Supi:J . 12. 
could have recovered) for the benefit of a deferred class. In Virginia if there are 
m beneficiaries of the first o cond classes then the recovery belongs t o the 
sstate o e deceased. Under our statutes The awar of amages or ~E3~gful 
death is the important matter, the manner of distribution is of secondary considera-
t io n.-:<- -;~ ~<- It is hardly conceivable that the legislature could have intended -;<- ~~- -:<-
that one through negligence ~<- ~~ -;~ might kill an entire family, and yet recovery or 
:K> r ecovery against him be, in some instances, made dependent upon the moment and 
~> equence in which his several victims died. n 
TORTS )~_,;· ~ f1~ ;-~ ~ 199 Va.85 
F, a father-in-lUw, volunteered to teach D how to drive a car. D had a learner's 
permit. While D was driving the car it careened down a hill at a terrific speed. It 
crashed into a tree and F was killed and D seriously injured. D does not remember 
what happened. F 1s personal representative sued D. 
Held:(l) Plaintiff would have to prove that D was grossly negligent as the relation-
ship of the parties was a social rather than a business one.(2)The doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur has no application for F was in at least partial control of the car. 
(3) Even if it did apply it would not prove gross-negligence but only ordinary 
negligence. 
TORTS 199 Va.lOO. 
P's decedent parked his car at night partly off and partly ona two lane one-way 
highway to change the left rear tire. 1'he place ;.;as f airly well lighted by flood 
lights from a nearby store and at least one t ail light was burning. D who was 
approaching this car at a speed of 50 miles per hour did not see the situation until 
within 70 feet of P1 s car. He then did all he could to avoid the accident, but it 
was too late and P 1 s decedent was instantly killed. Was P's deceased guilty of 
contributory negligence? Would the last clear chance doctrine apply? 
Held: The deceased was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, 
but that question should l1ave been left to the jury. Tbe statute forbidding one to 
stop on the highway is not an absolute one but applies only when stopping renders 
the highway dangerous to others. Since the place was reasonably well lighted and 
there was another one-way lane in the same direction t here was at least , a jury 
question as to whether or not he was negligent despite the f act there were much safer 
places nearby which he could have used. 
Assuming, but not deciding, that decedent was negli gent the last clear chance 
doctrine would not apply. Since deceased was not helpless but orily i nattentive, D 
only owed a duty under that doctrine to use due care to avoid injuring deceased after 
he saw his peril. The doctrine assumes that there will be effective time to act 
after the discovery of the peril. In this case there was not sufficient time so 
that if the jury in the next trial find that deceased was negligent, they must find 
for the defendant.(~te:Of courseD was negligent in that he failed to keep a proper 
lookout for he shou have seen the car before he was within 70 feet of it). 
TORTS Hunici pal Cgr porations /!1,41tt-Lh c.e__. e7" S;/--,.~~-1; - J::..-1J2 Va .• l §9.1-._ 
P was injured because of the ai'leged negligence of Arlington County in the mair,l-
tenance of a parking lot that was a portion of the county road system. It consented 
to being sued as it was covered by i nsurance. 
Held: The county was immune from suit. Since this immunity depri ved the court of 
jurisdiction and lack of jurisdiction carmot be waived the suit should have been 
rilismissed. NQ:!:.e that while a county has such an immunit does not have so far 
e_s the main~nce of i s s ree· s J.S concer11e • 
TORTS--Pleading and Prac~ce ·5(i Libel /c -".4. j kc J- 199 Va.l96 
D, a small loan company, wr6te --"il. false a1Jdd~famatort'retter to P1 s employer, an 
agency of the United State~, with a request that the agency bring pressure on P to 
pay although p was not in default. D knew the l ett er whi ch was written in February 
of 1955 would be placed in P 1 s file. In March of 1956 the question of P's promotion 
came up, and his file was reviewed by his superiors some of whom then saw the letter 
for the first t i me.D could have reasonably foreseen that this new publication would 
be made. P sued D more than one year after t he first publi cation but '1-lithin l ess 
TORTS, De(;.195? .Supp . l3o 
t han one year after the republi~tion. D relied on the one year statute of limita-
~ . ions. 
Held in a 5 to 2 decision that the action was not barred. D was liable for the 
republication if he could reasonably expect such a republication. Hence a new and 
independent cause of action arose at that time(The dissenting judges argued that the 
republication did not constitute a new cause of action, but only increased the 
d~mages recoverable in the original cause of action.~ 
TORTS Fraud 199 Va.254 
D agreeo~o buy a farm house from P after he had asked if the premises had ever 
been infested by termites and was told that the premises had been inspected by T, an 
exterminator, in 1950 and three or four times later and that as far as he knew there 
were no termites in the buildings. He was not told that termites were found in 1950. 
After signing the contract D had X make an inspection and he found live termites in 
portions of the buildings. D refused to pay the purchase price, and P sued him for 
damages. 
Held: For D. He has the defense of fraud. pt s words were not the :whole tr..u.th and 
were aesigned to lull D into a false sense of securi tl• Whether or not there were 
termites i n the buil dings was a quest~on of fact rather than opinion. 
TORTS Workmen's Compensation tJr-- ~~ jJ 199 Va.409. 
On a co~~truction job P worked for one independent contractor and D for another. P 
was killed as a result of D's negligence. Does workmen's compensation or common law 
goYern the rights of the parties? 
Held: Common law. D and P are strangers to each other even though their work may 
result in a component part of the same structure. Note: Had P been a loaned employee 
under a duty to take orders from D then Workmen's Compensation statute would have 
applied. But if he is not a loaned employee and is only co-operating with D, then 
common law applies. Whether P is a loaned employee under a duty, or only co-operatine 
is for the jury to determine in close cases. 
TORTS h~ ~-J /?J, ~·vlze 199 Va.460. 
This cas~o1ds t f:Wt under V# ."46-203 and 46-244 a pedestrian who starts to cross 
a street on a green light conti ues to have the right of way over cars despite a 
change in the light while he is crossing as long as the pedestri~n acts expeditious-
ly. A green light is not the same as an absolute order to a motorist to proceed. 
It is rather a conditional one subject to the exigencies of the situation. 
TORTS S~er PrJ yUe~e 199 Va.495. 
R hurt~ f oot i n an accident occurring during and arising out of his employ-
ment. R went to a doctor who treated the foot unsuccessfully and who told the work-
men's compensation insurance carrier that the best thing for R's foot would be for 
him to go back to work. R then went to P, a chiropodist, who discovered that there 
was a chipped bone. While P was successfully treating the trouble, D, an agent of 
the insurance carrier, told R that he should go to a diff erent kind of doctor, and 
that P was "a doctor for ingrowing toenails, flat feet, and falling arches." P 
sued D for slander, and D defended on the ground that the occasion was a privileged 
one and that he had no malice. 
Held: For P. While reasonable words of persuasion would have been privileged be-
cause of the common interest of R and the Insurance Carrier in R's speedy recovery, 
the .~ords used were unnecessarily belittling and hence a jury could find they were 
spoken maliciously. If such be the case the qualHied or conditional privilege is 
lost.(Hudgins, C.J. dissenting on the ground that the alleged defamatory language 
was not so strong, violent or disprop~rtionate to the occasion as to raise an 
inference of malice). 
TORTS, Dec.l158 Supp. 
TORTS 199 Va.897 ~ 
In an action for damages growing out of an automobile accident P testified to 
facts that indicated D was negligent, and D denied such facts, and testified to othe 
facts that indicated P was negligent which facts were denied by P. One of the in-
otructions given by the Court was, "E,ren though each party to a collision exercises 
all the care the law requires of him nevertheless it recognizes that accidents 
occQr. In such an event they are known as unavoidable accidents. If from the evidencl 
you believe this case presents such an accident, you should find in favor of de-
fendant~ 11 
Held: Re;sersible error under the evidence in this case. The term "ugayg idable 
accident" '('means one which due care by both parties would not have prevented. Here 
the evl.dence showed no such thing. The "accident" was either due to P1s negligence, 
or to D's negligence, or to the negligence of both. The jury should not be given 
an easy way to decide the controversy by an ins'truction not supported by any evidence-
since this accident was clearly one caused by someone: s negligence. 
TORTS. si,U(~ of fY'trt-f ·- ~es..f "5~e__;_.- 199 Va.903. 
A and B were b~others. A was driving a car in which B was asleep. The car went off 
the highway on its left, struck several objects, hit an embankment of a cross road 
and came to rest on its top when it rebounded~ A was killed instantly when thrown 
out of the car and B who was A's guest was hurt. There were no eye witnesses. B sued 
A's estate. 
Held: For the defendant estate. 1rfuat caused the accident is pure surmise. B had 
the burden of proving that A acted in such a manner as to show "an utter disregard 
of prudence amounting to complete neglect of the safety11 of his guest. Merely show-
ing a possibility that he actad in that manner is not enough. 
TORTS 200 Va.ll4. 
P tripped over some cereal boxes in D • s supermarket vihile there to make a purchase. 
The aisle where she tripped was six feet wide and well lighted. She stated that she 
di.d not see the boxes on the floor because she was looking for the particular kind 
of cereal she wished on the shelves. 
Held: For D. Even if D were negligent he was under no duty to warn P of an obvious 
danger. P is barred by her contributory negligence in failing to even glance at the 
floor on which she was walking. 
TORTS 200 Va.l27. 
D lent his car to a girl friend who did not have a driving permit. She drove the 
car negligently injuring P who sued D. What judgment? 
Held: For D. The injur:y WOQld have taken place whether or not the friend had a 
permit. Failure to have a permit was not the proximate cause of the accident. There 
was no evidence introduced that the friend was not a competent driver and that D 
knew that she was not. In f act it seems that D reasonably assumed that she had a 
driver's license, but even if he knew she did not have, D1s l ending his car vTOuld 
only have been a violation of law and negligence per se , but still not a proximate 
cause. 
TORTS--Libel--Privilege tJ-f ~~~ Jtr J~ 200 Va.212. 
D and F wsro rival editors o~ly newspapers in Princess Anne County. D edited 
the "machine" paper and P the 11 refo!'m11 one. P made defamatory statements about D who 
replied in his paper that they were deliber ate falsehoods. P then sued D for common 
law libel and insulting wo:::-ds under our statllte .• (Vh'B- 630) 
Held: The trial court should have instructed the jury t hat the occasion was a privi-
leged one. When D's reputati<m was attacked he had the privilege of counter attacking. 
However D will be liable if he exceeds the privilege by acting maliciously and going 
beyond the bounds of permissible sell defense. l.rJhether or not D has exceeded the 
privilege is a question of fac t for the jury but the court should instruct the jury 
what would constitute an abuse of the privilege. 
TORTS, June 19)9 Sllpp. 
TORTS 200 Va.294. 
D employed P, a brickmason, to repair the wall of a brick house. Later he also 
employed S as a laborer to assist P. S built a scaffold out. of some half rotten 
l umber. The defects were not obvious but a reasonable inspection would ha.ve di s-
closed them. P was seriously injured and sued D who defended on the ground that 
P's injury was due to the negligence of a fellow servant. 
Held: If a jury should find as above D would be liable even if S and P were 
fellow servants. An employer owes a common law duty to _furnish his em lo ee ~th a 
r~sonably safe place to work. This is a non de ega a e u y. While S was perform-
ing this duty he was a vice principal and his negligence towards P is D's negligence 
It was error to strike P1s evidence • . 
moRTS--Defamation f.-~+ of ~p~,-~  )),P-ttt-1-4 J-06 s.E.2d 620, 200Va.572 
D through error wrote a letter to ptdl employer to thf ~ct that P owed him a sum 
of money, and"that P had never honored his contract promptly, and that it was now 
four months past due. P was not a merchant. P sued D for libel and under the statute 
of insulting words. P failed to allege that he h~d suffered any special damage. 
Heltl for D following 182 Va.512. Geqeral damages will not be presumed where, as 
here, pis a me ic and has no ~l_n@~ ~redit. It is not libelous per se 
to s ate that a man does not pay his bills promptly-liniess such a person is a mer-
chant. It would plaoe'too great a burden on merchants who must write dunning letter.s 
to hold them liable every time they make an honest mistake. Since 1940 the trial 
court has·had the right to pass on the question as to whether or not words are in-
sulting. Note: Words that are defamatory(libelous)per se when in ermanent form are 
actionabl~hou roof · · ~he mqJOr~ rule, 
th~ are not actionable if not l~b~lous un aaa,_ung~~ doc e~of_ libe~ 
p~r quod, they result in special damage, oral, would cons±.H.nte slande:r: per s~ 
TORTS 107 SoE.2d 402,200 Va.722. 
D was a neighb?r and close friend of X who had two children, S, a girl aged 12, 
and P, a boy aged 6. D took S and P to their school every day on his way to work 
over a long period of time. On the day in question P got in the back seat of D's 
four door sedan, and because the rest of the seat was occupied l-rith D's laundry, 
S got in the front seat. P closed the door tightly. After D had driven some distanc( 
and while he was making a right hand turr!- at a reasonable rate of speed P fell out 
of the car and was injured. 
Held: Judgment for P reversed~ He was a gratuitous guest and D is not liable un-
less he has been grossly negligent. The gratuitous guest rule applies whether or 
not P is an infant. It was not gross negl~gence to allow P to occupy the rear of the 
car by himself, or to become absorbed in driving properly rather than watching p 
at the moment of making a turn. 
TORTS--~eifBy !]lht - ol-c_jv:;~~b(~ D.~ j, 200 Va. 736 
D was general ·contractor who was engaged~~dnstructing a new highway for the 
State. S was a subcontractor for the grading. The highway had to be built over one 
of the main lines of Railroad. Permission was granted to D to cross the line in the 
course of the construction of the road. D agreed to use great care, to notify Rail-
road in advance when heavy equipment was to be moved across the line, and to save 
Railroad harmless from all losses as a result of D's crossing it. D sublet the 
grading portion to L. One of L1 s employees drove an enormous earth mover and scraper 
across the line without any advance notice some 200 feet in front of a passenger 
train which was clearly visible . The engineer applied the emergency brakes. L's 
employee jumped to safety but P, an employee of Express Company on the express car 
was seriously hurt. D contended he was not liable because he had no control over thE 
operations. Held: Contention unsound. As a result of his contract with Railroad he 
owed a non-delegatable duty. But i ndependently of the contract he also owed such a 
duty at common law. Operating heavy, slow-moving machinery across a railroad line is 
an extra-hazardous activi t y, and one who undertakes such a thing_cannot escape 
liab"lit b ettin some one else to do it for him so it is immaterial that L was 
an independent contractor as far as P is conc erned. 
'l'OH.'l'8--:f4f!1i1fis · LeO:}ol959 Supp. 'l'orts page 16 200 V.;l.791, 
A verd~c . f ~~125, 0~0 in favor of a 16 yr. old girl l'Yho lost her leg due to the 
aeghgence of D was sust.ained. It is not so high as t.o shock the conscience or' the 
8ourt when one considers that she will ~e permanently crippled and very probably wil: 
never be a wife or mother. The money is scant compensation for deprivation of a 
normal life of one so young. 
'1'0R'I'S--Liabili ty of Chari table Hospital 200 Vae 878 o 
P was burned t6 death while a pat:t~nt in the D Hospital in an oxygen tent. Assum-
ing that his death was caused by the negligence of an employee, but that there .was 
no negligence in either the employment of or the retention of the employee -is D 
liable under the death by wrongful act statute? 
Held: If the D _Hospital is a c a t.a~p'tal it ~annot be sue!Lby: the e_cipi~IJ.·! 
of its benefits ev§~gh_auch recipient is a paying patient. While this rule seem: 
to be on the way out, it is too well established in Virginia to be changed by judi-
cial decision. If the court held for pfs personal represent~tive there would be 
liability on all charities for all torts not barred by the statute of limitations 
even though most of them carry no insurance because of their supposed immunity. The 
rule is one of debatable public policy, and if it is to be changed this should be 
done prospectively by legislation. In this case the charte~ provided that the 
hospital was to be operated solely for charitable purposes. There were no stockhold-
ers. Its directors received no pay. It expected those of its patients who were able 
to pay to do so. It took in patients whether they could pay or not and charged off 
the accounts of those who could not pay. It had operated over the years at a s light 
loss. Thus it was a charity by charter and in practice both of which are required 
for immunity from tort liability to those who are the recipients of its benefits. 
TORTS--Federal Em~lo~ers' Liability Law f J?.Z /} 200 Va. 908. 
P was employed y he V1rgi nia Railway Co. to weigh coal cars just before dis-
charging their content.s into ships. It was necessary for him to throw a hand switch 
to get a certain car on the scalE::s • . The switch was defective and when he exerted 
all his pressure to throw it, it kicked back and injured him., 
Held: P is entitled to recover under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 
U.S.G.A ##51 et seq. for the Act provides that the railroad is liable for injury or 
death resulting 11 in whole or in part.tt from its negligence, or by reason of any de-
fect, due to its negligence, 11 in its * ~~ appliances, machinery, * * or other equip-
ment." "Under this· .statute the M-st~f a · jury case is simply whether the proofs 
justif t lusion that e er ne li ence l a;yed an art even the ali ht st 
i n.-producing the i 'ur -1~ *·" 
~ORTS Pain and Anguish at so Mucb per D~ 201 Va.l09. 
P entered a store owned by the D Corporation to purchase a television set. There 
were a number of sets on a shelf that had been built by an independent contractor 
P1 s hl;lSband said to the clerk, 1lThat shelf is loose"ll and the clerk replied, 11Don•t 
worry it has been like that. We are going to fix it. 11 Hardly had this been said, 
when the shelf and sets fell pinning P t.o the floor. At the 1rial P's attorney used a 
blackboard to add up the damages. Among the .items ligted were traumatic arthritis at 
50 cents per day--$5,475.00; and seven weeks on crutches at $10 daily-~~490.00. 
Held:(l) It is immaterial that the shelf was originally put up by an independent 
contractor since D has not properly inspected and repaired it. (2)But it is improper 
to value pain and mental anguish by the day. Different people feel different amounts 
of pain under similar circumstances, and pain varies in intensity from time to time. 
If experts cannot measure these matters with accuracy, certainly lawyers cannot. All 
this is for the jury, and while it was permissible for P~s lawyer to use a black-
board he should not have been allowed t.o usurp the functions of the jury by telling 
them the exact value of pain and mental anguish per day. 
C. j /JJ · f) '{) / .. · · · Torts 17 • TORTS "[I ll /b... {\" L.Aro~.S. ~n..C: . {~~ e_.- 110 S.E.2d 177, 201 Va. 1.83~ · -
Tl1e Vir inia ublic railroad crof:lsing comparative ne 1· ... u.±..e..Cll#'.:5.6d.l.-1.6) 
i s not applicable to crossi ng.s-w ·ties and towns. In the a.bsence 
of an ordinance, common lal-7 principles are applicable to accidents at such crossings 
In this case P crossed almost directly in front of an engine and tender in broad 
daylight at a crossing in an incorporated town. The engine and tender were backing. 
P thought that they were going forward or standing still as no crossing signal 
was given. 
Held: While it was common law negligence for the engineer to fail to give such a 
signal, P was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in failing to 
note what was obvious, and in blindly relying on "the implied invitation to cross 11 
(if there was one)from the failure of the engineer to give a signal. The last clear 
chance doctrine is not applicable as there was no opportunity for the engineer to 
prevent the accident after he saw P and realized his peril. 
TORTS c~ >~j;. ~C.:1JS~ 110 S.E.2d 189, 201 Va. 244. 
p was an invitee ~n D1s store. As she was going downstairs and rounding a newel 
post at a landing she slipped and hurt herself. There was a showcase on the landing. 
The stairs were polished hardwrrd. There was a handrailing on the left but none on 
the right. P was wearing what she described as "normal ladies' wearing shoes" with 
an M.average heel" ~ inches high in the rear, 2! inches high in the instep, and 9/16 
by 9/16 of an inch across the bottom. Immediately after her fall the manager asked 
her what caused it, and she replied that she had tripped on her heel. When she 
slipped the heel on her right shoe was broken off. She claimed that D was negligent 9 . (l)in having a showcase on a landing thereby distracting a~tention and narrowing th6 
landing (2.) in not having a handrail on the right side of the stairway also, and (3) in not having anti-slip treads and nosings on the stairway. 
Held: For D. There is nothing to show that any of the alleged defects caused her 
fall. She may have fallen because she tripped on her heel. It is elementary that 
where the evidence shows that any one of several things may have caused tbe i~~~ry, 
for some of which the defendant is responsible and for some of which he is not, and 
leaves the real cause to speculation and conjecture, then plain·(;iff has failed to 
establish his case. 
TORTS 110 s.E.2d 193, 201 Va. 157. 
D's employee took a routine blood srunple from a seventeen year old boy while he 
was seated in a chair. She then turned to attend to the sample. The boy rose at 
once, blacked out, and fell on the hard floor injuring himself. The employee had 
not expressly told him to wait a few minutes before getting up. Evidence indicated 
that persons were more apt to faint if given warnings, but that she could have said 
ttwait to get up until I remove the pledget I have placed on your arm." 
Held: Judgment for plaintiff reversed~ There is no eviden~e of negligence. 
Ordinary care was exercised and that is all that is required. D1 s employee had no 
reason to expect that the patient was a special case, or that he would arise abrupt-
ly the moment she temporarily was caring for the sample. 
TORTS 110 S.E.2d 198, 201 Va. 193. 
1 was visiting D at his home and left at 1 a.m. He soon returned and told D he 
could not get his car going. D pushed L's car onto the main highway, but he could 
not get it started. It was raining hard, and the ligh~s on L's car had gone off. 
D instructed L to make a left turn at a certain street. Instead L made a right turn 
in front of a car in which P was a pass enger. P was badly hurt and sued D. The court 
instructed the jury to the effect that if L and D ·were engaged in a joint enterprise 
they should find for P which they dido 
Held: Reversed and remanded . There was no oint enterprise here. L and D were not 
mutual agents. They did not have equal con ro • was merely trying to help L get 
his car started. Whether or not D was using due care himself is another question, 
and so the case was remanded for a new trial on t hat issue. 
/. 
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TORTS ~ , /}_y >~e - · Page 18 To:Lts 201 Va.239. 
D, a lC:I..<:-dr:l:'v.er, in violation of V#46-231 cut the corner excessively in mOJ.{i:ng e:. 
left turn and collided with a car in which P was a passenger. While the jury was de-
liberating, the foreman asked the Court whether, if a person violated the letter of 
the law, would negligence be presumed. The Judge replied that negligence is never 
presumed but must be proved. Counsel for P excepted. ' 
Held: Reversed and remanded. While the Judge's statement may be true as an abstract 
proposition, the jury should also have been told that violation of a statute js 
negligence per se, and that if such negligence is a proximate cause of an-.inj~t 
wgl Sll t diet fo gmgg s for such in ·ury_. 
TORTS--Co~ributory Negli~nce br-i~ tJ , fule.!>.f,-,' ~Vv .201 Va. 358. 
p crosse a highway in a non-residential and non-business area, where cars and 
pedestrians have equal rights, in front of a truck some 100 feet away. P did not 
quicken his pace nor did the truck driver slow down or change his course. At the 
time of the impact P was just a step from the curb and safety. 
Helq: P is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Split second 
timing is not due care. He was co-author of his own misfortune. Hence the trial 
court correctly entered swnmary judgment for the defendant. 
TORTS-•!ight of Way r~~~ i tJ-,-t-rL d J . 201 Va. 380. 
V#46. -2~ provides(w1th some exceptions sene of which are applicable to this case) 
that the man on the right has the right of way. It also provides that the driver of 
any vehicle which is being operated at an unlawful speed sha+l forfeit any right of 
way he would otherwise have under this section. D was approaching an intersection at 
an illegal speed. Does this give F, who was on D's left, the right of way? 
Held: No. D forfeited his right of way, and F never had the right of way. Hence 
neither had the right of way and each was under a duty to the other to use due care 
to avoid a collision. 
TORTS--Grfui taus or Pa;;,d ng Gu~st? 201 Va.426. 
p bough a second hand car from D paying cash for it, and telling t..i.m he wanted it 
by Monday for a business trip. D agreed to paint the car and to have it ready. P 
went to D's place of bus.iness twice on Monday and 1•vas told each time that the car 
- w~s not yet ready .for delivery, but he was assured he could have it Tuesday. P went 
there Tuesday and the car was still not ready. P complained to D and said, "You know 
I need the automobile to go to Virginia Beach to see about a job". D then offered 
to drive him there. P accepted the offer. On the way back D drove negligently but not 
grossly negligently and P was injured. Under the guest statute V#B-646.1 the owner 
or operator is not liable in the absence of gross negligence unless the injured 
party pays for the transportation. 
Held: D is liable. Payment need not be in money. D was driving P as a result of a 
business transaction to keep his good will and to make good in part his own default 
in not having P's car when it was promised with knowledge that he needed it for a 
business purpose. This is not a mere exehange of social amenities. 
TORTS--Evidence 201 Va.466. 
p waslllft passenger in a car drj.ven by X headed in an easterly direction. As X was 
about to go over the crest of a hill there were two tractor-trailer trucks approach-
ing him. The first of these dimmed its lights. The second one then attempted to pass 
the first one on X's side without dimming its lights and the driver of the first 
truck(although it had not yet passed X)then brightened its lights. X turned to his 
right and put on his brakes. This caused his car to skid broadside across the road 
in front of the second tr.:J.o"tor-trailer. P was injured. X Has convicted of reckless 
driving, and the trial court admitted evidence of such con-viction, and struck P•s 
evidence. 
Held: Reversed and remanded. It was error to strike P1s evidence as a jury could 
have found that the failure of the driverc of the tractor-trailers properly to dim 
their light(which was negligence as a matte~ of law)was a proximate cause of the 
accident. It was also error to admit evideroe of X1s conviction of reckless driving. 
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.P was not a party to that case, and the civil and c rirninal trials are separate and 
distinct.(Note: As to this latter point the SlllJreme Court of Appeals indi cat ed that 
t he Heller~ 149 Va.82, 106, in which it was held t h n ct·on b an in§_ured 
to collect fire insurance after he had Q~Qted_o~etting fire to the 
pr emises to defraud the insurer was barred, was not a repndj ation of the.-g.cmeraL rule 
bui-a special exc Qpt~n~o). 
TORTS--Damages 201 Va.522. 
p was 1nj ured in an automobile accident, but did not lose any time from work. How-
ever she lost 159 hours time in securing medical and physiotherapeutic treatments. 
Is she entitled to compensation for this time assuming that the jury has been 
instructed in the usual way with reference to pain and mental suffering? 
Held: No. Loss of time and the deprivation from carrying on normal activities is 
compensable as a form of mental suffering, and hence already covered by the in-
struction on that item of damages. 
TORTS-~D~ree of Care Owed Gratuitous Ouest in Airplane 201 Va.557. 
D offered to f l y P from Fredericksburg to Beckley, West Virginia without charge. 
She accepted the offer. Although D was not well acquainted with the Fredericksburg 
field, fog was rolling in, and visibility was poor, he attempted to take off. In 
doing so he lined up his lights incorrectly. As a result P was killed when D taxied 
the plane into the side of an unlighted building near the runway. The Court instruct-
ed the jury that D owed .a duty of due care to Pin spite of the fact that she was a 
gratuitous passenger. D insisted there was no liability on him unless he was gross-
ly negligent. 
Held: For P's personal representative. The automobile guest statute-d~es-not-&pply 
to airplanes. It has been on the books since 1955~ The fact that the legislature 
over these many years has not extended it to airplanes shows that it was not intend-
ed to apply to them. Travel by air is so different from travel on the surface 
(especially in that one cannot leave a plane as readily as a car when the pilot 
proves to be negligent)that the common law Virgir.~a rule applicable to ~ratuitous 
b~lments and free automobile transportation should not ~d ~planes. 
TO~TS {)r;, .. 1/t...lj) ;,._ C/r D<;..->1 #\.( 5, /-,.~t. t- 201 Va.564. 
City Hall Avenue in Norfolk runs east and west and is a four lane highway with no 
island in the center. Metcalf Lane makes a T intersection with City Hall Avenue on 
its southern side. This lane has no sidewalk, is only 11 feet wide and is used only 
for one way south bound traffic. P who was 77 years of age was walking west on the 
south side of City Hall Avenue. He wished to cross it, so he walked until he came to 
the Lane and then turned north at a right angle. He wore dark clothes and the night 
was dismal and raining . P looked both ways, and was a foot over into the third lane 
when he stopped to let a taxi headed west ·' go by. This taxi was in tile fourth l ane 
(on his extreme right)but veered over into t.he third lane far eno'ugh to strike p a. 
glancing blow. The taxi should have stayed in the lane furtherest to its right. 
Held: (two judges dissenti ng) P_ is . uilt o co "butor y: gligenc.e-.a a matter of 
l~e should not have s ood · · 'n the 3r d lane but should have stepped back 
when he saw the taxi coming over his way. The Court r e-udfated t · o - the 
street comparative sa doctrine in view· of increased traffic conditions.(The 
d1ssenting judges thought t hat P1s contributory negligence, if any, was a question 
for the jury as a 77 year old oldster should not be required to dodge taxicabs 
operated in violation of law) Note that P did not have a r i ght of way, as he would 
have had, had there been a side1-1alk on the east s ide of the lane and he had been 
walking across City Hall Avenue 1vithin the lines of that sidewalk extended. 
/ 
·_~OHTS--In~ur~ to ; ~e~old TQrts Page 20 201 Va.834 
During ·"C l ebi Vu0Tr which there was a band and parade a five year old child 
~arted across three lines of a six lane divided highway and was killed when struck 
by D's car. r1'he Court instructed the jury that D had a right to assume that no one 
vrould cross a street between intersections, and that the jury should find for D if 
t he child ran from behind an obstruction under such circumstances that he had no 
chance to avoid striking her after he saw, or should have seen, her. 
Held: Error. D knew children were present. A cQild is not governed by the s~e 
r.1,1.les as ·j s an a.Q.ult. Deceased was too young to be contributori,ly negligent. Since 
th'ere was no obstruction for her to run from behind it was error to give an in-
struction not supported by the ~ridence.(Note:The fact that D was driving in the 
third land instead of in the first was not a proximate cause of the accident.) 
TORTS*ltMunicipal Corporations 1/H-: ~~ D-f Dt·{~ 201 Va.879 
P stepped i nt o a conceaied hole in a grass plot owned by the City which adjoined 
the main street in Virginia Beach. The City has much trouble with erosion and makes 
a dai+,y inspection of the plot. Holes sometimes appear suddenly. P sank to her knee 
and broke her leg. 
Held: Judgment for P reversed as she failed to show that the City had actual or 
constructive notice of the defect in time to remedy the situation. The defect and 
the injury are not enough to make the City liable as it is not an insurer, but 
f liable only if negligent. 
TOJiTS-:-Punitive daruages from drunken driver f't.VV\t; 1:., L })il-K.. 4 .;g1 Va.90.5 
As car was struck from behind by D's car uhile P's car was ~opped in a traffic 
lane awaiting the green light .• D had had two drinks of Vodka and showed signs of 
intoxication. The jury awarded P $3,000 compensatory and q~4,000 punitive damages. 
Held: This is not a case for punitive damages. D did not run into P's car on pur-
pose. She had nothing against P. She merely failed to keep a proper lookout. There i 
nothing to show that she acted in a ..spi · lschief criminal indifference or 
C3f1SCious disregard . of the_tightS:o£-O-thers. 
TORTS--Owner of· car as grat.nitans guest of. u:iyer 201 Va.919. 
-D asked P, to drive him in P's car to D's employer so that D might ask his employ-
er for a loan. P replied that h~ doctor had told him not to drive until an injury 
had healed. A little later D a~d if he might drive P's car for the purpose above 
stated. P replied, 11Yes, tf I go with you. 11 This was mutually satisfactory. D drove 
the car negligently but not grossly negligently seriously injuring P and killing 
himself. The trial court held that P was D's guest since no one received any compen-
sation. 
Held: The owner of a car is not the uest o· ersDn-he_permits _t~ drive his _car 
within the mean~n of automobile ~est statu-te. The owner remains the host even 
if he e s his guest drive. Hence P need prove only ordinary negligence to win his 
case. 
TORTS--Ex~losivesp-R~~a loquitur 116 S.E.2d 38, 202 Va. 176. 
p deede land t o the Commonwealth for a highway. In this instrument the highway 
plan and specificat.ions were identified, and P covenanted that the considerations 
paid to him "Shall be in lieu of any and all claims to compensation and damages by 
reason of the location, construction, and maintenance of said highway" except such c 
may be caused by negligence or departure from the plans. The contractor, D, found it 
necessary to do a great deal of blasting. After the blasting there were some 200 
cracks in P's house which was situated some 550 feet from the highway. Rain came 
through the cracks. Due to D's negligence P's spring and reservoir were damaged by 
improper drainage. The jury returned a verdict in favor of P for some $4400 but did 
not separate the damages due to blasting from that due to improper drainage. 
Note: The Court expressly s~ted that whether one used explosives at his peril,or 
whether one is liable only if negligent, had never been decided in Virginia. It ther 
said it was unnecessary to decide the point in this case as P had released the 
Commonwealth and its agents from liability except for negligence. Hence D will not 1 
liable unless he was negligent. 
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Held: No liability for injui'ies caused by bla.sting, It is impossible to blast wit,~ ' 
out causing vibrations resulting from the blasting, and cracks caused thereby do not, 
f!'OVe negligence as the doctrine of res ipsa loqui t.ur does not apply. No expert 
t estimony was offered to prove that excessive charges were used. p has failed to 
prove negUgence, and the burden of proof was on him.(The case was reversed and re-
manded with directions for a new trial limi t:ed. to the amount of damages caused by 
D's negligence in failing to provide proper drainage.) 
TORTS-Proo.i' of negli gence 116 s.E.2d 48, 202 Va.60. 
z P was a passenger in a car going south in the southbound lane. This car collided 
with D's car which was going north when it swerved from the northbound lane into the 
Southbound lan.e. D testified that he had a blowout in his left rear tire and that 
despite his best efforts the car swerved as described above. The Court instructed 
the jury that if they believed from the evidence that it is as likely as not that 
the left rear tire blew out, producing without defendant's fault a sudden emergency 
in which he operated his car as a reasonable person would have done under similar 
circumstances, they should find for the defendant. 
Held: Error in that the instruction is too favorable for the defendant. The phrase 
"as likely as not" is incorrect in an instruction on the burden of proof. "It suggest~ 
a guessing process which ought not to be resorted to in arriving at a verdict. In 
this instance *** it placed the burden on the wrong party and in effect required the 
plaintiff to prove that the tire did not blow. out". ~ (1) The fac · t 's car 
wa5 on the wrong side made a p~ima facie case of negli gence £or P. (2) The burden 
of going forward with the eyidence the · to to show wh it was t fier_ci_. (3) 
If th e ur reasonabl believP.d that D's tire blew out thereby creati a sudd~n 
emergency, the burden was then on P to show by a preponderance of the whole 
that there was li ence on the rt of D vThich was a roxim te ca 
juries. Reversed and remanded. 
TORTS--Negli~ence ~~r~s todg]j n~ ~¥ in ~treet 202 Va.4o. 
p who was u mon ~o age waso \ 1ng unattended acro~s Ocean View Ave., a 4 
lane busy thoroughfare, when she was struck by D's car. The court instructed the 
jury that motorists had a right to assume that pedestrians would cross only at 
intersections and that since D was faced with a sudden emergency, that principle 
was applicable. 
Heldt The instructions were erroneous. There is no presumption that such a child 
will cross only at intersections, and hence the instr~ction given, is inapplicable. 
The sudden emer enc doctrine had no a plicat.j on as child did not dart out ·from 
behind a car ut was toddling towards D's car. D, in the exercise of due diligence, 
should have seen the child in time to avoid hitting her. The fact that other in-
structions properly stated the law is immaterial as the jury may have relied on 
the erroneous instructions. 
TORTS School Board Immunity 202 Va.252 
School Board permitted X to use a high school auditorium for a concert for which 
an admission charge was made. P, a paying patron, fell in the aisle because of the 
slippery condition of the floor. 
Held: p· hasno cause of action against the Board either on the theory of negligence 
or that of nuisance. The Board is an agent of the State in the performance of a 
governmental function and has the irmnunity of the State from suit. This immunity is 
not lost because it has permitted third parties to use a school building for an 
educational or cultural purpose. 
TORTS--H~nicipal Corporati ons 202 Va.274 
The city of Norf olk passed an ordinance requiring all occupants of premises ad-
jacent to sidewalks to remove the snow therefrom within three hours after the 
cessation of the fall. D failed to comply with this ordinance. P broke her ankle 
when she slipped on the sidewalk adjoining D's premises. 
Held: No liability on D. While the violation of a statute or ordinance is ne li-
ge~oe per se, that pri nci pl e of 1 a a ip__ a SJ.nce the 
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m··dinance r1as enacted for the benefit of the City of Norfolk and not for the 
·~e;:·c.~on o ir persons. a~ e ~n er ac ~on against the City ecause she 
failed to give the City the notice required by V#8-653(ordinarily 60 days written 
notice after accrual of cause of action). 
'£0RTS 202 Va. 278. 
P sued D for injuries ar1s~ng out of an automobile accident. Over objection the 
Court instructed the jury "that if they believe from a preponderance of the evidence 
that P was susceptible to emotional upset or more susceptible to emotional disturb-
ance than an ordinary person at the time and place of the accident, and that this 
condition in her made her injuries, if any, more severe, or more aggravated, or 
difficult to cure, then she can, if she is entitled to recover, recover for the 
additional ·aggravation and difficulty resulting from the injuries, but not for any 
pre-exiating disability .n , 
Held: A proper instruction since it correctly states the law.(A nervous person is 
entitled not to be ne li entl in ured and if ~he i .~nag~d-mo~haa-aa-average 
ersort more to compensate her). 
TORTS--Malicious ProsecRtion 202 Va.299. 
D, a lawyer, parked his car near where workmen were building a brick wall in such 
a way as to obstruct the work and to create a traffic hazzard. P, the chief of 
police, requested D to move the car. D refused, so after another ineffectual request 
p moved the car some 75 feet and notified D what he had done. D became enraged and 
swore out a warrant against P for the felony of unauthorized use of an automobile 
with intent to deprive the Ol,;ner of its use temporarily. P was tried and acquitted. 
p then sued D for malicious prosecution and recovered a judgment for $1,000. D 
appealed claiming that since P actually did corr~it the crime he had a defense to 
the malicious prosecution suit as a matter of law. 
Held: Affirmed. There is no evidence whatever that P intended to deprive D of the 
use of his car at all. There is no crime under the statute(V#l8-220.l)without such 
an intent. All the elements of malicious prosecution could have been found by a 
jury to have been present. 
TORTS In~ry to Seyeg Year Old Boy 202 Va. 347. 
· p, a seven year old boy, was struck by a car possibly driven by D although D never 
admitted his car struck P. Because of P1 s injury he had no recollection of the 
accident and there were no admitted eye witnesses other than P's five year _old 
brother. There was no evidence of any negligence on D's part nor was it proved just 
where p was when he was struck, nor his whereabouts just before he was struck, or 
how he entered the road. 'l'he trial court struck P's evidenceo 
Held: Affirmed. P had the burden of proving D's negligence. This is not a res 
ip~a loquitur case, and since P has not sustained that bu~den the trial court acted 
correctly in striking P's evidence. Under these circumstances it was immaterial that 
D knew children were accustomed to play in that viciruty. 
TORTS--Gross Negligence Q2est Statute 202 Va.548. 
pta int~ate was a gratuitous gueSt in D's car. D was driving his car something 
over 40 miles per hour well within the speed limit. It was raining and the two 
lane hard surfaced highway was wet, D's car was, as far as known, in good mech&ni~,~ 
cal condition. The two rear tires lV'El!'e worn alrrost smooth but still in good enough 
condition to pass inspection. X's tractor trailer was approaching D's car. When 
the two cars were about 60 feet from each other D's car veered across the center 
white line and then for some unexplained reason went into a 180 degree skid so that 
the back of D's car was in X' s lane. X did not even havs time enough to apply his 
brakes and pta intestate was killed. The jury found that D was grossly negligent 
and rendered a verdict for $10~000 for P which the trial courtr refused to set aaide. 
Held: Reversed and final judgment entered for D. For him to have been ~uil~ of 
gross ne li he must have shown an '"'utter disregard of prudence amounting to 
e-
TORTS Page 23. 
?Ondcrance of the evidence. If reasonable men can differ it is a jury question. 
:a D clearly was not guilty of gross negligence, there is no jury question. Here 
it is plain that P ha8 not proved gross negligence. The cause of the accident has 
not been explained. D may have become sick suddenly. Something may have gone wrong 
1vi th the car. D may have inadvertently gone over the white line and the car may 
have just then come into contact with the slick spot. 
TORTS--I~ ~ructipna o.n law ohflegllgence 202 Va • .535. 
As D was driving his ear in a snol1 stonn because of which he could not see the 
center white line or the edge of the hard ~urface of the road he saw P approaching. 
In order to give P plenty of room D veered to his right. There was ice on the road 
under the snow and D's action caused his car to skid first to his right against a 
bank and then over to the left of the highway in front of P•s approaching car. P 
was hurt in the collision. 
Heldt (J_) P is not entitled to an instruction that D was guilty of negligenoe as a 
matter of law for being on the wrong side of the highway. This fact only made out a 
prima facie case of negligence and cast the burden of going forward with the evidence 
on D. If the jury believe that D did everything reasonably possible to avoid the 
accident or even if they believe the evidence to be in equilibrium it should find 
for D, as P had the burden of proving ~'s negligence. (2) But it was error to in-
struct the jury that P had the burden £o convince the jury of D's negligence. One 
of the meanings of '"convince" is to have beliefbeyond'd.O'Ubt. P need prove hi~ case 
only by a preponderance of the evidence. {3) Nor was it proper to tell the jury that 
if D crossed the center line they nmight asswnett negligence. Rather such fact only 
cast upon D the burden of producing a reasonable explanation. 
TORTS--neg matj on-swnrnarx iqdgment 202 Va • .588. 
The D Fifpaper published a letter in its "Letters to the Edi tortt feature which 
stated of P, who was Superinter.dent of Schools, and who was active as a segregation-
ist, NHow can we as citizens prote~t our public school property from unscrupulous 
leaders? We are tired of his continuous crusading, and having our children suffer 
* * *·'' It was stipulated at a pre-trial conference that there was no actual malice 
on the part of D. The Court granted D 1 s motion for a summary judgment in his favor. 
Held: Affirmed. Since P was a public officer statements made with reference to 
him in that capacity were qualifiedly privileged. Since P has admitted that there 
was no actual malice the qualification is satisfied. P cannot have a better case 
than his own admissions give him when those adffiissions are made with full knowledge 
of the facts. Hence there is no jury q uestion and a awnmary judgment for D was 
proper. 
TORTS 202 Va.605. 
p who was of a nervous di~position and predisposed psychologically .to emotional ups~ts, slowed down her car as she app~oached a red stop-light. D, who was driving 
a car immediately behind her put her foot on the brak~. She was wearing tennis 
shoes and her foot snipped and hit the a~celerator. This caused her oar to run into 
pt 8 ear. Only slight damage was done to the car3, but P, who was then pregnant, 
suffered a whip lash injury and developed a permanent conversion hysteria which a 
normal person would not have developed. D requested an instruction to the effect 
that if her foot slipped through no negligence on her part the jury must find a 
verdict for D. The court refused the instruction and also allowed damages for the 
permanent hysteria. 
Helds Affirmed. While it is not negligence as a matter of law for one's foot to 
slip neither is it due care as a matter of law. Sin~e this was a finding instruct-
ion lt should have been a complete one. This instruction failed to tell the jury 
that it was D's duty to keep her car under proper cont~ol under the traffic condi-
tions then existing. It wa3 for the jury to say, from all the evidence, whether or 
not the collision could have been foreseen~ anticipated, or avoided in the exerci~e 
of reasonable care. As to the damages, art is a g~ral rule that one who neglig~;m.t­
ly inflicts a personal injury on anoLher is respon ble for all the Ill effects 
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Htic:h, conE>iderin the condition of health in which the plaintiff was when he re-
cef ved t he i n.N_ry:, nat_urally and gecessar~ y follow su~:h injury. Hence a defendantis 
Li&o~ ity is in no way lessened or affected by reason of the fact that the injuries 
l'lOuld not have resulted had the plaintiff been in good health * * *". 
'.1~CR.TS 202 Va.646. 
P owned a house which was neated by natural gas furnished by D. The pipe from the 
Gtreet main to the property line was owned by D, and the pipe from there to the base-
ment was owned by P. Without any warning, there was an explosion which killed P who 
was watching television in a room over the furnace. Before the explosion A smelled 
gas on the outside of the house. After the explosion D dug up the pipe. That owned 
by D was in good condition while that owned by P showed signs of a fracture. The 
jury found in favor of P's personal representative. The trial judge set the verdict 
aside as contrary to the evidence. 
Held: Affirmed. The source of the leaking gas was not proven, but rested soley on 
surmise. The doctrine of re~ ipsa~~~ is not applicable as P had control of,and 
was responsible for, a portion of the line. P's personal rep~esentative had failed 
to prove that D was negligent. 
TORTS 202 Va. 731. 
p worked on the second floor of a manufacturing plant. Some of the madhinery broke 
down, and while waiting for it to be repaired) P stepped out on the metal fire 
escape for a smoke~ It was ~ark and there was a drizzling rain falling. When he was 
through with his cigarette he flipped it into the street below. In doing so his hand 
struck an uninsulated electric ~ire maintained and controlled by the City of Richmond 
He suffered severe injuries. He 'first sued the City but lost because he had not 
given the City the statutory 60 days notice required for the maintenance of such an 
action. He is now suing the D Electric Co. which furnished the electricity. It is 
admitted that the wire in question was placed too close to the fire escape. There 
was no evidence that D knew this fact, or that D owed any duty to supervise,repair, 
or inspect wires strung by the City. 
Held: For D. In the absence of actual knowledge that it was feeding electricity 
into wires improperly placed by another, and of a duty to inspect same, there was no 
violation of any duty owed P by D and hence no negligence on D's part. 
TORTS Immunity frgm Snit 202 Va.452. 
The Elii'abeth River Tunnel District v1as created by the legislature for a declared 
public purpose to construct and operate a bridge-tunnel system across the Elizabeth 
River. Its activities are by statute stated to be governmental in nature. The project 
as constructed does not permit use by pedestrians. To provide for them the District 
entered into a contract with the Virginia Transit Company under the terms of which 
severa~ busses are operated by the Company which controlled the actual operation and 
repair of the busses· and employs the persons necessary for such operation. P was 
injured as the result of the negligence of the operator of a bus. She secured a judg-
ment against the District and the Compa~y. Both claimed immunity from suit on the 
ground that they were State agencies engaged in work of a governmental nature. 
Held: The Tunnel District is Dffinune from suit except in so far as the State has 
consented to its being sued. '!'here is no such consent, as far as tort liability is 
concerned. The Tunnel District is part of the State highway system. The fact that the 
act creating it provides that it can sue and be sued creates only procedural rights 
and is not a waiver of immunity. It was then held that the Virginia Transit Company 
wae an independent contractor and not a State agency, and that it had no such 
immunity. 
TORTS ~~lieence 202 Va.752. 
D owned a truck. Since it was to be driven for a long di stance empty he deflated 
the ti.res to a pressure of 30 pounds. At the end of the trip and before reloading 
he asked P, a service station operator, t o inflate to 90 pounds. The tire assembly 
was held in place only by the air pressure . It came apart while being inflated and 
injured p ~1ho sued D on the theory that when one person puts a thing in charge of 
,. 
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::. ;;other which he knows, or in the exercise of due care should have known, to be 
.:la.ngerous, he owes a duty to such person to warn him of the danger. 
Beld: For D. There was no evidence to in~tcate that he knew or should have known 
anything was wrong. D was under no duty to have an expert mechanic examine the tire 
assBrnbly when he had no reason to suspect anything was wrong. Since the tires were 
~mder the control of P when the accident occurred the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
has no application. 
TORTS--Res ipsa loguitur 202 Va.826 
p owned a radio tower. D owned an unfenced parkway lot nearby on which he kept a 
number of second hand cars and trucks for display and sale. The parking lot land 
sloped in the direction of the radio tower. J.ights on the parking lot were turned 
off about llp.rn. each night. Among the cars parked on this lot was a heavy truck. 
There was evidence that D had the truck in its lowest gear with brakes set. In some 
unexplained way the truck rolled down the incline and ran into P1 s radio tower 
damaging it so badly it had to be rebuilt. The truck was not damaged. On examination 
it was found to be in neutral with the brakes completely off. P sued D. The court 
instructed the jury that if it believed from the evidence that D's truck ran off its 
parking site into P's tower, these facts raise a prima fac~ presumption that defend-
ant failed to use reasonable care. 
Held: This was error. The instruction above should not be given unless the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur applies. It d~es not apply in this QaB s D did ot have ex-
clusive control of the cars in t ~ ot. The accident could have been due to 
causes or which D was not responsible. ~orne trespasser may have changed gears and 
released the brakes as a prank or even maliciously in the early morning hours. Where 
the injury may be due to one of several causes for some of which D would be liable 
and for some of which he would not be liable there is no presumption that the 
damages were due to D's fault and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no applica-
tion. 
TORTS--nama rmanent". 121 S.E.369. 202 Va. 900. 
In an ac ~on or personal injuries growing out of an automobile accident the only 
issue was the amount of damages. The Court instructed the jury in part as follows, 
"You may also consider the nature, character, extent and duration of her injuries, 
wheth~r temporary or permanent and their effect, if any, in the future." The only 
evidence that there was any permanent injury was Dr. Wis testimony that he thought 
pt s shoulder blades would give her trouble and "that's going to be prolonged". 
Held: Error to give any instruction about a permanent injury when there was no 
e~dence of any such i nj ury. "'Prolonged' implies ultimate c~re. 'Permanent' implies 
that there will be no cure·" Reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
TORTS 121 S.E.373· 202 Va. 948. 
p was a passenger in a private contract carrier bus owned by D which carried cer-
tain passengers to and from their work for a charge of $3,00 per week. When P was 
about to get off, the street gutters were overflowing from a storm. The street was 
some six lanes wide counting two parking lanes. The bus driver straddled the second 
and third lanes from the west side at a 4.5 degree angle so that he could discharge 
p in a dry spot. Traffic in the rear of the bus had to either wait or to pass the 
bus in the first west lane or in a lane on the other side of the bus which was being 
used for traffic in the other direction. As P alighted he was instantly struck by a 
bicycle which was passing the bus in the lane nearest the west sidewalk. 
Held: A judgment for P even though supported by a jury verdict must be set aside 
and final judgment rendered for D. P is barred by his c~ributary pegUgence as a 
matter of law. There is no r oom for a difference of opinion. P should have looked 
to see whether anything was corni ng when he got off a bus stopped in the middle of 
the street at a 4.5 degree angle . 
/ 
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TuRTS 12 E ., 2 . l So .2d 375. ~O Va.913. 
P entered D's supermarket to buy a can of lemon juice. These cans were on a shelf 
just high enough to be out of her easy reach. She braced herself with her left hand 
by· grasping a shelf some thirty inches from the lemon juice and was in the act of 
getting it when some cans of V··B juice fell on her left hand. She did not touch the 
v ... a juice, which was piled four or five cans high. These cans were 2.2 inches in 
diameter and 4 inches tall. The trial judge gave summary judgment for D. 
~eld:(tw? judges dissenting) Affirmed. There is a chance that pts extra weight 
wh~le brac1ng herself caused the cans to fall so the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
has no application. What really happened is purely a matter of conjecture(Ground of 
d~ssent: The Co~rt s~ould have taken judici~l notice that cans of small circumference 
p1led four or f1ve h1gh might fall, and whether or not piling them that high on 
shelues that high was negligence should have been submitted to a jury). 
TORTS 121 S.E.2d 379l202 Va.9a6. 
While P' s car was stopped in a line of traffic by a car waitJ.ng to make a left turn 
Dis truck ran into it. D claimed that the accident was caused by a sudden mechanical 
failure of the brakes. An inspection of the br~ces after the accident showed that · 
they did not work and it was admitted by all that the accident had not affected the 
brakes. There was expert testimony to the effect that their failure might have been 
due to an air pocket. They worked up to within a few feet of the collision. The 
trial judge struck defendant's evidence. 
Held: Error~ This could have been an unavo~?able accident as D claimed. He was 
entitled to have a jury pass on his theory w 1ch had some support in the evidence. 
Note: Be sure to see this cas~ on another point on p.593 of the Pleading and 
Practice Cases. 
TORTS Malicio~osecution 121 SoE.2d 466,202 Va•1001. 
The X Onion ~~ttempting to wrest control of the employees of the S Plant from 
the Y Union. It had four organizers who distributed pamphlets to employees of that 
plant as they went to work. One of these employees, R, was a member of the Y Union. 
She filled her water pistol with a bluish liquid and squirted D who was one of the 
organizers for the X Union. D swore out a '~>Tarrant against R, and also against P who 
was an organizer for the Y Union. D's reason for including P was that he was con-
fident that P had put R up to the squirting since P was the local leader of the Y 
Union. Before swearing out this warrant D consulted L, a lawyer. D failed to make a 
reasonable investigation of the facts and hence failed to tell L some, and misstated 
other, material matters. L then ad,is ed that the warrants be obtained. There was 
clear evidence of malice by D against P. R. was convicted, but the case against P 
was nolle prossed when no evidence could be f ound to support it. P then sued D for 
malicious prosecution and was given a ,judgment on a jury verJ::i:ct for $5,000. D 
contends that since he acted on advice of counsel he was privileged to institute the 
action, that the damages were excessive, and that the following instruction was 
erroneous, 11 The court instructs the jury that, if you find from a preponderance of 
the evidence that the plaintiff has esta~lished t he essential elements of his cause 
of action, as defined in other instructions of the court, against the defendant,then 
the plaintiff is entitled, without f urther proof, to recover d.amages(note that 
"if any11 is omitted) for: 
(1) The harm to his reputati on which(normally) resulted from such an accusation as 
that which was brought agai nst hi m; and(2) The disgrace which(normally) resulted 
from the initiation of such proceedings." The word "normally" was deleted by the 
court without objection from D. 
Held2 Affirmed. Since D failed to make a full and fair di sclosure to his attorney 
the rule that one who acts in good faith on such advice i s immune from liability has 
no application. The instruction 1vas based on the rule set forth in #670 of the 
Restatement of the Law of Torts, and the law as there stated was expressly approved. 
In a case of this sort general damages are presumed . Hence the qualification "if 
any" with reference to the damages is not required. While the word "normallyn 
should have been included in the two places indicated, D's failure to object to its 
being stricken by the court was an acquiescense thereto. Nor is $5,000 general 
damages so high as to be unreasonable in the light of all the circumstances. 
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"'ORTS--Guest or Pa~ng Passenger-contributory Neglige~e l24S.E.2dl91,203 Va.372 ., 
D ownecf a car in ew yo'rk. She andh'er friend, P, decided to vist Williamsburg. 
D and P each put $5 into a "kitty" to defray the automobile expenses of the trip. 
'l'hey each put in more money from time to time as needed. The 11kitty11 was in a 
separate pUrse in D's possession. When D entered an intersection against two stop 
signs and a red light her car was struck by X's car and P was injured. Prwas sitting 
on the front seat but failed to warn D that she should stop in obedience to the 
signal and signs. The trial judge ruled (l)that P was a paying passenger rather 
th,an na guest without payment" and hence D owed a duty not to be ordinarily negligent 
and (2) that P was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in fail-
ing to warn D of what she was doing. He therefore refused to give any instructions 
on contributory negligence. 
Held: Affirmed. She was being carried for a consideration and hence the guest 
statute about gross negligence had no application. There was no evidence to indicate 
that up to the time of the accident D had driven carelessly. A passenger may assume 
that his driver will use due care until he has been given reason to believe the 
contrary. In the instant case P did not have time to give a warning after she dis-
covered that D was driving improperly. Since there was no evidence of contributory 
negligence, no instruction on that matter could have properly been given. 
TORTS--Pleading and Practice 203 Va.378 
While P was in D's super market a customer knocked a bottle of starch from a shelf. 
It broke when it hit the floor and its contents spilled over a circular area of some 
.five feet in diameter near the entry to one of the check-out collnters. The manager 
immediately closed this counter, sent one of the employees for a mop, and posted a 
guard to warn the customers of the condition of the floor. While the guard was 
directing a child to another check-out counter, and just as the man who had been 
sent for a mop arrive~ on the scene, P, who had turned around to call to one of her 
grandchildren, stepped into the starch, slipped, and fell, suffering injuries. She 
sued D. Assuming proper motions, if needed, 
(a) If the jury find for D, what, if anything, should the trial judge do? 
(b) If the jury find for P, what, if anything, should the trial judge do? Give 
reasons in each case. 
Held: 'rhere is no negligence on D1s part as a matter of law. Reasonable people 
could not differ. Hence if the jury find for D, judgment should be entered for D. 
If the jury find for P, the verdict shoQld be set aside as contrary to tho evidence 
or without evidence to support it, and ,judgment entered forD as provided by V#B-352. 
In the above case the jury found for P and the trial court entered judgment on the 
verdict. Held reversed and final judgment for the defendant. 
TORTS--Res Ipsa Loquitur 203 Va ,124 S.E.2d889 
P, a two and one half year old cbild, his mother and her mother entered D's store 
so that the mother of P could assist her mother in the selecti on of a dress. There 
were two rooms at the rear of the store. One of these was used as a dressing room, 
and the other as a combination dressing and storage room. While P's grandmother was 
in the dressing room P unexpectedly broke loose from his mother and ran pell mell 
into the other room. Ther e was a terr ifying crash , A large full length mirror had 
fallen on Pl He recovered a verdict of ~20 ,000 upon which judgment was entered. 
Held:The child >vas an invitee and not a mere licensee. Hence there was an affirma-
tive duty of care owed to him. Bllt it vJas error to give an instrllction under the 
theory that the doctrine of' ~ ipsa_loquitur was applicable. The room was one open 
to the general public so D did not have exclus ive control over the mirror. D testi-
fied that the mirror was kept back of some dress racks and tnat it wa8 not in use at 
the time as there was another mir ror attached to the wall. P1 s mother testified that 
it was leaning against t he wall with its base on a polished floor. How it got there, 
and for how long,was not. shown by tne evidence . The doctr i ne of.!'~~~ loquitur is 
inapplicable if the accident 1nay have very well happened without D's fault,and it is 
also inapplicable where the evidence of the cause of the accident is just as access-
ible to the plaintiff as it is t o the defendant. i(eversed and remanded for a new trial 
TORTS--Pleading & PI;actice TORTS P,28 203 Va.472. 
P and D were carpenter~ working for the X Corporation. P was under a duty to get 
on the job a few minutes ~ early as he was custodian of the tools. D was also under a 
duty to arrive a little early to prepare ice water for the other workers. D negli-
gently ran into p with his car while each was preparing to perform the duties 
mentioned above. P sued D, and D filed a plea in abatement to the jurisdiction of 
Court. 
Held: Plea sustained. Here there was an accident occurring during and arising out 
of the employment as both men were then charged with duties even though the regular 
1-vork day had not started. Hence p1 a only remedy is under the Workmen 1 s Compensation 
Law which is administered by the Industrial Co~tission and not the courts. 
TORTS--Municipal Corporations--Go~ernmental or ~Qp~tary? 203 Va.551 
P was i nJured when the car in whiCh he was r1 ng ntt a .tree trunk which was pro-
j ecting a car's width into a Norfolk street and which was not lighted. The City 
showed that Hurricane Donna had passed by a few hours before leveling some 800 
trees across the streets and that it was doing everything humanly possible to make 
the streets passable for emergency equipment. 
Held: No liability. The ole~ ng of the etFs9ts of debris where there has been a 
disaster resulting from an act of God is~overnmental function in the performance 
- / of which the City has the immunity of the S:ate.(In fact the r~gular remoyal of 
g<i!bage is a governmental fn pcti on, 152 Va.278 ,288). ... 
TORTS 203 Va.596. 
A felon, F, was known to be in a certain house and heavily armed. C, . th~ Chief of 
Police, requested D, a member of the Virginia State Police Force, ~d P who had 
been specially deputized, to help in F's apprehension. It was 4:30a.m. and foggy 
and dark. By prearrangement D stationed himself at the back door while C accompanied 
by P knocked at the front door. As an~icipated F ran out the back door with a gun. 
D fired at him and missed. P heard the shooting and ran towards it. In the dark D 
mistook P for F and shot him in the arm. P sued D. 
Held: For D. He was confronted with a sudden emergency. The shooting was acciden4· 
al, and P assumed the risk of being mi~taken for F in the dark. Note: The court thus 
found it unnecessary to decide whether D was protected from suit by the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. 
TORTS--Landlord and Tenant--Negli~ence 203 Va.638. 
L and T=Wufe Iathllota and t enan • The lease provided tha~ L would keep the premises 
in repai.r. T complained that the upstairs shower leaked causing water to come through 
the ceiling onto the kitchen floor. L hired X to make the necessary repairs • . However 
the leak continued and T slipped and, fell in some water on the kitchen floor. T 
failed to prove that X had been negligent. There was evidence that X's use of 
ttpermatext• was at least one proper way to repair the defect. 
Held: For L. The rule in this State is that negligence cannot be inf·erre<;i from the 
mere fact that the trouble continued after it was ~~upposed to ha:ve been fixed. L is 
not--an nsurer that the defect has been remedied. 
TORTS-Fraud 203 Va. 760. 
Dairy~ueen of Virginia, Inc. is a Virgin:i.a Corporation which owns several stol'es 
and .has contracts with a number of operators in Virginia. Its stock was owned by A 
and B. Things were not going too well, so A and B placed an advertisement in the 
Wall Street Journa.l to. the general ef fect that they would sell the stock for $301 000 
and that the business made a gross profit of some $25,000 per year. P saw the adver-
tisement and. paid $25,000 cash and gave his notes for $5,000 for the stock. Before 
P, who was an experienced businessman, bollght the stock he went over the books of 
the Corporation .and asked the auditor whatever questions he wished. The books had 
been properly kept. A and B did not in.form P that there was general dissatisfaction · 
on the part of the operators, that some of t he s tores would not reopen . next season 
(the stores closed in the winter months), and that one of the stores needed repairs. 
Heldt pis not entitled to any relief. Since P made a partial investigation and 
TORTS P.29. 
'ras at liberty to make a fuller one, he relied upon his investigation and not on an:· 
misrepresentations of A and B. Quoting Chancellor Kent, 11 The common law aff ords 
every one reasonable protection against fraud but does not go to the romltic lengt h 
of giving indemili ty against t.he consequences of indolence and folly or a careless 
i ndifference to the ordinary and accessible means of information". P could have 
talked to the various operators and inspected the stores. 
TOR'rS--l~u? sance 203 Vao 711 .. 
I. D operates a coal processing plant ir.. an industrial area. Some six tons of dirt 
and waste material come from its smoke stacks every day and some of this settles on 
pts farm. The T Power Co. operates a steam generating plant about two miles away 
and some white ash therefrom also settles on P's farm. P sued D for damages. The 
Court instructed the jury that P could not recover any damages from D unless he 
proved what part of the damages were caused by D and what part by T. 
Held: Error. The inst1~ction could be understood as requiring P to prove the 
exact amount of damage caused by each. This would be an impossibility. P need only 
prove the proportion within a reasonable degree of certainty. 
II. The Court also instructed the jury that they should take into consideration the 
location of D's plant, its operation, the nature of the surrounding community with 
respect to the purposes for which it is adapted, and all other pertinent circum-
stances, and determine whether defendant's operations were unreasonable. 
Held: Error. The instruction is vague, lays down no standards, invites specula-
tion, and incorporates a principle of law that has been repudiated over and over 
in Virginia. In his t e o n's ri hts are not measured by another man's 
~· P had certain natural rights to reasonably fresh au ~n he canoo e_ epriv-
ed of them witlillut-DLs-pa~ng_him_damages just because P lives in an industrial 
~ N~ There wa~ no need 11 to balance the equiUes 11 a.s P_did.__n sk for an 
injunct!_Qn. 
TORTS--Joint Adventure--Independent Contractor 203 Va.740 
In the cons t ruction of a public school, W was the general contractor who had 
general supervision of the site, G was a subcontractor for the excavation work, and 
the status of R who operated the excavation machinery was in dispute. One piece of 
this machinery needed repairs. R took this piece from the job and negligently left 
the bowl off the ground while he went to get a replacement part. P, a nine year old 
boy, was killed as a proximate result of this negligence. There was evidence that R 
was a sub-subcontractor who leased G's equipment, that he was under G's control and 
hence G's employee, and that R and G were engaged in a joint venture each having an 
equal voice. P's personal representative sued W, G and R. The trial court struck 
plaintiffs evidence so far as W and G were concerned and plaintiff appealed. 
Held: It was error to strike this evidence as far as G was concerned for it was a 
jury question as to whether or not G wa.s a joint adventurer or an employee or an 
independent contractor. If R was either of the first two, G would be liable. But it 
was not erro:c to strike the evidence as to w. A princi pal is not 1· o rtf 
of his independent contractor unless the lJork without creatin 
nu 1s a case o ilit or involves a non-delegable 
General supervision over the site for the purpose of seeing that su -con rae o s 
perform their contracts does not give the principal contractor control of his sub-
contractors' employees. 
.!rORTs-.. plead~n~ and practice ·'J:TORTS p.~~ -- -::17<.¥ .;:> 203 va.876. 
D was dr'iv ng a car through a cdt~tr1r~igh~ which i1 tersected Route 2 in the 
out so that the drivers of cars on these highways could not see each other until 
tlJey reached the intersection. D failed to see a stop sign just before he came to 
Route 2. As he entered he was struck by X's car on Route 2 and P, who was a gratuit-
ous guest in D's car, was injured. The trial judge ruled that D was guilty of gross 
negligence as a matter of law and submitted the case to the jury for the sole 
purpose of assessing the damages. 
Held: Error. Reasonable people could differ as to whether or not D was guilty of 
gross negligence. Hence it was error to take this issue from the jury. Reversed 
and remanded. 
TORTS--Common Carriers 203 Va.892. 
P telePfioned the D Corporation for a taxi. It sent one driven by X who by chance 
knew P, and who had taken her on trips an~dates. While X was taking her to her 
destination he said to her, 1tHum, I ain't got no money and I ain't made no money 
today." P replied to the effect that X needn't think she was going to give him any 
(other than the fare). This answer infuriated X and he struck P with such force that 
she needed medical attention. P sued D and X. Is D liable? 
Held: Yes. D is a common carrier of passengers and is under a duty to protect its 
passe ers from insu s an a uses o o ers an a or or rom nsui s an 
aouses of its own amp yees. ence t i s Irnm:ter iai that the argument in this case 
WAI over a private matter having nothing whatever to do with the employment. 
TORTS FG--l}d_ s-- t~<e.- f-/~ 203 Va.913. 
P wedt into D's store to purchase groceries. When she was standing close to the 
shelves, reaching ior a package of sugar, with her right foot under the bottom shelf 
which was a few inches above the floor, she put her weight on her right foot to 
turn, and her foot slipped on a small piece of celery which was dark inc olor and 
underneath the bottom shelf. Does P have at least a jury case? 
Heldz No. "In some jurisdictions the courts permit juries to speculate on how long 
a foreign substance had been on the floor or how it got there. Such decisions are 
in the minority. In theseminority decisions a description of the substance such as 
withered, old looking, dirty, or grimy has been held sufficient to allow the jury to 
infer that the substance had been on the floor a sufficient length of time to re-
uire the defendant in the exercise of reasonable care to have known of its presence' 
ut none of this in Virgj~al ~The plaintiff cannot be said to have made out a case 
for the jury when 'It is neces~~l _for _!_he jury to specu a~ o guess-Hl- C>oFder- t'o 
allow rec Y.Br.y." - - - - · - · 
TORTS Instruction on the ~of Negligence c:_.~ dl~ I 203 Va.934. 
In an atltomobite negngehcecase the Court [a;~ lthe foll6wing instructions, nsimpl· 
negligence is simply a lack of due care. And an absence of due care constitutes 
simple negligence. · In this case the plaintiff insists that she is entitled tore-
cover on the theory that the defendants, at the time of this accident, were failing 
to exercise due care and were therefore guilty of simple negligence." 
Held on appeal that the giving of such an instruction is reversible error. It 
leaves out any mention of proximate cause as an element of negligence. It puts undue 
emphasis on the degree of negligence by using the adjective Ksimple" over and over. 
It is argumentative rather than explanatory. It is not cured by a later instruction 
on proximate cause as the above instruction is inconsistent with the later one. 
The instruction is merely an attempt on plaintiff's part to have the court apparent-
ly agree with his theory of the case, and shoul~ refused. 
TORTS PleadiJ! and Practice 203 Va.955. 
B, L, J, and W went oUt in J's mother's car for a joy ride. While the car was 
going at a speed of some 85 miles an hour through an S curve where the maximum saf'e 
speed was 50 miles per hour it left the highway and J was killed and B and L were 
seriously injured. There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether B or L was 
driving. L sued B and J's estate alleging that B was grossly negligent and that he 
was J's agent. B counterclaimed alleging that L was driving in a grossly negligent 
TORTS P. 31. 
manner. J's personal representative counterclaimed alleg~ng that L was ordinarily 
negligent. The trial court refused to order separate trials on the counterclaims. 
The jury found for the counterclaimants and against L. Note: If one guest is driving 
th host's car he owes a duty of ordinary care to the h~ who cannot be a ues£ 
in his own car but is not lia ~he ~ts although the driver and the 
others are all equally guests)unless he is grossly negligent. This is because of 
the wording of the guest statute~V#B-646 .1 ) '*No person transported by the owner or 
operator of any motor. vehicle as a guest without payment---"· 
Held: Affirmed. Rule 3:8 provides that the court in its discretion may order a 
separate trial of any cause of action asserted in a co.unterclaim. There was no abuse 
of discretion here. The case is uncomplicated. The only matter in issue was whether 
L or B was driving. The fact that a different degree of care was owed J is not 
important as the jury could follow instructions. Further note: L in suing B contend-
ed the driver was grossly negligent. In defending the counterclaim L contended 
there was not sufficient evidence to show gross negligence. That is, if B were 
driving B was grossly negligent, but if L was the driver, L was not grossly negli-
gent. Held: L cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time. 
TORTS 204 Va.36 
As P approached a 400 foot two lane bridge he saw that D's car which was coming 
over the bridge towards P was in a skid. P at once stopped his car. D's car continued 
to skid, came over onto P's side of the road and struck P's car injuring both P and 
his car. The uncontradicted evidence showed that there was no ice on the approaches 
to the bridge, that D had gone over the bridge a short time before and encountered 
no ice, that D's car skidded 200 feet before striking P' a car, that it was very . . 
difficult to see the ice on the bridge from the driver's seat and that two other . 
cars skidded on the bridge at approximately the same time. The jury found for D. 
p appeals on the ground that the physical facts show D must have been travelling at 
an excessive rate of speed and that he was violating the statute by having his car 
on his left side of the highway. 
Held: Whether or not D was negligent was a jllry guestion. He was not negligent as 
a matter of law. A jury could find, and did find, that the accident happened without 
any fault on D's part. He did not voluntarily or intentionally drive his car on the 
left of the road. 
·roRTS De r 204 Va.41. 
D, while driving his car, struck P, a minor who a passed his 14th birthday but 
was not yet fifteen years of age. P was riding a bicycle. There was evidence to the 
effect that P was subnormal mentally--a high grade moron. What degree of care does 
p owe so as not to have been guilty of contributory negligence? 
Held: Since he is over 14 years of age he is not entitled to the benefit of the 
rebuttable presumption that a child over 7 and under 14 is presumed to be incapable 
of negligence. But 'since he is still a child(no upper age indicated)the general 
rule is that he mus£ exerc~se that amount of care expected of a child o£ like age, 
~rience, discretion and know or not he did so i n the i nst ant case 
shou ave een left to the jury. 
·---TORTS Negligence Trespass / vcs.;:..~ss 204 Va.81 
D owned a railroad and was in possession of a certain freight train made up of a 
diesel engine followed by a caboose and fifty frei ght cars. It proceeded along a 
siding until it reached a switch. This switch had been tl~own so that the train 
could go over to the main track. After 9 cars had passed over to the main track the 
train was stopped for a proper purpose for about two minutes. During this period a 
muscular five year old boy threw the switch back to its original position. To do 
this the boy had to remove an S shaped hook, lift a 30 pound weight to an upright 
position and let the weight down in a reversed position. This was the first time 
in forty years that anyone had tampered with one of D's switches. Within a moment 
or two after the switch had been thus tampered with and in ignorance thereof, 
employees started the train. After it had proceeded a few ear lengths and reached a 
speed of five miles an hour the engineer thought something was wrong. And there wasl 
TORTS p;,32 
'J.'hc: cars back of the flWit.ch proceeded up th~ s:J.de track they were on, became derai1 , 
ed, and ran into P1s building. P sued D for the resulting damage on both negligence 
and · trespass theories . 
Held: No liability. There was no negligence on D's part. 
suppose anything of this nature might happen. It cannot be 
to guard against the highly improbable. The sole proximate 
the act of an irresponsible person. There is no li 
It had no reason to 
expected to post a guard 
cause of the accident was 
s to 
tl!e better view s ' ' pt 
voluntary, mistaken, or negligent one. It was not 
ac1Givity. Nothlng 1S t o be galned by shifting the 
aQ£ther such- persoey. 
on ~t was not a 
engaged in an extra hazardous 
loss from one innocent person to 
TORTS VinJ:at.i op of Stt3tute Proximate Ca.J;!se 204 Va.96 
While D's car was approaching the deceased some 300 feet away, the latter was in 
the act of crossing a street between intersections. D did not slow down but attempt-
ed to pass in front of deceased by veering to D's left. This caused deceased to be-
come confused and while he was hesitating as to whether to keep on going, or go back, 
he was struck and killed. D now contends that even if he was negligent, deceased's 
personal representative is barred from recovery because it is negligence as a 
matter of law by stat11te for one to cross a street between intersections. 
Held: Whi le deceased was ~lilt of_negligence) a jury could ha e found ~hat the 
sole proximate cause of his de t: w s the n gligence L D- in ailing_ to slow_down 
an' n 1V ng to his l~ft. Hence a verdict against D should not be set aside. 
Deceased did not become an outlaw just because he was actin~ negligently. No 
mention was made of the last clear chance doctrine. 
TORTS Punit ive Damages W ) .< reo-u e ...-eel .~, cl€..t:_~t-cl h9~E,l~!-..-
X grossl y and wantonly injured P. Before trial X aied and D qualitfed~a~ 
administrator. P asked for an instruction on punitive damages but the Court refused 
to give such an instruction. 
Held: Affirmed. Since the object of punitive damages is to punish the wrongdoer 
and since this object is f rustrated by his death, no such damages can be recovered 
against his estate. 
TORTS 204 Va.390. 
D owned a right of way for its towers which supported high voltage lines. The 
tower in question was on the ridge of a mou~tain far from any road or place where 
children were apt to play. P, aged 12, climbed the tower and touched a high voltage 
wire which was 23 feet f~om the ground and suspended 3 feet from the tower. P has 
no recollection as to. how he climbed the tm..Jer. The cross bar nearest the ground 
was 7 feet from the ground. P could have "shinned" up a t ower support, used a 
grape vine or rope or pole or climbed up some bolts near the ground. 
Held: In the absence of evidence, there is no proof that D1s having bolts in the 
tower support close to the ground was the proximate ce ..uoe of P' s asce: d .ng the tower 
and touching a wire 23 feet high and 3 feet from the tower. Although D owed a high 
degree of care, since electrici ty is inherently highly dangerous, D is not liable 
1n the absence of proof that its acts or omissi ons caused the injury. The trial 
court properly· set aside a jury verdict ln favor of P. 
TORTS Blasting- Nuisance Dama~es 204 Va.414 
D used explosives in the operation of a quarry 500 feet from P1s home under a 
use permit secured from the County Board of Zoning Appeals. P1s home was built in 
1758 by a noted colonial architect but in the course of time large cracks had 
appeared in the walls and there had been considerable settling . P had to leave this 
home(which was built on the same ledge of rock that D was quarrying)when it appear-
ed that the front wall had buckled. Houses near by had not been damaged by D's 
blasting. The evidence showed that D's blasting amounted to a nuisance, but failed 
to show negligence. D contended that he was protected by his use permit. P sought 
an injunction, damages for inj ury to the house, and for costs of moving. The 
Chancellor allowed the last ite~ only and both P and D appealed. 
TORTS P .. 33 
Hel d: Affirmed. The us e penni t could not authorize D tocommi t a nuisance since t h::·. 
c~.~unty itself could. have given no such authority. ID the case of a nuj sance there 
;n~y ·be liability without. negligence. No damage to the house as a result of the blast-
ing was proved with reasonable certainty. What portion of the damage, if anv, was 
due to blaeting, and what portion to natural deterioration over the centurieswas a 
matter of pure speculation and conjecture. This is not enough. But an award of 
damages of the cost of moving because of D's acts is not plainly wrong and hence 
will be affirmed. 
TORTS C~venant not to ue e 204 Va.428 
L own rucks and tractors to according to mileage 
driven. By the terms of the lease G was to hire the drivers and furnish gasoline and 
oil; L was to keep the vehicles in repair; L was to obtain insurance for himself and 
G who was to be a coinsured; G was not to be liable for any damage done to the 
vehicles whether due to its negligence or not: and the insurance was to expressly 
provide that no insurer would be subrogated to any of L's rights against G. One of 
the vehicles was damaged by the negligence of D, an employee of G. L sued D's 
administrator. The lower court held that the lease in effect contained a covenant 
by L not to sue G, and that a covenant not to sue G barred an action against G1 s 
employees. 
Held: Reversed and remanded~ The following distinctions were drawn: 
(a) A release of one joint tort feasor even with a reservation of rights against i ~ 
another is a release of a;Ll joint tort feasors. 
(b) A release of the employer is a release of a negUgent employee. 
(c) An accord and satisfaction with one joint tort feasor coupled with a covenant 
not to sue that tort feasor and with a reservation of rights against another tort 
feasor is a discharge of the latter. 191 Va.306; and now the instant case which is 
different: 
(d) A covenant not to sue an employer without any accord and satisfaction by the 
employer and made before any cause of action arose is not a bar to an action against 
~ an employee. The covenant or promise not to sue was clearly meant for the protection 
of G and no one else. Nor is there a release for at the time thf- lease was made 
there was no claim to release. · 
TORTS Ch~itable Hospital Immunity 204 Va.50l. 
p was injured when she fell out of bed while a pati ent at the D Charitable 
Hospital. There were no side rails on her bed. 
Held: C itable hospitals are not liable to a r 
~ tort, corpora e or otherwise. save failure to use due care in the seJection end 
retention of personnel. This is our settled public policy. Otherwise there is 
danger that the hospital's ability to do charitable work will be lessened by a dis-
sipation of its resources. If this policy is to be changed, the change should be 
made by the legislature. (A bi ll modifyi ng our present rule was defeated in the 
1962 Session) . Note: Thi s immunity does not extend to cas es in which non-benefici-
~ I • 1 ..J • aries of the char1ty are 1pva v eu as a v1 sitor to see a pat1ent. 
TORTS Contributory Negligence Last Clear Chance 204 Va.509 
p parked his car in the mr&dle of the block and then proceeded to cross the street 
to a store. In so doing he violated V#46.1-230 forbidding crossings at other than 
intersections when not necessary . There were other cars parked on both sides. There 
wer e cars coming from both directions. P watched his chance and made it to the 
center line. While standing ther e wai t ing for an opportunity to get across the next 
lane he was struck by D who was approaching from the opposite direction to the 
traffic that P was watching. D wa.s not negligent in not seeing P sooner, and he did 
everything possible to avoi d striking him after he saw him. If P had jumped into the 
next lane he would have been hit by a passing car. D 
Held: P was gui lty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, and since never 
had a last clear chance t o avoid stri king P tha t doctri ne has no application. The 
center of a street can no l onger be regarded: as a camparat.jve z.o.ne_of_s•fety. 
-
TORTS P. 34 
TORTS'" Skiddi on Lane as Negligence 204 Va. 601. 
TNhile . D was going down a moun a1n on nding road(Route 60) at a speed of 25 
mil es per hour in the rain and while leaves were on the highway she skidded int~ th€ 
opposite lane of tra~el hitting P's car. D's car was in good ~echanical condition. 
\fuen she started to skid she applied the brakes a little harder to no avail. P sued 
D and the jury found for D. The trial judge set the verdict aside and ordered a new 
trial on the issue of damages only. The jury at the second trial awarded her .~15,000 
which the Court approved. 
Held: Reversed and first verdict re-instated, and all proceedings thereafter 
annulled. It is nQLne.gli~ _§!, but only- presumptive erid.ence of neglig_ence 
to be in the w~g_l~e. In the instant case it was at least a jury question as to 
whether D .was driving too fast, or acted with due care at the time of the skidding. 
The jury should have found for D if the members thereof believed she was free from 
negligence, or, since P had the ultimate burden of proof, for D if they believed 
the evidence was in equilibrium. Hence it was error to set aside the first verdict. 
TORTS Unlawf.'ul Speed v. Unreasonabl e Speed 204 Va.624 
V#46.1-221 read~ 11 -!HH<The driver of any vehicle travelling at an unlawful speed' 
shall forfeit any right of way which he might otherwise have hereunder" and only\ 
applies to cases involving the general right of way in favor of the driver on the 
right. V#46.1-222 reads in part, "The driver of a vehicle, in an intersection and 
turning therein or approaching the intersection shall yield the right of way to 
such other vehicles. 11 
~ Held: That under the above statutes that one approaching an intersection at an nreasonable speed does not forfeit his right of way to one making a left turn therein, and that such speed is material only on questions of negligence and whether the party making the left turn was acting reasonably in thinking that it could be made with safety. 
·-TORTS Injury to 7 year Old Child 204 Va.634 • 
. While Jj was dn .vi ng h1s car at a speed of ten miles an hour along a street in 
which to his knowledge children were accustomed to play, P a 7 year old child rode 
out into the street on a tricycle from between two parked cars. D's bumper struck 
the tricycle and it became wedged between the bumper and the street. D testified 
that he thought he would do less injury to I:' if he came to a gradual s ·top than if 
he ground the tricycle and boy on the pavement by stopping suddenly in a slidding 
stop. The jury found forD, and P appeals. 
Held: Affirmod. There is nothing to show negligence on D's part. He was confronted 
with a sudden emergency. It was for the jury to determine whether he acted reason-
ably at the time of the emergency even though what was done appeared afterwards to 
have been the wrong thing. 
TORTS Liapil j t ;y of Charitable Hospital t g .Pl:ina:tQ Wurse 20L~ Va. 703. 
D was a charitable hospital and under Virginia law immune from suits by recipients 
of its charity except for negligence in the choice of, or keeping of hospital 
personnel. P was a special nurse paid by her patient who was a helpless old man in 
a semi private room. X was a powerful 17 year old youth weighing some 190 lbs. xrs 
leg was broken in an automobile accident and he l"as put in the other bed in the 
room. His leg wae placed in traction by a weight ·and pulley device. When X learned 
that one of his friends had been killed in the accident he had some sort of a 
mental breakdown and threatened to·· kill those about him. He was restrained by 
hospital personnel and given a sedative. Despite the fact that these episodes; 
continued he was not remov~d from the room for special treatment. X got out of bed, 
jabbed p while her back was turned and threatened to throw the weights at her~ P 
attempted to push X back into the bed am became entangled in the traction weight-
pulley apparatus. She suffered a severe injury. Is D liable? 
Held: Yes$ p was not a recipient of the hospital's chariaable bounty,but had the 
status of an invitee. A jury cuuld and did find negligance on D's part. The Supreme 
Court of Appeals refused to broaden the qu.astionable doctrine of charitable immuni t.y 
,TORTS P.35 
TORTS ~ipaf Qgr pnrations Duty Owed Children Pla~ing in Street 204 Va.752 
The Ci ty of Norton, hereinafter=ea±-1&l~eed c4RFF@'te drainage pipes weighing 
900 lbs. each on the green between the sidewalk and the street parallel to each ethel 
and perpendicular to the sidewalk and street. No precautions were~ taken to prevent 
t hese pipes from rolling. P, a 12 year old girl, jumped up and down on one of the 
pipes. It started to roll and her leg was caught between two of these pipes as they 
came together. She was seriously injured. ~~aimed it owed no duty to persons play 
ing in the street, that it was not n~gligent, that even if it were, the sole proxi-
mate cause of the accident was P's act in playing on the pipe, and that P was barred 
by her contrib~tory negligence. The trial court struck P's evidence and P appealled. 
Held: It was error to strike P1 s evidence. It was a jury question(under proper 
instructions)as to whether or not D was negligent, P was contributorily negligent, 
and whether D's negligence, if any, was the proximate cause of the injury. 
The following statffinents on basic negligence law are of more than passing interest: 
(1) nrn **'.t-we pointed out that . when once it has been determined that an act is 
wrongful or negligent, the guilty party is liable for all the consequences which 
naturally flow therefrom, provided the injured party is free from contributory neg-
ligence. 'The precise injury need not have been anticipated. It is enough if the act 
is such that the party odght to have anticipated that it was liable to result in 
injury to others.'" {2) "'Where it is claimed that the defendant's act was not the 
proximate cause of the injury beca~se the result could not reasonably have been 
foreseen, it is ordinarily a question for the jury whether the result should reason-
ably have been foreseen. 111 
It was also held that, by the better view, a municipality owes the same duty of 
f are to provide a reaso~abl~ safe street to children playing in the street as it 
~oes to children travel1ng 1n the street. 
TORTS Violation .of -- s-tatute-Proximate cause 204 Va.893. 
P's intestate was walking on a dark highWay with his back to the traffic in viola-
tion of statute. A jury found that D struck P's intestate and killed him instantly 
while driving around a curve, on an unlighted highway, at a speed of some 37 miles 
per hour, on a dark, wet, misty night, with the headli ghts of his car on low beam, 
and that his negligence constituted the sole proximate cause of the accident. 
Held: While the conduct of P's intestate w&s(contributory) negligence as a matter 
of law, reasonable people might differ as to whether or not it was also a proximate 
cause or a remote cause of his death. In such a caso the question is for the jury 
and its finding will not be disturbed on appeal. 
TORTS Pleading and Practice Finding instruction 204 Va. 
D's taxi struck P1s truck at a street intersection. There was conflicting evidence 
from which a jury could have found thct both parties wero guilty of contributory 
negligence proximately causing the collision, or that P used due care while D was 
negligent, or ~t D used due care whil~ P was negligent. The court gave a finding 
instruction to the effect that if the jury believed P's eviC..ence(which, if true 
showed only that D was negligent)it sho~ ld return a verdict in P's favor. ' 
Held: Reversed and remanded. The ab~o~v~e~i~n~s~t~r7u~c~tl~·o~n~i~s~a~f~i~n~d~i~n~~~~~~1, and fails to take into consideration the that t that p 
ilt of contr1 u o the collision. 
TOR'l'S .Qj.ving of instructi one in t lle abs ence of evidence 205 Va.l 
p drove his car eastwardly from his private driveway on to u.s. Route 2?0 which 
runs north and south. He stopped before er.tering the highway and looked in both 
directions. He testified that he saw D1 s tractor trailer approaching from the 
south at an estimated distance of half a mile and thought he had plenty of time to 
enter the highway, make a left turn, and proceed in a northerly direction. Just as 
he completed his left turn his motor stalled. He succeeded in getting the car 
started, and when 75 feet north of hls point of entry he was struck frorr. the rear 
by D's tractor trailer the driver of which was kill ed. There was a clear view for 
at least 420 f eet. There was no evidence thnt the deceased driver had applied any 
brakes. The court gave an instructi on on thn l aw of sudden emer gency. 
tfbR'l'S P1 36• 
Heidi This was error. There was no evidence that there was any sudden emergency 
not due to D*s fault. No instructions should ever be given unless they are based on 
evidence in the case before the jury. 
TORTS UGtoreseeable conseQ~ence~ 205 Va.12 
D's servants installed an automatic washing machine without first removing certain 
shipping bands. When P used the washer it behaved like a beserk robot and frighten-
ed her to such an extent as to cause a moderate nervous breakdown and to aggravate 
other physical weaknesses. D aFgUed that he was not liable for such injuries as 
they were not reasonably foreseeable. Note the following language from the opinion. 
of the Supreme Court of Appeals: 
~ether reasonable care was exercised depends upon what a reasonably prudent 
person, with knowledge of the circumstances, ought to have foreseen in regard to 
the consequences of the act or omission. However, the precise nature of the con-
sequences need not be foreseen. ~~ Once the act or omission is determined to be 
negligent with respect to the injured party, the negligent party becomes liable for 
all the injurious consequences which result naturally from such act or omissionJI 
TORTS Mal 1 ci nus froeecnt:i on Effect of Acquittal 205 Va. 149. 
P•s dog severely bit D's daugHter. Under the l ocal law it became P1s duty to keep 
the dog confined for a certain period of time at a place within that county. P sent 
the dog to Massachusetts after having secured the permission of the Director of 
Health of said County. He had no authority to give such permission. D swore out a 
warrant against P for violation of the , County Ordinance. P was acquitted. P then 
sued D for damages for malicious prosecution and recovered substantial compensatory 
and punitive damages which the trial court refused to set aside. 
Heldt Reversed and final judgment entered for D. She had probable cause as a 
matter of law. If this is so it is immaterial that she acted maliciously. Moreover 
the action of malicious prosecution is for the benefit of the innocent, and the 
guilt of the plaintiff may be shown even though the plaintiff has been acquitted. 
Public policy favors the exposure of crime, and persons who expose it should not 
have to take chances on the ultimate conviction of the person exposed where such 
person is actually guilty or reasonably thought to have been guilty. 
TORTS--Watch Your Door& 205 Va.l53. 
P was fhjured wli'en she mistook a plate glass panel for an open door and walked 
through same. The door and panels on each side were of standard construction, 
approved by architects, and in general use. 
Held: A verdict and judgment thereon for P must be set aside since P was clearly 
guilty of negligence as a matter of law. R.eversed and final judgment. 
't::I;.~~~~~~=:Act Proof of Damages 
.- s e e that f t was error to case 
that in dete n dama es the ur ~ Ce&$ed'-s-in-e-e1.ligence and 
health whe:r.!LnQ evidence was offered on these matters. 
It w~ also held that a jury could ro erl consider d eased' a fe ~ectancy 
where ther as evidence or" his age--In death oases proof of life E!ltpectancy by 
mo~tal~ty_tables_is nQt requi~ed. 
-
TORTS ~aet C1ear Qbanoe 205 Va.l59 
pte intestate was struck and killed by D's car as P and his intestate were cross-
ing c Avenue. pte theory of the case was that her intestate was not gui lty of any 
negligence. D was driving at an excessive speed but P1s intestate stepped in front 
of n•s car immediately before being struck. The trial court gave an instruction on 
the last clear chance doctrine. 
Heldt Error. That doctrine does not a 1 jur:ed paz:.ty lola egligent, 
nor does it a 1 wh ~&-lor defen~ae 
ac \Wed pBJ!ty plaoed-himseJ.t. ·· position-of peril.- The doctrine 
pre-suposes that there was an opportunity for defendant to act. 
TORTS P. 37 
TID,RTS Collil,s ion w1 :Jib MuJ e Wandering on Hi~way at Night 205 Va.,l71 
D owned mule~ which were under the immediate control of S, a shrecropper. S 
violated inatruotiona as to the proper method of closing a gate or gap in the fence 
so that it was possible for a mule to put his he~d between some wires and lift up 
the gate . sufficieht~y to cause it to fall flat on the ground. At any rate nrs mules 
escaped from the enclosure and were wandering on the highway at night when P ran 
into one and was injured when his truck overturned. The gate was lying flat on the 
ground. The mules had·--never escaped before and no one can tell for sure hot-J" the 
mules escaped. 
Held: Verdict and judgment for P must b~ set aside and f'il'..al judgment entered for 
D. He is liable only if he was negligent and his negligence was a proximate cause 
of the injury. Here we have' only conjecture and .peradventure. P had tl1e burden of 
provir.g that D's(or Sts) negligen~e caus~ the injury. No one knows how the mules 
got outo Some third party may have opened the gate. It is not up to D to prove 
that a third party opened the gate, but for P to prove that the escape of the mules 
was due to S's negligence. This he has not done. 
TORTS M~stciool Corporations Less9r ... J.as::;ee 205 Va.298. 
The R i~ and the C Church made an agreement which was carried out to the effect 
that the C Church would convey a certain church annex to R, that R would let C use 
part of the premises on Sundays for churoh purposes, and that R would keep the 
premises in good repair. P, while attending Sunday School walked along a corridor 
and was struck on the foot by a falling 35 pound fire extinguisher that had been 
improperly installed on the wall and severely injured. Is he entitled to recover 
damages from the City which was using the building on week days for public welfare 
purposes? 
Held: Yea. In effect the City of R was leasing a portion of the premises to the 
c Church. P was invited to use the premises for the purpose for which he was using 
them. The City was under a duty to use reasonable care in the maintenance of these 
premises to all persona who came thereon in the right of the C Churoh. The City 
was not en . · n(and hence immune from suit) when i t 
entered into the above agreement with the C Church. 
TORTS Slip~g_on-wet floor 205 Va.406. 
P entered a s t ore while it was raining. The floor thereof had a plastic covering 
which was slippery when wet. P slipped and was awarded a $10,500 verdict for 
damages sustained. The trial court set aside the verdict and P appealed. The evi-
dence was in conflict as to whether or not D had a cocoa mat at the entrance to help 
prevent water from being tracked in and as to whether or not D had reasonable 
notice that the floor was wet and a reasonable time thereafter to mop up the water. 
No warning was given P of any danger. 
Held: Jury's ve~ict re-instated. Whether or not D was negligent or P was con-
tributorily negligent were questions for the jury. The jury could have found that 
n•s failure to warn, his failure to have the mat in position, and his failure to 
mop up the water amounted to negligence. The..,.Supreme Court of Appeals expressly 
repndiat.ed the rule of law in several jurisdictions that there can be no liability 
because the storekeeper has no control over the weather, cannot prevent some tracking 
in of water, and the customer ·knows as much about the weather and the danger of 
slipping on wet floors as does the storekeeper. 
' .. -' ... 
TORTS Municipal Corporations Liabilitl of contractor after acceptance of work 
- - 2o5 va.424 
A, a contractor, and B his subcontractor dug a sewer line for the City of R exa&t• 
ly as per specifications. R inspected the work almost every day. The line was 
laid and the ditch filled in in an approved manner. Then the City put some crushed 
rock on top and rolled it down. Then it put asphalt on top of the rook and rolled 
it down. After a heavy rain' the ditch settled almost a foot in one place. Although 
R had notice of this defect there was no light or barricade of any sort. P was 
injured when the front wheel of his car went into the depression. He sued R,A and B. 
TORTS P.38 
Held: R is liable, but not A or B. Dj.gg:L1:g a sewer line is not an extrA hazard ... 
(iUS undertaking and A and B cannot bo held since they were independent contractors 
whose work had been accepted by R. None of the exceptions to this rule apply in 
the above case. 
TORTS Customer slipping on !l~or 205 Va.409. 
P enterea Bi§ !tore arid was ·invite4 by E, an employee, to go to another counter :~ 
to see some merchandise, E preceded P. Someone had spilled some Coca-Cola on the 
floor and P slipped and fell. Can a verdict in her favor be sustained? 
Held: (the Chief Justice dissenting). Yes. A jury co.uld have found from the 
evidence that E should have seen the mess on the floor and warned P, that p could 
not have seen it because E was immediately in front of her and besides she was 
being asked to look at merchandise. Hence she was not barred by any contributory 
negligence. 
TORTS ~~~ Clear Chance 205 Va.69l. 
X, who was subject to epileptic seizures, was collecting cabbage leaves at the 
city dump and ·placing them in a box. As ha was about to cross D1 s railroad tracks 
he was taken with a seizure. He sat down on the track with the box in front of him. 
He was for the time being powerless to comprehend his danger and to escape there-
from. E waB the engineer of an approaching train. He saw the box but was un-
certain as to whether or not there was a human being ~n the track so he sounded his 
whistle and slowed down from 20 to 18 miles per hour. When he definitely discover-
ed that there was a man there it was too late to stop and X was killed. 
Heldt On the above facts jury could have found that D had a last clear chance to 
have avoided the accident. Even if X were in a position of danger due to his own 
negligence he was pewerless to escape. Under the rules laid down in the Greear 
Case(l97 Va.233 fo h estatement..-D:was under: a..d.u.t t.o_kee r..oper 
loo out to disoVer such a peril and act w' ~able care after he shQuld-have 
discover o ng own rom 0 to 18 miles while there was still time to 
iiQid running over a man could have been found by a jury not to have been reason-
able care. Hence it was error for the trial court to strike P's evidence. 
TORTS Mator Vendors of Ice Cream .eta. 205 Vae719 and 205 Va.727. 
Dl solo ice cream f rom his enclosed truck. He was parked for the time being on 
his righ~ half on the shoulder and half on the paved surface of the road. P was a 
five year Qld child who had crossed the road and purchased an ice cream cone. As 
he was returning to his side of the road he was struck by D2 who was dl~iving a car 
headed 1 n the opposite direction from that of the truck. P sued Dl and D2. The 
trial court struck P's evidence. 
Held~ Reversed and remanded. A ju.l.'y could have f ound that Dl was negligent in 
that he had parked his truck i n such P way as to ren~ar the highway dangerous to 
others(in that D2's view was :.,bstructo11 and so "1-ras P1s) in violation of V#h6.1-248. 
It could also have found D2 negligent :, :. ~. that he shoulc.1 have realized that children 
are apt to be near ice cream ··rendors' tn~0ks and hence should have slowed down 
enough to keep his car under C•.'ntrol in t.l-Je event a child darted out from behind 
the truck. 
TORTS Dul:y Owod? Legal causation t..vY~~ ~ ~ 205 Va.822 
A cartoad"'i5Fgrlifn was shipped from the mJ.d l·~cst o~er t e nes of the A Carrier, 
tbtion the N Carrier to Norfolk, and then to Belt. Line in Nor olk. It was the duty 
of p, wh~ was employed by the X Grain Elevator Gorporation, to help unload cars 
cf grain after X's engine had taken the cars fr o!,l Belt Line, and shunted therri to . 
the propel" lecation. After P had unloaded the ca.: · in questi on X 1 s engine ran into 
;tJ, gently se> as to couple it automatically. Thex 4 was a slight jolt after which a 
siiding door on the car in which P was standing f ell on P injuring him. P want~ 
vorkmen's o~mpensation from X; and damages from Be:~ Line and N. 
Jlelds p is, of course1 ent.j..t.]ed to workmen's compe~.8ation from hi s employer. This j.s the limit of P's rights as against him. But the \ !Odonent s compefleation act 
doelf not deprive P of his right to sue third parties 1o'ther than hi s fellow 
TORTS Po 39 
e'mpl~yees) for torts cormnitted by them. But N is not liable for negligence as it 
has not violated any duty it owed P. The only duty of a connecting carrier is to 
inspec:t cars given to it to see if they are in proper condition for transportatione 
If Belt Line is a terminal carrier it was under a duty to make a casual inspection 
to see if the car was safe for unloading. There was no evidence in this case t~ 
show that a casual inspection would have suffic ed to discover the defect, so it is 
imrna·terial that no inspection at all was made. Hence Belt Line's failure to lnspect 
'1-ras not, a legal cause of the injury. Nor does the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
apply as Belt Line did not have exclusive control over the car and its door. 
TORTS ~Bal Causation 205 Va.646. 
X, a titteen y9ai' 6ld boy, and an excellent swimmer, drowned in D's lake which 
was open to the public for a consideration. There were some 300 people in the lake 
at the time of X's death. No one heard any cry of distress. X just disappeared. 
His body was recovered after a ' search was instituted. There was some evidence that 
D had an insufficient force of life savers on duty. Because of this negligence a 
jury found for X's personal .representative. 
Held: Reversed • . Even if D were negligent, there is no proof that such negligence 
was a proximate cause of X's death. If there had been ten more life guards it is 
pure conjecture that any one of them would have noted that X was about to sink and 
drown as there was no reason to suspect that such a think was about to take place. 
The Court refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, as D did not have 
exclusive control over X. D was not an insurer of X's safety. 
TORTS G-re~ u . /J. 205 Va.903 
pts house was ~maged by~ttions when D, pursuant to contract with the State 
Highway Department, blasted rock in the construction of a new highway. The evidence 
indicated that D had an expert in charge of the operations and no negligence was 
proved. The trial court instructed the jury that D was absolutely liable for damage 
caused irrespective of negligence. 
Held: Error. D~ while ~erforming his contract with the State, in a proper manner, 
has the immunity~£ the St~e_tr_o~~~t. 194 Va.836 followed. 
- . 
TORTS Ne~ligepce trains blocking crossing 205 Va.949 
X malic1ously set fire to a building i n P's amusement park. A portion of the fire 
fighting ··~uipment was delayed because of moving trains of D blocking a street cross-
ing for fifteen minutes. There was an or~inance prohibiting the blocking of streets 
Q~traiQP for more than eight minutes. P ol~imed that as a result of this delay the 
fire got out of control and spread to other-buildings. 
Heldl(l) There was no violatiQn of the ordinance. It does not a 1 to moving 
t~ins. To hold otherwj se waul d he to~ en th of trains thus to 
interfere unlaWfull with interstate cornm~~ce. (2) Even ·if there was a delay caused 
by D's negligence, whether or not the other buildings would have been saved or 
destroyed under the facts of this case if there had been no delay was a matter of 
pure conjecture and speculation and would have been insufficient as a matter of law 
to have shown legal causation by a preponderance of the evidence. 
i f i.- r ~TORTS P~40 
TOT:TS VjiJ-rf\W'--~ .':>. 206 Vac45 
P, as an employee of X, delive d a truck load of lumber to D. P's only duty aftGr 
the lumber arrived was to loosen the chains around the lumber. D used a fork lift 
to unload the truck. The fork lift was equipped with a counterbalance. 1rJhen the 
load to be unloaded was extra heavy D requested the drivers of the trucks to stand 
on the counterbalance. In the instant case P did as requested and was injured when 
the fork 1 ~t unexpectedly til ted. P had frequently helped out D in this manner 
in the past. P collected >vorlonen's compensation from his employer, X, and is novr 
suing D in a court of laH claiming ·that the latter was negligent. D contends that 
this was an industrial accident and hence P' s ri hts are limite to ~e.c..QJl:.e:ry.. under 
wo~ hat, even if this is not so, P assumed the risk. 
Held: D ~ wropg. D_was a third party as far as P was concerned. P did not work 
forD and owed D no duty of help. Nor ' was there any eviden~e to indicate that P 
knew of any danger, and hence he could not have assumed the risk. 
N$-J.• If P reeovers a ainst · ur-
a .,.. · of com ensation r c 
Note 2. The Court permitted the jury to take the pleadings to the jury room. This 
was e1:-ror, but under the facts of this case, harmless error. 
TORTS Railwa · nflict of E · ce f~-1?-~.J- :· .~t.. ~~~ J. 2~.9~ ~.)-»-
K was w en an automobile he was driving .w(;ls struck broad~ide by D's fre~ht 
train at a grade crossing in the Gcuntry, K wa.s guilty of contributory negligenC•3 
as a matter of law, but by Vf/'56.,hl4 nuch negligence is not a bar if it is not V"lo 
sole cause of the accident and the ra:l.lway company has failed to give the signals 
required by statute. In SlJ.Ch a case, the contributory negligence of the driver 
must, however go in mitigation of damages~ · The jury found fo~ KTs personal repre-
sentative in the amount of ~~25,000. The~e were several w~tnesses of the accident 
some of whom were in cars w~th the windows down ~ and the drivers of which knew 
that the freight. train was c~ue and were listening for i t s signals. They testified 
that no signals wore given until after the train struck the car K was in. The 
crewmen testified to facts that would indicate that proper signals were given. There 
was thus a square conflict in the evidence~ (Since the 1.;i tnesses for the plaintiff 
were listening for the signals their evidence that no signals were given is not 
merely negative evidence to the effect that t hey heard no signals but positive 
evidence that the required signals were not given " 
Heid: Affirmed. Under these circums~ances the plaintiff with a jury verdict 
approved by the trial court in her f avor occupies the strongest position known to 
the law. There is credible evidence in support of the verdict and a complete con-
fltct in the evidence,. This 1 court will not usurp the role of the jury as a trier 
of facts and the weigher of test~nony . 
TORTS U~sulated Electric Wires 206 Va.l27 
p work~ior a sewage di sposai- plant. It was P's duty to keep the pipes of one 
of the tanks free of sludge. To do this he st.ood on a l edge of the tank and used a 
20 ft. squeegee to manipulate the sludge. The squeegee on the occasion in question 
became clogged with sludge and P raised i·~ from the sewa.ge to unclog it. There 
was an uninsu.lated high voltage elec t ric wire 16 feet above the ledge on which he 
worked or about 10 feet over his head . The squeegee came in contact with this wire 
and p was seriously injured. The wire Has located 8 f eet higher than the National 
Electrical Safety Code r equired f 0r uninsulated wires. The D Electric Co. had no 
notice that employees of the pla.nt used anything in their work that was apt to come 
into contact with the wires. Thus this case is dl sti nguishable from the orchard 
case where defendant had knowledge that metal ladders were used to thin apples and 
the trees were higher than the lines. 
Held: There was no primary negligence on the part of D and hence no l i ability. 
TORTS Po4l. 
TCRTS Contributory Negl ·j gence 206 Va"l39 
P h3.d the right of 1vay and supposed of aourse that D would yiel<! at the inter-
::; e~tion where P ' s and D's cars collided., Accordingly she paid no at·tention to what 
D was doing. D negligently failed to see P' s car and drove into her. 
Held: P is barred by her contributory negligence. Her own testimony proves her to 
have been contributory negligent. ·· The fact that one has the right of way does not 
absolve him from the duty of keeping a proper look out. 
TORTS Guest St ahJte 206 Va.l53 
P's inteDtate was a guest in D's car. D drove this car across an intersection 
controlled by a stop sign without properly looking to see if there was any approac~­
ing car. In a suit by P against D the Court instructed the jury that D owed a duty 
ofslight care to her guest to stop and look at the step sign, to keep her vehicle 
under proper control, and two other specified duties, and that if she .6ailed to t'I.C ~ 
slight care as to any one of these duties, then she uould be guilty of gross nr--:(:_.:_ Q 
gence, and, if this failure was the sole proximate cause of the accident then th~; 
verdict of the jury should be for P. 
Held: The instruction was erroneous. A failure to use slight care as to any on<') 
of the above duties would not necessarily mean that D was dri'lring with an utter 
disregard for the safety of her passenger G Since reasonable persons might dif'n c;-' ,. <:: 
as to whether or not D was guil·ty of gross neglig'O'Ince in entering the hight•my •.-· ! · .. l--
out properly looking the case l-Jas properly submitted to the jury on the issue •<' 
gross negligence. Reversed and remanded so that on the new trial proper inst~·t.~ ··,:i. .:Y':\: 
on the law of gross negligence can be given. 
TORTS Railway Crossings Co e 
Vl/'56- 16 provides that. if.f~a~ra~i~l~w::=a::y!:lra~~~~~~~ 
its rain approached a public crossin the ne li. en~-an.-i.n,}w:ed....per.soll.-S.1u,, .: .. ; c~n~ 
e a bar to h s ac u rather oea in mi ti ation of dama ges thereof. The' <'• 
signa s are spa ou 1.n detal so far as railway crossings in the country m 'd 
concerned. a it o incorporated town has no ordinance then common law ~ 
applicable f the Ci a...a i ance e that ordinance sets fo l'l.:.l1 t-h~ 
du Y• P was injured while crossi ng nvs tracks in the City of Staunton.. P's view 
o~tracks was blocked by a warehouse and a box car on a siding in front of the 
warehouse. A city ordinance forbade the blowing of train whistles in the city un-
less necessary to sound a warning in an emergeney or near e:ii:r:1rgency~ In the ins~: a.n~,;. 
case no whistle was blown and there was a conflict in t ha evJ.dence as to v1hethe1· e J.• 
not the bell was sounded as required by ordinance. Th r~ tri2I court inst..;:·ucted t :rl<-'> 
jury that if they believe that a reasonable man .in the opera t 5.on of the train vmdd 
have sounded the whistle then P's contributory negligen~ e, if any, would not be a 
bar to his action but would only go in mitigation of d~nages. 
Held: Error and case reversed and remanded. An ordinance prohibting the sounding 
of a whistle except in an emergency by way of warning and not even speci fying the 
place, time o:.- r.1anner of sounding is not a law specifying what signals n,u ·~t be 
given. Rather it permits the railroad to give s i gnals that -would be proy:,e:::- at 
common law. Hence a failure of the engineer to blow the whistle even if :,here we:r0 
an emergency is not a failure to give signals required by law and no instructton C· .~ 
comparative negligence should have been gi ven wi th res pect to such failure. On the 
other hand the signals required by the ordinance are required by law(Mr. Justice 
Gordon doubt.ing) and on a retrial only the bell facts and law should be considered .. 
~~~u.J.:~..ill---L;L:.aL.~O-i:l.ucu..w..~~~~~~~1:lU~..!ti:r~ 206 Va. 220 
a privately owned shopping center par king 
lot failed to gi ve a signal tha ·C. she was about to turn. D ran into her. The Cour-t 
ins tructed the jury that it should find P was guilty of negl igence if she failed to 
give the si gnal. This instruction was based on the language of V/146.1- 216. The 
jury accordi ngly found for defendant. 
Held: Reversed and remar:ded. The motor vehicle traffic laws are not applicable 
to cars bei ~iYen...on -:R ivate prop~_:!iy . T~e1·e common la~ princi ples apply. 
ere is no absolute dutf at common law to give s i gnals. 'l'he Court's instr:uctf on 
TOR'rS P ~42 • 
pravented P from properly arguing t.hat due care on her part under the circumstances 
Ciid mot require the jury of a signal. 
TOR.TS Du~ Owed Social Guest 143 S.E.2d 827,206 Vao 450 
P e>.nd "117 f amily were visiting D, a friend, at D's invitation. D had a horse named 
13i3uckshot11 • After the children had been taken for rides without mishap D invited P 
to ride Bu¢kcb.ot. He did not question P about her riding experiences or vmrn her 
that Buckshot was nervous and high spirited. He gave P a fevJ directions ar,d helped 
her mount the horse. P held the reigns too high. This was thought by Buckshot to 
mean that he should take off. He did and P fell from the ho1•se as he was making a 
normal turn at fairly high speed. There was no evidence that Buckshot was a vicious 
horse. The trial court inst ructed the jury that P could not recover unless D was 
(lll i..lty of gross negligence. 
: Held: Error to give such an instruction in the above case. A ~istinction ~s 
drawn between the passive negligence of noLusing-due_can to Jla,y_e~remi~in a 
re~sonabl safe condition for a licensee, and active ne i ence with r ect o a 
l ipensee1an invited soc~a guest is not an invitee but a licensee) kpown to be 
p~In this latter case there is a duty to use ordinary care· not to injure the 
licensee. Whether or not such care had been used, and whether or not P assumed the 
risk, and whether or not P was guilty of contributory negligence were under the 
above fact.s questions for a jury. Reversed and remanded. 
TORTS Cop tributory Hegligence 4 s Matter of Law 143 S.E.2d 839; 206 Va. 336 
P, a northbound motorist, l'll'hile roads were I n an icy condition observed that while 
D on his right had the rig4t of way at the crossing in quest,ion the latter had come 
to a stop while P was some car lengths from the crossing. P erroneously assumed 
that D was waiving his fight of way and did not lessen the speed of his car. P 
struck D's car as it entered the highway in front of hiso 
Held: P is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The fact that D 
was extra cautious under the circumstances did not warrant P in being extra careless. 
TORTS Pleadipg fWd IXagtJ,ce T~.>fr . L ~ _s 143 s.E.2d 866,206 Va. 344 
Mrs. C owned a car. She, F, a 17 ye~ld"youth, and several others consumed 16 
cans of beer over a three or four hour period, but there was no evidence as to how 
much of this beer, if any, T had drunk, or that T was in fact drunk when he later 
drove Mrs. Cts car at some 80 miles per hour causing it to overturn in an accident 
in which Mrs. C was killed. Her administratrix sued T. Although T requested 
instructions on contributory negligence and assumption of risk, the trial judge 
refused them. 
I 
HeJld: Properly refused. Instructions should never be __give~unless there is evidenc ' 
to which they are applicable. In t e instant c ase there is no eviaence that Mrs. C 
knew that T was unfit to dri ve. To give the instructions asked for would be to in-
vite tho jury to find a verdict based on guess and conjecture. 
TOR.TS Dut~ed Sgg1al X!isj tor 143 S.E.2d 872, 206 Va. 425 
P, a t we ~year old boy, was at D's home as a fri end of D's son watching D remove 
the motor from a power lawnmower for use elesewhere. When D was unable to dislod ge 
a portion of the me~hanism he took a large screwdriver, and attempted to pry it loose 
The two boys were watching, and D then told them to get back-~not because it was un-
safe to be so close, but because they were in the way. The boys then stood up, and 
D struck the blade end of the screwdriver a sharp, hard blow with a hammer. A piece 
of the screwdriver was shattered and severely injured P 1s eye. The jury awarded P 
$20,000 and pts father $5,000 having found that D failed to use due care and that P 
was not guilty of negligenoee 
Held: Affirmed. This case involves the same principles as the ~est-host horse 
injury case decided this date. Even thou a mere licensee(an invited social 
guest who is itee there was a duty owed to him by D no njure him by 
negl e y_ cond activi J.es in hi s ~sence. 
.1 . ,, TORTS Page 43. 
TORTS ~~~ 206 Va.370o 
P, while ~ ing his car, decided to pull off the road to examine a road map. He 
slowed down gradually while looking for a suitable place. He was struck by D from 
behind. P did not give:· any signal as he had nop yet decided where he was going to 
stop or turn. Did such conduct on P1 s part bar an action against D? 
Held: No. The statutes(V#4 6.1-216 ~nd 211) QO not reqaire one to signal every slow 
down in speed, but onl sto d turns wb.en_sJlch.-.S.to.ps_an rns may effect other 
tra 1.c. A gradual slow down is not a stop within a meaning of t.he s a uw.-
~
TORTS Landlord and Tenant 206 Va.412. 
P, a ff~year ol d gJrl, is a daughter of T, a tenant in L1s apartment house. The 
lease contained a provision to the effect that children were not to be allowed to 
play in or on the common passageways. One of these passageways had a railing set :tn 
three inches from the side to protect its users from a four foot fall. P, and other 
children, played on the railing and the outside 3 inch ledge. P fell and was in-
jured. L's supervisor had repeatedly warned children not to play on the railing or 
ledge, but they would frequently come back as soon as she was out of sight. P con-
te~ded that L was negligent in not providing a safe railing for the children to 
play on, in not policing the area properly, and in not notifying the parents of the 
children. 
Held: For L. He was under no duty to provide a safe r~ng_f.o the-Children Jvo 
pl~-A railing is not meant to be played o~.. The duty of supervision of the 
chl~dren was on the parents and they should not ge' allowed to shift it to third 
parties. L was not an insu _r_o.Lthe_sat:ety-o.f-all_tlJ.~ildren.. in.Jlis---.a:Rartmen"l:, 
hp~ 
TORTS CoQtributory Negligence--Passing in Interse9!ion 2U6 Va.613. 
While dr1.V1.ng south on Aberdeen Road, a two way street having one lane of travel 
in each direction. P attempted to pass the car in fron of him. P had not completed 
this act when he came to the intersection of Galax Street with Aberdeen Rd. and D, 
who was traveling west on Galax St. and attempting to turn north on Aberdeen Rd., 
collided with P in the intersection. A jury returned a verdict for P. 
Held: Judgment reversed. P was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of 
law. There was no conflict in the evidence on the critical point that the collision 
occurred in the northbound lane, within the intersection, and while P was still in 
the act of passing. P was thus uilt of reckless drivin as defined by Code 
46.1-190, by · ntersection, and also violated the "Rules of the Road,n 
Code 46.1-205, in failing to~avel on the right side of the highway when crossing 
a intersect on'. The violation of either of these statutes is negligence sufficient 
to support a civil action if suCh negligence was the proximate cause of the injury 
sustained. It is clear that P was guilty of negligence and equally plain that hie 
negligence was a proximate, efficient cause of the accident. 
TORTS--Railway crossing 206 Va.649. 
A switching cperatlon was in progress on the eastbound tracks of the D railway 
company as plaintiff approached the crossing from the south and he was forced to 
stop his truck. When the end of the last unit of the switching train cleared the 
crossing, plaintiff immediately started forward notwithstanding the presence of a 
reflector sign reading '"2 tracks,., and the continued operation of the flashing red 
lights and ringing bell. He passed over the eastbound tracks safely but, as he 
drove onto the westbound tracks, his truck was struck by a westbound freight, in-
flicting permanent i njuries on him. D introduced positive evidence that the west-
bound freight gave the required statutory signals while plaintiff's evidence con-
sisted of statements by persons otherwise engaged that they didn't hear any such 
signals. A jury found for defendant and plaintiff appeals claiming that, even 
though he is guilty of negligence, yet under the saving provisions of 56-416 he is 
not barred from recovery if defendant failed to give the statutory signal. 
Held: Judgment affirmed. There was no positive contradiction of the positive 
evidence that the statutory signals were 8iven. Plaintiff had no right to have a 
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jury speculate upon the insufficiency of the warnings given in the absence of evi-
dence of their inadequancy. Moreover, even if the signals were not given, plainti ff 
must still prove that the railroad's negligence was the proximate cause of the 
accident and that but for it the accident wouldn't have occurred in order to recover 
under 56-416. Here, plaintiff's conduct in ignoring the imp~rative warning of the 
signals without any reasonable excuse amounted to an utter abandonment of care and 
caution. He might as well have intentionally driven his truck in front of the 
approaching train. His negligence was such as to constitute the BC·le proximate 
cause of his injuries. 
TORTS--Loss throu h re ossessi"n of ro ert 206 Va.c-65. 
Plaintiff, who was engaged in the bus ness o hauling coal and sand, was involved 
in an accident with D which resulted in his hospitalization and a twenty to thirty 
per cent general disability. Plaintiff's equipment was purchased on conditional 
sales contract and about )0 days after the accident a tractor and two trailers were 
repossessed by the conditional vendors because plaintiff had failed to keep up his 
payments. At the time of the accident there was a substantial unpaid balance on 
the 3 vehicles and plaintiff was several months behind in his payments. Plaintiff's 
adjusted gross income for 1961 and 1963 was $32 and $1451 respectively and in 1962 
he showed a loss of $953. D claims that the trial court erred in admitting, over he~ 
objection, evidence as to the alleged damages resulting from the repossession of 
these 3 vehicles because such losses were a remote and not a proximate cesult of th~ 
collision. 1 
Held: Judgment for plaintiff on this item reversed. Negligence carries with it 
liability for conse uences which in the light of attendant circumstances,~could 
reas na ly have been antici ated b a rudent man bu no for casual s w c 
though possible were wholl~ i pr~bab~e. One is not charged with foreseeing that 
whiCh could not be expected to happen. It is apparent from the evidence that 
plaintiff was not conducting a profitable business, and it would be highly specula-
tive to say that if he had not been injured in the accident he would have been able 
to keep up the payments on the vehicles and prevent repossession of them. Moreover, 
even if it be assumed that plainitiff's future profits would have been sufficient 
to enable him to meet his installment payments, it cannot be said with any degree 
of certainty that he would have applied the profits to these obligations. Illness 
or unforeseen emergencies could have arisen which would have required the consumption 
of all the profits to the exclusion of the conditional sales obligations. Therefore 
these alleged losses were speculative, remote, and not the natural and proximate 
result of any wrongful act on D's part. 
TORTS•Gross Ne~l~gence 206 Va.693. 
Plaintiff, aefendant, and defendant's wife were riding in the front seat of a Ford. 
Defendant was driving, his wife sat in the middle and plaintiff sat by the right 
door. Aoccording to plaintiff's version after defendant had stopped for a stop sign, 
he took off at a high rate of speed, spinning the wheels of the car; he asked de-
fendant to slow down but defendant just laughed and went faster; when they reached a 
11 S11 curve in the road about o4 1l1f a mile from the stop sign the car was traveling 
between 55-65 m.p.ho and skidded on the first part of the curve; plaintiff again 
asked defendant to slow down but defendant laughed again and kept going faster; that 
defendant lost control of the car on the second curve, plaintiff's door flew open 
and defendant's wife was thrown against plaintiff causing him to fall out of the car 
and be seriously injured. Defendant's wife's testimon ~'Y corroborated plaintiff's. 
Defendant denied that he was driving in the manner claimed and stated that his top 
speed was 45 m.p o h~, that the car hadn't the power to perform as plaintiff alleged, 
that plaintiff had only asked him to slow down so plaintiff could take a drink and 
that there was nothing wrong with the door latch on the car. The jury found for 
plaintiff and defendant appeals claiming that he was not guilty of gross negligence 
and, even if he were, it wasn't the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. 
Held: Judgment for plaintiff affirmed. Proof of gross negligence depends on the 
facts and circumstances of each case. Here the jury was justified in finding that 
defendant's excessive speed, failure to heed protests, and deliberate inattention 
TORTS P. 45. 
to his driVing constituted gross negligenc~. - !~der for defendan~gligence to 
be a rox te cause of the i ur it i~ no~ __ t!_ecessary that he should have forseen 
the precise injury that_happe:n_ed. It is suffit!fent if any-or diniry; -careftiland 
prudent person ought, under the circumstances, to have foreseen that an injury might 
probably result from the negligent act. "It is a matter of common knowledge that it 
is impossible to drive an automobile around a curve, at a high or suddenly acceler-
ated rate of speed, without going off the traffic lane, or sliding, or causing 
passungers to shift or lurch in their seats, or be tossed about or -;;hrown against 
one another, or against the car doors,; and the courts take judicial notice thereof." 
TORTS--MeglQal Malpractice--Statut of Limita ons 206 Va.810 
After Doctor D had performed a go er operati on on plaintiff in 1946 she had pain 
and a stinging sensation in her throat. She told Dr. D about it several times but 
he said she was doing fine and would be all right. Later in 1949 she told Dr. H 
about a lump in her throat when he ~perated on her neck for the removal of cancerous 
tissue but he also said it was due to her earlier operation and would be all right. 
In May 1962, Dr. X discovered that plaintiff's troubles were due to a misplaced 
surgical needle. Dr. K operated on plaintiff in Oct. 1963, and removed the needle. 
He testified that the 1946 and 1949 incisions were close together, that the muscle 
in which the needle was found would have been disturbed in both operations, and 
that he couldn't say whieh one it was related to. Dr's D and H both testified that 
the scrub nurse kept a count of all needles and that to the best of his knowledge n~ 
needle was lost in his operation. Plaintiff brought this action against Dr. D in 
March 1963 and now appeals the granting of summary judgment for Dr. D on the groundG, 
inter alia, that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. 
-:Heid:-Jlldgment for Dr. D affirm~d. Virginia is committed to the (mi1or~ule 
that in ersonal in tiona the limftati on on the right to sue beg~n 
when the wrong is done and not when the plaintiff discovers e-ha-s- been da-maged. 
nS'tatutes o£ Iiiriitation are statutes of repose, the object of wh1Ch is f;o compel the 
exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time. They are designed to · ~ 
suppress fraudulent and stale claims from being asserted after a great lapse of 
time, to the surprise of the parties, when the evidence may have been lost, the 
facts may have become obscure because of defective memory, or the witnesses have 
died or disappearedtt(l8S Va.S61). Plaintiff's evidence completely failed to 
establish that Dr. D concealed plaintiff's cause of action from her by trick or 
artifice which would have tolled the statute. 
TORTS-Right of Way ~~ ~ 206 Va.737. 
Code 46:1-221 provitles that w~en 0wo vehicles approach or enter an intersection 
"at approximately the same time", the man on the right has the right of way(with 
certain exceptions). Does this mean that the driver on the left has the right of 
way if he enters the intersection first? 
Held: No. In such a situation neither driver has the right of way over, or is 
required to yield to, the ohBer. Each is under the duty to exercise ordinary care 
to avoid a collision. (Note: If the driver on the left enters the intersection 
slightly before the driver on the right does, the latter would still have the right 
of way because the two vehicles would have approached or entered the intersection 
»at approximately the same timen with~meaning of the statute. 
TORTS--Violation of Ordinance &~ <il._L) 206 Va.9.Sl 
A city ordinance requ~red that all ~~tops be clearly marked with signs indicat-
ing them as such. V Bus Company, a common carrier within the city, had an agree-
ment with the City Board of Education to pick up children at school and discharge 
them at convenient places along the route, some of which were not marked as bus 
stops. P, a boy of 12, got safely off the bus at one such stop, and then suddenly 
ran across the street in fron of the bus and into the aide of an automobile sus-
taining serious injury. P sued the bus co~pany on the theory that, since n~ sign 
had been erected, there was no definite proof that this stop had been authorized in 
the agreement with the School Board. Consequently the ordir~nce had been violated 
and the violation led to the injury. 
TORTS P.46 
Held: P cannot recover. The violation of an ordinance constitutes actionable neg-
ligence only when it injures someone of the class to be protected by the ordinance's 
enactment. The city ordinance was not :enacted so that the plaintiff might be 
benefited, nor for school children in general. It was rather enacted so that the 
public might know where one alights from or boards buses. The fact that there was 
no sign did not have any direct relationship to the driver's care and so is not 
actionable negligence. Nor was the driver bound to keep P on the bus since the 
passenger on a common carrier may alight at any stop which he desires, be he infant 
or adult. 
TORTS ~d ~r- 207 Va.343 
D owned property u~n which he maintained a residence for X, his mother. He re-
tained complete control of the property and performed all maintenance thereon. In 
the course of this upkeep, D erected an iron pipe which protruded some distance 
from the ground~ Six months later, P, a frequent visitor, paid an evening visit to 
X, but, at the suggestion of X~ left her car in a different place from the usual 
parking area, a place where her entrance wa s much nearer the pipe~ In the darkness 
P failed to see the pipe and tripped over it, injuring her leg thereon. P brings 
this action against D for negligence in not warning her about the pipe, despite the 
fact that it had been there for six months. fw"' f "-.4 
Held: For P. A social guest is only a lic•ensee and not an invitee.Lf(t'rice there is 
n~ duty u12on +.be .. pos:o lilssor to make the premises safe for such a person and he ie 
li2 ble only for wil lful or wanton injuries. However, the court, relying on Restate-
of Torts 2d 342, notes several e=tioQ~ to this general rule. The one here 
applicable concerns dangers not ~rent to the licensee and which the possessor 
knows or has reason to know, might create a hazard- Here D is held as the putative 
head of the family and~ thus, under a duty as a posses~or to warn the licensee of 
any danger of which he has knowledge and which P might not. P, parking in a differ-
ent area, was placed . in an imminent danger of which D should have known and P was 
under a duty to warn her. 
TORTS 207 Va.491. 
As D approached an intersection, the traffic light changed from green to amber. 
D applied his brakes and found them ineffective. His car careened into the inter-
section and collided with P's car. P brought an action for damages and, during the 
presentation of evidence, D admitted that he had tried his brakes earlier and 
found them to be only half-pedal, though he thought he had enough brake to stop 
him. After the evidence had been presented D's counsel asks for an instruction 
telling the jury that a presumption of due care attaches to the D and follows him 
throughout every stage of the trial only to be overcome by a preponderance of the 
evidence. D's counsel also asks for a sudden emergency instruction and court 
grants both. 
HeldJ(l) As to the presumption of due care instructions, reversed. Here the un-
disputed evidence proved that D ran through a red light. This is a violation of 
statute and makes out a prima facie case of negligence. At this point, the burden 
of goi ng forward with the evidence on the issue of negligence switches to D to 
show why he broke the law. 
(2) The defense of sudden emergency is proper here. Though only available to a 
party completely without fault in causing the emergency, it could be used here 
eince D was found by the jury to be faultless. D testified that the brake was 
half-pedal but he had enough to stop when he checked it earlier, and the jury 
found him without negligence in creating the emergency. 
TORTS jt-4 / tc,~ ·- {; s w ~«-- "-ff;: 'l. ---201 va.534. While shopping 1n D Supermarket, P heard a soft p an~~t a pain in her leg. 
Looking down, she saw a piece of glass with a bott cap on it sticking in her leg. 
p sued D Bottling Company for damages and during the evidence, testified that the 
bottles in her own wagon were intact and she saw nothing prior to the accident 
which would indicate where the glass came from. D Supermarket's manager testified 
that he found a carton sitting on the floor near the accident, with two broken 
TORTS P. 47. 
bottles, that the last drink delivery had been 5 days previous, and that customers 
often moved the cartons on the display shelf and left the shelf in disarray. The 
jury found for P and D appeals on the ground that P failed to show D's negligence 
caused the injuty. 
Held: Reversed. N~ligence cannot be presumed from the mere happening of an 
accident. The doctrine o! res 1psa loquitur does not apply i n the case of an un-
explained accident attributable to one of several causes, for some of which the 
defendant may not be responsible. In such cases it is incumbant on the plaintiff to 
show why an accident happened. Here P showed only that a bottle exploded, not 
which bottle or where it was located. 
TORTS 207 Va.567. 
P owned a farm, bordering on the D railroad's right of way, on which he had a 
large tomato crop. In order to kill some weeds within this right of way, D sent tts 
spray train past P's farm spraying the right of way with brush killer. P's evidenGe 
tended to prove that on the day in question "a pretty good breezett was blowing 
which caused the spray to drift onto his crop; that on walking through the fields 
the spray could be seen on the tomato plants; that within three or four days after 
the spraying the leaves on a substantial number of his plants withered and the 
blossoms turned black and dropped off; and that the plants showed no sign of 
disease prior to the spraying. D introduced evidence of due care in his spraying 
operations and that an examination of the field three months later showed signs of 
disease typical of early blight which was confirmed by laboratory tests. The court 
gave the following instruction which D claims was error. 
"'The Court instructs the jury that if the instrumentality which caused P's damage 
was in the control of D, and the damage was such as would not ordinarily occur if 
reasonable care was used by D, and D alone had the means of discovering how and 
why it happened, the jury may infer that the damage was due to some negl~gence of D. 
Held: The fundamental issue in the case was whether the damage was caused by the 
spray as P asserted, or by the blight, as D claimed. 
The · es not a 1 where 
i the 
TORTS,~ages 207 Va.602. 
D con racted to pave a portion of highway for the State. D in turn contracted with 
i to supply crushed rock. X leased some land adjacent to P's farm and began the 
operation. D located his asphalt plant on this same land for convenience. P brought 
an action of nuisance against the quarry and asphalt plant for damages caused his 
farm from substance emitted from the two operations, which settled on his farm. 
(1) D contends that since he had contracted with the Commonwealth for the performanc 
of public work, he is entitled to share in the immunity of the state from liability 
for incidental injuries necessarily involved in the performance of the contract. 
(2) D also · contends that P cannot recover because he has failed to show how much 
damage, if any, was caused by either X's quarry or D's plant. 
Heldt No as to (1) The operation of the asphal t plant an tbe lease ~Fena-s~s as 
not essential to the performance of the contract with the state. Onl those 
ac 1. · 1a to the erformance of a corrti:ac...t_w.i:th.__:the__stat arfL.Jmtl:U.ed" to 
twmun1tx• onvenience does not amount to necessi ty. Hence there is no immunity in 
this case. Aa~o (2) D's contention is valid. There is a distinction between joint 
~ortfeasors and joint contributors to a muisance. Jqint tortfeasors can each be eld liable for the whole damage whether they_acted-in-conce t-ar--not~ However, here persons maintaining a nuisance act independently, as did D and X, there must e evidence on which to apportion the damages resulting from the conduct of each. 
TORTS P. 48. 
TORTS--"~t For Rule" 207 Va.616 
A negl{iently stored 40,000 feet of primacord in a loft of W's factory. w had 
stored 50 tons of ammonium nitrate in ,another part of the factory. A fire in the 
factory resulted in the explosion of the primacord and the ammonium nitrate which 
caused damage to P's home 2 mile away~ Evidence was introduced that primacord will 
detonate from a shock of ~ the magnitude required to deonate ammonium nitrate, that 
ammonium nitrate can be detonated by fire and heat, but primacord can't. The last 
person to view the scene testified that the ammonium nitrate was on fire and burning 
fiercely and that the primacord made only a small contribution to the total con-
cussion. The jury returned a verdict for P against both A and w. The trial court 
set aside the verdict as to A. 
Held: Affirmed. Negligence and an accident do not make a case. A person 1 not 
liable unless but for his ne ligent ac thaJha~Quld not have oc~urred. There 
- -must be a ca usa connection. The evidence shows that the ammunium rii~rate was 
burning firecely, and that primacord cannot be detonated by fire and heat. Thus P ~ 
is left only with the argument that the fire caused the loft to collapse, and the 
subsequent shock from the fall caused the primacord to detonate, and this in turn~ 
caused the detonation of the ammonium nitrate. While this is possible, it is only 
speculation. The ammonium nitrate could just as easily have caused the detonatiop 
of the primacord. Applying the "but fo~' test to thi~ case, only if it could be ~ 
shown that the primacord detonated first and then detonated the ammunium nitrate, 
would A's negligence in storing the primacord have been a cause in fact of the 
damages sustained by P's house. 
TORTS--Malicious Prosecut ion / ~~ 207 Va.679. 
P and ngr f amily were visiti~Th:~·stopped at D's Supermarket and P 
went in to purchase some presents. She pa~d for them and left the store. tater P 
returned to D Supermarket where she made another purchase. She removed the prior 
pureh.a«ss from her pocketbook, took out some money and paid for the purchases. As 
she was leaving the store, P was stopped by a security officer who accused her of 
stealing the prior purchaseSJP;owho was Italian and did not speak English fluently, P 
protested, but agreed to go to the s tore office. The store manager was called, and 
P further protested to him. She was not allowed to go back to the car and get the 
sales slip, and no effort was made to go out to the car where P's family waited and 
where the sales slip was. The police were called and P was taken into custody, 
fingerprinted, photographed and placed in a jail cell. She was later released on 
bond. She was tried for petit larceny and promptly acqu·itted~he then filed a 
motion for judgment against D Supermarket and asked for compensatory and punitive 
damages. 
Held: P should be allowed compensatory damages. The~ as t~se for 
prosecution is whether the facts and circumstances known, or made known to the 
prosecutor are sufficient to justify a prudent and reasonable man that the accused 
is guiltyof the crime chargedF Mere belief or impression that the accused is guilty, 
as D argued, is not sufficient. The evidence in this case shows the opportunity of 
D to have obtained information which would have invalidated any belief. 
legal malice may be inferred from the want of probable cau The conduct of the 
security guard i nvalid any c a1m tf.lal-- e acted- as a reasonable and prudent man. 
His disregard of information communicated to him constituted an aggravatsd circum-
stance which supports the jury's finding and warranted an inference of legal malice. 
~euer, there must be ac ice in er to~~ran p~niti~e da~ages. There 
must be indication of personal ill will or a r eckless disregard for P's r i ghts. 
Although the security officer was not performing his duties in a reasonable manner, 
it cannot be said that he acted with actual mali ce. He did not know P and had 
never seen her before. 
TORTS 207 Va.720. 
P suffered a compens~ble injury under the Workman's Compensation Act, while at 
work and was sent to the doctor by his employer. After P's injury had healed he 
was allowed to leave work to visit the doctor to have the stitches taken out of his 
wound. On the way to the doctor's office, in his personal car, P suffered a blackout 
TORTS P. 49. 
and in the ensuing accident was further injured. P admitted that he had been subject 
to these blackouts for a number of years prior to the accident. The Industrial 
Commission awarded P compensation for these addition injuries and the employer and 
his carrier appeal. 
Held: Affirmed. The requirement of the Act that the employer furnish the employee 
medical attention is read into the contract between them. When the employer di:;:o:; ta 
or authorizes the employee to seek medical attention for a work-connected injury 
and the employee follows such direction, they are but fulfilling the reciprocal 
obligations of the act and this contract. An additional injury suffered by the 
employee while fulfilling such an obligation is work-connected and arises out of 
and in the course of employment. Nor is the result changed because P's additional 
injuries were caused by a black-out resulting from a vascular condition. This :i. s 
analogous to an injury suffered as a result of a fall on the job caused by a bJ ..=,'·•l:-. .• 
put. The basic rule in a fall ~e is that the effect of such a fall is compens-~ ~L~ 
if the empl oyment places the employee in a position increasing the dangerous 
effects of such a fall, such as on a height, near machinery or in a moving vehi C': ::.2. .~ 
Yc57 J~ s-c.o 
TORTS Deceit 153 S~E.2d 2l b 
P's were interested in the purchase of Blackacre, a house and lot. They inqui~ed 
of D, the real estate agent and inspected the house casually. In agreeing to purchas£ 
the house, they signed a form contract of sale, which stated that if termite damage 
was discovered, the purchaser could rescind the contract. D addressed a letter to 
P's which informed them that a termite inspection bureau reported the house had been 
treated for termites after some had been discovered and had continued under treat-
ment for ten years under a guarantee. The letter also said, "If the Bureau's report 
did not sp~cify that there was termite damage, then there was no termite damage. 
p took possession and discovered extensive termite damage. P then brought an action 
against D ~lleging that they were deceived by the report of the bureau and the 
statements of the agent and relied on these facts to their detriment. They also in-
troduced evidence to show that D had concealed a report or Orkin which told of 
termite damage. They further alleged that, had they known all this, they would have 
rescinded the contract. 
Held: If a purchaser given or secures information as to condition of 
a y prudent men~ he is then 
un true eon iti0i1- anacann"()-t'rely upon- the statements 
o~. ~t]ver, the fresence and activity o term1tes are matters_uPQn which 
opinions of exper __ are requ1red. Xiso, if the vendor says or does anything to 
throw a purchaser off his guard or divert him from making inquiries or examinations 
as did D in this case, then the purchaser is not bound to discover the true condi-
tion for himself, even though he has information which would excite the suspicions 
of reasonably prudent men. The statements of the agent and his concealing of the 
Orkin report concerning the termite damage to the house were designed to throw 
the P's off guard, Furthermore his statements were of fact and not mere opinion and 
the P's were entitled to rely upon them. 
. TORTS P.SO 
TORTS Wilson v. Whittaker~ u,~;d~-<:-.. /A---"-·". "' /JIL . . 2t5Tr -Va.lo,a2,.1v/4 In an action under the VlTglnfa death by wroogtuf aMS ~~e ~ puni ii/s as ' 
well as compensatory damages allow~ble? 
No, Onlf compensatory Qama.ges are allowable as .:the statute--G~eates-a-new_r.ight-in 
d~erit reRrea~~tive to be com 1ensated for the lops; it does not cause decedent~ 
right of action to survive. 
TORTS Elder v. Holland 155 S.E.2d 369 
D, a state police officer, testifying in ~n administrative hearing repeated defama-
tory words that another party had spoken about P, the person being investigated. 
Is D liable in an action for commo~law defamation and under the Virginia statute 
of insulting words? 
Testimony during an administrative hearing, as opposed to a judicial proceeding, 
is only qualifi·ed privileged, not absolutely privileged, but to recover P must 
show actual malice on the part of D. 
TORTS Easterling v. Walton 
P was operated on by D, a surgeon. About 1 year later x-raya disclosed a lap pad 
sponge embedded in the area of the operation performed by D. ~elies on ~ ipsa 
loquitor to show liability. 
Held: For P. For the first time Virginia held that when a fa~ign_aubject is left 
in-AJ!tient's botcy;~ne li ence i}3 inferred and expert testimony i,!.__!!Qj; p.ece!'Jsary ~ 
~oh it.. -~/L ' Jl_. Jli;J t== ~ _ - ,.__, ,_ 
RTS ~ 208 Va.352. 
P, a four year old infant,sustained injuries when she was attacked on a public 
sidewalk in the city of Norfolk by an unattended and unleashed dog. A Norfolk 
ordinance subjects an owner to a fine if his dog shall go at large upon any public 
street of the city unless such dog is accompanied by an attendant or held in leash 
by a responsible person. Relying on this ordinance P (by her next friend) brought 
action to recover damages for her personal injuries. The trial court instructed the 
jury that D's violation of the ordinance constituted negligence and that they should 
return a verdict for p if they believed such negligence proximately contributed to 
her injuries. The jury found for plaintiff, and D appeals contending the court 
~ erred in instructing the jury that .violation of the ordinance ~o:natituted negligence , 
Held: Judgment affirmed. Under Virginia law, violation of a statute or o.Fd1nance 
constitutes negligence per se. But failure to comply with the requirements of a 
legislative enactment dQes not "Coiistitute actionabl e neili~ence unless the inJured 
~rson is a member of a class (Qr whose benefit the legislation was enacted~ The 
purpose of the ordinance in question was to protect the public against hazards 
created by dog's running at large, including the most obvious hazard>dogbite. 
Persons such as P, who might be bitten by dogs running at large are therefor within 
the class intended to be protected by the statute. 
TORTS-negligence 208 Va.525 
D became ill while operating his car and lost consciousness, thereby colliding 
with P's parked car. P then charged D with negligence. 
Held: For D. Where a person suddenly and with no prior warning or reason to anti-
cipate it becomes ill, loses consciousness and has an accident, there is no 
negligence. 
TORTS--Death by wrongful Acts 159 S.E.2d 650. 
F, an experienced firefighter, died of burns suffered while fighting a fire 
negligently cause by C & 0. The forest warden who requested F's help testified that 
he and F had an understanding that F would help fight such fires, and that F had 
in fact helped on previous occasions. For this work F received compensation from 
the state. P, F's administratrix, now bri ngs an action for wrongful death against 
the C & o. 
Held: For 
